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1 Introduction 
In June 2010 the European Council approved the Europe 2020 strategy which defines 
the growth strategy of the European Union (EU) for a 10-year period. Europe 2020 suc-
ceeds the Lisbon strategy pursued from 2000 to 2010. One important constant in both 
strategies is the aim of boosting research and development (R&D) activities in order to 
foster growth of both productivity and jobs thereby assuring increased international 
competitiveness. The evaluation of the Lisbon strategy shows however, that one of the 
main goals, namely the goal to spend 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) for 
R&D, is clearly missed. In fact during the period from 2000 to 2010 the EU average 
remained almost constant, moving from 1.85% in 2000 to 1.9% in 2010 (European 
Commission, 2010a). On EU level, the evaluation report also identifies a “persistent 
inability to get innovation to the market and turn new ideas into productivity gains” (p. 
13). Moreover, the report shows that compared to other countries like the United States 
(US) or Japan, the gap in R&D intensity (R&D expenditure expressed as share of GDP) 
is still not closed with the difference being mainly a result of lower levels of private 
R&D investment. 
As a result, Europe 2020 contains many goals that were already included in the Lisbon 
strategy, among which is also the 3% goal as a means to develop an economy based on 
knowledge and innovation. The Commission points out clearly that in order to deliver 
the objectives of Europe 2020 it is vital to enhance key instruments such as the single 
market. Therefore they are willing to make use of specific competition policy which is 
supposed to assure that well-functioning markets support competition thereby providing 
incentives for innovation and growth. From an economist’s point of view, the relation-
ship between competition and innovation is not so clear though. In the relevant literature 
there is a long lasting discussion about how innovation incentives are shaped by compe-
tition in a product market. Depending on the assumptions about the type of innovation 
(e.g. cost-reducing vs. demand enhancing, step-by-step vs. non-step-by-step), the type 
of market structure before and after the innovation, the strength of patent protection or 
the dynamics of the innovation process, it is possible to establish negative, positive, u-
shaped or inverted u-shaped relations between product market competition and innova-
tion (Gilbert 2006; Vives, 2008; Schmutzler 2009, 2010). Traditionally, economic theo-
ry provides a rationale for a negative relationship between competition and innovation 
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incentives which builds on three main arguments. First, fierce competition leads to a 
reduction of profits and subsequently diminishes internal funding opportunities for in-
novation projects. Second; intense competition decreases the rents accruing from inno-
vation and third, it increases the uncertainty about competitors’ reactions on own inno-
vation activities. As a result firms with ex ante market power have a higher incentive to 
innovate which is referred to as the Schumpeterian effect or Schumpeter hypothesis II 
(see, e. g., Schumpeter, 1942; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980 ). Contrastingly, competition 
might encourage innovation, as it forces incumbents to innovate in order to keep their 
position ahead of established competitors or to avoid market entry of new competitors 
(Arrow, 1962). Recent studies link the effect of competition on innovation incentives 
also to a firms’ technological distance. That is, an increase of competition may have 
different effects on firms which apply the most efficient technologies compared to firms 
which are technologically lagging behind (Aghion, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2006). 
To make things even more complex, there are not only effects of horizontal competition 
that have to be taken into account when examining the innovation incentives of a firm 
but also effects of competition from downstream markets which are transmitted to verti-
cally linked markets via the relationship between suppliers and their buyers. Suppliers 
for instance, are increasingly confronted with larger buyers who possess buyer power. 
Buyer power refers to a situation with a downstream firm having monopsonistic power 
or bargaining power vis-à-vis its suppliers’. Monopsonistic power is characterised by a 
downstream market with just one active firm which is connected to an upstream market 
under perfect competition with numerous price taking firms (see e. g. Mas-Colell et al., 
1995). The main argument of this approach is that monopsonistic firms strategically 
reduce demand in order to maximise profits. However, this may not apply to most verti-
cal relationships. Hence, the bargaining approach emerged in order to reflect the very 
common habit to negotiate over prices and quantities in intermediate markets.1 This 
approach assumes that supplier and buyer negotiate bilaterally over prices and quantities 
of the respective good or service to be traded. Given that contracting between the sup-
plier and the buyer leads to joint profit, the split of the profit then depends on the bar-
gaining power of each contracting party. The strength of bargaining power is deter-
mined by the profits to be realised when the contract is made with an alternative suppli-
er or buyer. The higher such disagreement or outside-option payoffs in relation to the 
1 Björnerstedt and Stennek (2007) cite an estimation of The Economist that about 80 to 90% of all inter-
mediate goods are traded through extended term contracts. 
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counterparts payoffs the stronger the bargaining position of the respective contractor. 
According to this approach, buyer power results from the fact that more valuable out-
side options are at the disposal of the buyer thereby allowing the buyer to extract a larg-
er share of joint profits (Inderst and Valletti, 2007; Dobson and Inderst, 2008). As a 
result the distribution of bargaining power between contractors will influence incentives 
to carry out investments such as R&D because it has an effect on the appropriability of 
the rents accruing from these investments. At the same time, R&D activities may be a 
way for suppliers to increase their bargaining power as R&D is usually leading to lower 
production cost or improved product quality. This will result in a devaluation of the 
buyer’s outside options by decreasing the buyer’s profits from a contract with an alter-
native supplier. 
The European growth strategy Europe 2020 contains also instruments by which the de-
livery of the strategy’s objectives is backed up. One of those instruments is the flagship 
initiative "Innovation Union" which is intended to enhance framework conditions for 
innovation and R&D on one hand and the accessibility of financial means for research 
and innovation on the other hand. The implementation of this flagship initiative is sup-
posed to ensure “that innovative ideas can be turned into products and services that cre-
ate growth and jobs” (European Commission, 2010b; p. 12). To this end, the initiative 
encompasses among others actions on both EU and national level to support links be-
tween education (universities), business and research and innovation. The strengthening 
of these links is important as firms can benefit from connecting their own innovation 
activities to external know-how since doing so enables them to absorb innovation im-
pulses from other players in the innovation system. The increasing adoption of such 
cooperative behaviour is in sharp contrast to research and development carried out 
merely within the bounds of an enterprise. Literature reflects this change in enterprises’ 
innovation strategy in the concept of “open innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003). 
The implementation of open innovation activities is on one hand sparked by changes in 
enterprises’ economic environment: product lifecycles become shorter, technological 
opportunities emerge beyond enterprises’ traditional fields of expertise while at the 
same time competition intensifies (e. g. Calantone et al., 1997; Chatterji, 1996; Klein-
schmidt and Cooper, 1988; Ojah and Monplaisir, 2003). On the other hand the availabil-
ity of external knowledge resources increases. Highly qualified researchers and engi-
neers are more and more mobile, venture capitalists alleviate the commercialisation of 
new inventions and suppliers increasingly specialise thereby providing highly specific 
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services, materials and equipment (Chesbrough, 2003). Several studies have identified 
positive enterprise performance effects of incorporating external knowledge into inter-
nal knowledge stocks (e.g. Gemünden et al., 1992; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Love and 
Roper, 2004). A crucial element in the open innovation activities of firms is a firm’s 
search for external knowledge. A firm’s external knowledge search encompasses an 
“organization’s problem-solving activities that involve the creation and recombination 
of technological ideas” (Katila and Ahuja, 2002, p. 1184). Consequently, investments in 
problem-solving activities should result in favorable combinations and linkages of us-
ers, suppliers and other relevant actors in the innovation system. Laursen and Salter 
(2006) discuss the concepts of breadth and depth as important factors in a firm’s search. 
Leiponen and Helfat (2011) complement this view by extending the concept of breadth 
to innovation objectives. They find that the breadth of knowledge sources and of inno-
vation objectives positively influences innovation success at the firm level. Although a 
broader set of external sources and innovation objectives reduces the risk of unexpected 
developments, it has to be taken into account that a firm is constrained in terms of the 
capacity to absorb external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). 
This thesis is related to the instruments applied in Europe 2020 in order to reach the 
goals defined in the growth strategy: innovation incentives arising from competition and 
vertical relationships as well as the strengthening of links between actors in the innova-
tion system. The contribution of this work is to provide empirical evidence on the ef-
fects that can be expected to occur when these instruments are applied successfully. 
The first part of this thesis deals with the effects of bargaining in vertical relationships 
on suppliers’ R&D profitability and innovation incentives. So far, existing studies ne-
glect vertical relations and possible effects emanating from them. Section 2.1 studies 
how a supplier’s R&D profitability is affected by the strength of his bargaining position. 
To this end, the main determinants of suppliers’ bargaining power are identified, namely 
the market position and the concentration in the buyer portfolio. While the former will 
strengthen suppliers’ bargaining power, the latter has an adverse effect. Departing from 
results of theoretical and empirical literature concerning vertical relations between sup-
pliers and buyers, hypotheses are derived which are subsequently empirically tested. 
The effects of buyer power, i. e. a stronger bargaining position of the buyer compared to 
the supplier, on suppliers’ innovation incentives are considered in section 2.2. So far, 
this relationship has been discussed largely on theoretical ground while empirical evi-
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dence is rare. In addition, existing studies often lack an objective measure for buyer 
power on firm level but rather use either aggregated industry measures or firms' subjec-
tive assessment whether they are confronted with powerful buyers. Furthermore, anal-
yses of the relationship between buyer power and suppliers' incentives to innovate are 
mostly focused on particular industries which are perceived to be heavily affected by 
concentration processes among buyers. Also, effects due to high competition or intense 
R&D in buyer industries are neglected. 
In contrast to existing studies, section 2.2 applies objective measures that allow for dif-
ferent degrees of buyer power. Competition and technology intensity of buyer industries 
are taken into account and a first attempt to explore joint effects between buyer power 
and downstream industry environment is undertaken. Finally, the effects of buyer power 
on the suppliers' innovation incentives are disentangled into the effect on the decision to 
start innovation activities and the effect on the amount of resources spent on innovation. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the effects of horizontal competition on firms’ innovation in-
centives. One of the difficulties in such a study is the measurement of competition. We 
compare a recently proposed competition measure on industry level – the profit elastici-
ty (Boone; 2008) with a traditional firm level competition measure, namely the price 
cost margin. In addition, recent studies hint in the direction that innovation incentives 
are not only affected by competition effects but also by a firm’s technological distance 
as well as the technological spread between firms within an industry (Aghion et al., 
2005; Acemoglu et al., 2006). Therefore we also test how a firm’s technological dis-
tance and the technological spread within an industry may interact with competition 
effects. 
Chapter 4 investigates the links between actors in the innovation system and how they 
can be successfully exploited by enterprises. We argue that firms’ knowledge search 
targets particular knowledge sources (e.g. customers, universities, suppliers) depending 
on both the type of innovation and the sector they are active in. To this end, we integrate 
the role of knowledge search into particular sectoral patterns of innovation which are 
derived from a novel typology of sectoral patterns of innovation (Castellacci, 2008; 
2010) and distinguish between imitation and new-to-market innovation output. 
A summary of the chapters’ findings and subsequent conclusions are presented in chap-
ter 5. 
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2 Bargaining in vertical relationships 
This chapter presents work on issues of bargaining in vertical relationships and deals 
with effects on suppliers’ R&D profitability as well as innovation incentives in particu-
lar. 
Section 2.1 links bargaining in vertical relationships to suppliers’ R&D profitability. 
Section 2.2 is a joint work with Christian Rammer and investigates the effects of buyer 
power on a supplier’s innovation incentives taking into account the market environment 
of the buyer. 
2.1 Bargaining in vertical relationships and suppliers’ R&D 
profitability 
2.1.1 Introduction 
R&D is considered to be one of the most important drivers of firm productivity and 
consequently of economic growth and welfare. Thus, considerable amounts of public 
spending are directed towards programmes promoting R&D investment on firm level. It 
is by no means clear however, whether R&D investments are profitable since the costs 
are high, the outcome is uncertain, the risk of failure is considerable and profits accruing 
from these investments typically have a significant time lag compared to other types of 
investment.  
It is well known that the profitability of R&D strongly depends on the market environ-
ment of the firm. Traditional industrial organization literature emphasizes the im-
portance of market concentration and entry barriers for firm profitability (for an over-
view see Schmalensee, 1989) and this has been shown to be important for the profitabil-
ity of R&D as well (Grabowski and Müller, 1978; Conolly and Hirschey, 1984; 
Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2010). Another factor that may be important – and which has been 
neglected in existing studies – is the relative bargaining power that an R&D performing 
firm possesses in negotiations about prices and quantities with its buyers. Such vertical 
relationships between suppliers and buyers receive growing attention from economists, 
especially since it has become accepted that larger buyers may benefit from buyer pow-
er. Often, the emergence of buyer power is attributed to concentration processes among 
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buyer firms (see e. g. Chipty and Snyder, 1999, Inderst and Wey, 2007). Such processes 
however are not sufficient for generating buyer power. In Germany for instance, one 
can observe that for a third of all firms the three largest customers account for 50-100% 
of their sales (Aschhoff et al., 2007). Such a concentrated customer structure may lead 
to buyer power as well, notably if the supplier is small and the buyer large. The execu-
tion of buyer power is seen as predominantly negative, since it lowers the profit of the 
suppliers, thereby lowering their investment incentives (OECD, 1998; European Com-
mission, 1999a). 
As R&D translates into new products or lower costs of production not only on the sup-
ply side but also on the buyer side, bargaining over the distribution of the accruing prof-
its along the supply chain between supplier and buyer may occur and affect the profita-
bility of suppliers’ R&D investments considerably. On one hand, if the buyer has the 
stronger bargaining position, i. e. he has buyer power, it is possible that large parts of 
the gains from a supplier’s R&D activity will be appropriated by the buyer. On the other 
hand, if the supplier has the stronger bargaining position it is possible that he can extract 
significant shares of the buyer’s profit. To the best of my knowledge, there is no study 
dedicated to the analysis of R&D profitability however, taking account of these oppor-
tunities. Hence, the main contribution of this paper is the integration of bargaining pow-
er in vertical relationships into the analysis of a suppliers’ R&D profitability. 
Section 2.1 will deal with two major research questions. First, which factors determine 
the bargaining position of a supplier in a vertical relationship and how do these factors 
affect a supplier’s profitability? Second, how does the bargaining position affect the 
profitability of supplier’s R&D investments? I will explore these questions empirically 
using a dataset of 472 German manufacturing firms which contains information on the 
relationship to their buyers. 
The next section presents existing empirical literature on the profitability of R&D. Sec-
tion 2.1.3 reviews theoretical and empirical findings on the impact of bargaining in ver-
tical relationships and derives empirically testable hypotheses how bargaining affects 
suppliers’ R&D profitability. The empirical approach is described in section 2.1.4, 
while results are presented in section 2.1.5. Concluding remarks are given in section 
2.1.6. 
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2.1.2 Literature overview 
Empirical studies dedicated to the analysis of the relationship between R&D or innova-
tion activities and firm profitability provide mixed results on the relationship between 
R&D, innovation and firm profitability. Most of these studies include to some extent 
measures capturing the horizontal market structure which is in line with traditional in-
dustrial organization literature that emphasizes the importance of market concentration 
and entry barriers for firm profitability (for an overview see Schmalensee, 1989). Verti-
cal relations and the possible consequences on suppliers’ bargaining power are not con-
sidered however. 
Among the studies using US data, Mansfield et al. (1977) assess the private and social 
returns of seventeen industrial innovations. They find pre-tax private returns ranging 
from negative values to 214% with a median of 25%. In 30% of the cases though, the 
private returns were so low that no firm in hindsight would have invested in that project. 
Nevertheless the social returns exceeded the private ones considerably, ranging from 
negative values to 307% with a median of 56%. Grabowski and Müller (1978) find a 
positive impact of R&D on adjusted profit rates of US firms. They also consider market 
concentration in order to test the hypothesis that R&D in combination with high concen-
tration may act as a catalyst of competition. They suggest that while there is a tendency 
of cartelistic behaviour in concentrated industries, R&D delivers an incentive to deviate 
from collusive agreements because it is difficult to coordinate between the cartelists. 
Hence, R&D can induce rivalry in otherwise cartelistic markets. This is supported by 
the empirical results. More evidence for this hypothesis is provided by Conolly and Hir-
schey (1984) who estimate a simultaneous equation model with R&D intensity, adver-
tising intensity, firm profitability and the concentration ratio as endogenous variables. 
With respect to the impact of R&D on firm profitability they find a positive effect of 
R&D. Jaffe (1986) estimates a three-equation model using a dataset of 432 US firms 
with patents, profit measured as the operating income before depreciation and market 
value as dependent variables. The results show that the average gross rate of return of 
R&D is 27%. The concentration rate measured as the four firm concentration ratio is 
negatively affecting firm profits. 
Evidence for Europe is provided by several papers employing data from the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS). Recent papers of Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010, 2012) use a 
sample of German manufacturing firms and explore the effect of patent stocks, R&D 
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intensity and spillovers on firm profitability. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010) find a positive 
effect of patent stock but no effect of R&D intensity. With regards to the competition 
variables they find that concentration is positively affecting firm profitability while 
market share is insignificant. In addition they estimate a negative coefficient for the 
interaction between R&D and concentration thereby supporting the hypothesis of 
Grabowski and Müller (1974). In contrast, Czarnitzki and Kraft (2012) test for a non-
linear relationship between firm profitability and R&D. They find evidence for an up-
ward sloping curve with decreasing marginal returns. What is more, an effect of concen-
tration on firm profitability cannot be detected. Mata and Woerter (2013) explore the 
impact of external and internal R&D on price-cost margins for Swiss firms. They do not 
consider any market structure at all and find firms with both external and internal R&D 
activities to be more profitable than firms with merely internal R&D. Rexhäuser and 
Rammer (2014) also use a dataset of German firms but find no effect for the magnitude 
of the patent stock and the introduction of market novelties or cost saving innovations 
on firm profitability. In line with Czarnitzki and Kraft (2012) they do not find an effect 
of horizontal concentration. Their results show however a strong negative effect on 
profitability for a competition dummy variable which is a composite competition index 
taking unit value if the firm indicates that at least one of the following characterizations 
apply to their main product market: entry of new competitors, products and services are 
quickly outdated, the firm’s products can be easily substituted by competitors’ products, 
strong competition from abroad and uncertainty in demand or competitors actions. 
Geroski et al. (1993) use a panel of 721 British firms observed during the period 1972 to 
1983. They do not consider R&D but innovative outputs and assess the impact of the 
latter on firm profitability. They find a positive effect of an additional innovation on 
firm profitability. Moreover, the results provide evidence that differences in profitability 
between innovators and non-innovators are persistent with innovators exhibiting a high-
er profitability. In addition, Geroski et al. (1993) are the first to hint at the importance of 
vertical relationships when assessing the profitability of a firm in combination with its 
innovative efforts. They note that innovations in their dataset “have had a far greater 
impact on users' productivity growth than on producers' productivity (e.g., Geroski, 
1991), and there is no reason not to think that this might also be true with profitability” 
(p. 208). 
This statement reflects exactly why the distribution of bargaining power in vertical rela-
tionships may be an important factor in determining a supplier’s profitability. Given that 
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a supplier’s innovative product or process does have a greater impact on downstream 
profitability, he may extract a share of the downstream profit through bargaining. How 
much of the downstream profit can be extracted depends on the strength of the suppli-
er’s bargaining position relative to the bargaining position of the buyer. Conversely, if 
the buyer does have a stronger bargaining position compared to the supplier, the former 
can reduce the profits of the latter by extracting a large part of the upstream profit. 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no existing study however, taking account of 
these opportunities. Hence, the main contribution of this paper is taking account of bar-
gaining power in vertical relationships when analysing the profitability of suppliers’ 
R&D. 
2.1.3 Theoretical framework 
In this section I study how the profitability of suppliers’ R&D investments is affected 
by bargaining power. To this end, theoretical and empirical findings are reviewed. Sub-
sequently hypotheses are derived that can be tested empirically. 
First, I will consider how a supplier’s profitability is affected by bargaining power. Ma-
jor determinants of bargaining power in vertical relations are firm size and market con-
centration. Theoretical literature on vertical interactions frequently predicts a negative 
effect of buyer concentration on supplier profitability due to buyer power (e. g. Dobson 
and Waterson, 1997; Inderst and Wey, 2007, Smith and Thanassoulis, 2012). Usually 
this finding is derived from Nash bargaining models applying different assumptions on 
efficiency of the outcome, upstream and downstream market structure, uncertainty over 
output quantities as well as a supplier’s cost function. In most of these models it is as-
sumed that there is one supplier negotiating simultaneously with numerous buyers over 
the split of a joint profit v. The joint profit v is the sum of the upstream and the down-
stream profits generated by the contract between supplier and buyer, which I will refer 
to as “incremental profits” in the following. In a given negotiation the outcome of all 
other negotiations is taken as given, hence the negotiations with a certain buyer are over 
the last units of the intermediary product. 
Assuming inefficient Nash bargaining, i. e. bargaining over linear unit prices, buyers 
can reduce upstream profits if downstream concentration increases (Dobson and Water-
son, 1997). This is due to the fact, that the outside option of the supplier, i. e. the prices 
and quantities he can sell to all other downstream firms in case the negotiations with a 
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certain buyer fail, is devaluated since there are less alternative buyers available. If in 
addition downstream firms are very competitive (i.e. their products are perceived to be 
close substitutes) and behave in a Bertrand manner, supplier’s profits are driven down 
even further as the incremental downstream profit is close to zero and consequently the 
joint profit v decreases. 
In the case of efficient Nash bargaining, i. e. contractors maximize the joint profit and 
can settle on non-linear prices, similar results occur. Given the supplier can be certain 
over the final upstream quantity demanded, input prices are a function of average costs 
of supplying the buyer. Consequently a large order in combination with increasing mar-
ginal costs of the supplier implies lower input prices (Chipty and Snyder, 1999; Inderst 
and Wey, 2007). To derive this result it is necessary that downstream firms are consid-
ered as monopolists on symmetric but separate markets with marginal costs of trans-
forming the intermediate product of zero. In this case the optimal quantity provided by 
the downstream firm is independent of the market size and hence the downstream price 
is constant over all downstream markets. It follows then that only the incremental up-
stream profit is relevant for the emergence of buyer power and ultimately lower supplier 
profitability. Relaxing the assumption that downstream prices have to be constant across 
markets, Björnerstedt and Stennek (2007) derive buyer discounts also for the case of 
multiple upstream and multiple downstream firms. They argue that the relation of a 
buyer’s marginal revenue and a supplier’s marginal cost determines whether there is a 
quantity discount or a quantity premium for buyers. If marginal cost of the supplier is 
steeper than marginal revenue of the buyer, an increase in quantity for the buyer reduces 
incremental cost of supply more than it increases downstream revenues, ultimately lead-
ing to a quantity discount for the buyer. 
In the presence of uncertainty over upstream final output, a supplier’s profitability de-
creases if there are large buyers, i. e. buyers who account for large share of the suppli-
er’s sales, and decreasing marginal costs of supply (Smith and Thanassoulis, 2012). 
This is due to the fact that a supplier now attaches a probability of losing a contract to 
volumes negotiated with a buyer. The average costs of supplying the buyer are now not 
calculated over the final units but over all possible output realizations. Hence larger 
buyers imply larger expected output, lower expected marginal cost and thus lower input 
prices. 
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In line with the presented results from theoretical literature one can argue that increased 
buyer concentration is likely to have a negative effect on supplier’s profitability. Ac-
cordingly, the first hypothesis reads: 
Hypothesis 1: The profit of the supplier is decreasing the more concentrated the buyer 
portfolio. 
Next I will show how a supplier’s bargaining position is affected by his market position 
and which effect this will have in turn on his profits. A supplier’s market position is 
defined on one hand by the market structure in the horizontal market and on the other 
hand by the substitutability of the supplied product. A monopoly in the supply market 
does not allow for an outside option of the buyer which in turn should result in a more 
powerful bargaining position of the supplier in comparison to a supplier with a high 
number of competitors. Such a beneficial market position is for instance obtainable by 
product differentiation thereby making the own product less substitutable. 
Empirical studies dedicated to the analysis of manufacturer-retailer relationships in the 
food sector hint in the direction, that lower substitutability increases supplier margins. 
This is shown for yoghurt and peanut butter in the US (Sudhir, 2001), antibiotics in the 
US (Ellison and Snyder, 2010) and coffee in Chile (Noton and Elberg, 2012). If down-
stream product markets are very competitive because the products are easy to substitute, 
there is evidence for the existence of buyer power. For instance, for a yoghurt market in 
a particular region of the US with a considerable market share of private labels, there is 
support for the existence of two-part tariffs with zero wholesale margins (Villas-Boas, 
2007).2 A two-part tariff is characterized by the feature, that the manufacturer sets the 
wholesale price equal to marginal cost, so the retailer can claim all the profit for the 
product. The manufacturer is able to extract part of this wholesale profit in the form of a 
fixed fee the retailer has to pay. If wholesale profits are zero however, this implies that 
all the profit remains with the retailer. Hence suppliers’ profitability is reduced. 
Another way to achieve a monopoly position is patent protection. For antibiotics with-
out patent protection, i.e. if competition with generic products is prevailed, large buyers 
(chain drugstores) receive discounts when compared to smaller buyers (Ellison and 
Snyder, 2010). Again, this implies a lower profitability on the supply side if substituta-
2 Two-part tariffs are considered to be the optimal contract whenever there is downstream market power. 
This holds for certain demand or asymmetric information (Tirole, 1988) and uncertain demand (Rey and 
Tirole, 1986). If there are multiple retailers and multiple manufacturers however, two-part tariffs are no 
longer the optimal contract (Schmalensee, 1981). 
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bility is high. Against the background of these empirical results, it is obvious that sup-
pliers’ profitability positively depends on the strength of their market position. Conse-
quently, the second hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The profit of the supplier is increasing in the strength of the market posi-
tion. 
The theoretical results this section builds on, typically consider negotiations over price 
and quantity of a good to be traded between supplier and buyer with rational agents. 
Williamson (1975) however, does acknowledge that agents may be boundedly rational, 
i. e. they have incomplete information about market opportunities and future occurences 
for instance (Alchian and Woodward, 1988) and are prone to failure. What is more, 
agents can behave opportunistic in a way, that they disclose information selectively 
and / or distortedly or simply give false promises regarding future conduct (Williamson, 
1975). Such behaviour gives rise to transaction costs which may have an adverse impact 
on vertical relationships.3 In the context of R&D, transaction costs may be substantial if 
R&D is sourced out or performed within an alliance (Aghion and Tirole, 1994). Under 
such circumstances, suppliers of R&D services can have several motives to behave op-
portunistically: “increasing the profits by reducing the efforts, preparation of own com-
petitive activities and selling non-specific parts of the generated knowledge to a compet-
itor (Kloyer and Scholderer, 2012; p. 347)”. The buyer may also be tempted to behave 
opportunistically. That is, after the R&D supplier carried out necessary investments to 
fulfil contracted obligations, the buyer may enforce ex-post negotiations leading to con-
ditions which reduce the supplier’s profit margins or even lead to losses. Such behav-
iour is known as hold-up (Klein et al., 1978). 
This paper considers internal R&D investments of suppliers, i. e. investments that aim at 
the development or the significant improvement of production technologies or products 
to own benefit. Hence, problems of information asymmetries between supplier and buy-
er and subsequent opportunities for moral hazard or hidden actions may not be as severe 
as in contractual R&D relationships. If there are opportunities for one party to behave 
opportunistically however, it should be the party in possession of the stronger bargain-
ing position. This implies that even in the presence of opportunistic behaviour, suppli-
3 Transaction cost economics have been applied not only to vertical relationships but to a wide range of 
economic matters, e. g. “transfer pricing, corporate finance, marketing, the organization of work, long-
term commercial contracting, franchising, regulation, the multinational corporation, company towns, and 
other contractual relationships, both formal and informal” (Shelanski and Klein, 1995; p. 336).  
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ers’ profitability should be positively (negatively) affected by a stronger (weaker) bar-
gaining position. 
Regardless of bargaining power, it has been shown frequently in empirical work that 
R&D activities are a main driver of firm productivity (e. g. Griliches, 1994; Crepon et 
al., 1998; Griffith et al., 2006a; Peters, 2008). This is due to the fact that R&D translates 
into new products and/or new production processes, thereby offering the opportunity to 
charge higher prices (for new products) or to benefit from lower cost of production for a 
given output. Of course, among firms there may be different strategies of performing 
R&D. That is, some firms carry out R&D incrementally, i. e. they alter existing tech-
nology; while some others concentrate on developing new-to-the-market products 
and/or technologies. No matter which strategy is applied, R&D will at some point result 
in an innovation which gives a firm a competitive advantage. 
In addition to the positive effects of R&D on suppliers’ profitability, there are also posi-
tive effects to be expected on the profitability of buyers. Using industry data from the 
UK, Geroski (1991) shows that the biggest impact on productivity growth came from 
innovations used rather than innovations produced. Scherer (1982a) distinguishes the 
allocation of R&D expenditure by industry of use and industry of origin and explores 
the relationship to productivity growth in the US. In line with the results of Geroski 
(1991) he finds the R&D expenditure allocated to industry of use to have a larger effect 
on productivity growth. Hence, it seems plausible to assume that supplier’s R&D can 
enlarge the joint profit which is to be split between supplier and buyer by bargaining. 
On one hand, if bargaining power of a supplier carrying out R&D activities is weak it is 
not possible to appropriate a large share of the joint profit (Farber, 1981; Lunn and Mar-
tin, 1986; Peters, 2000). On the other hand, if bargaining power of a supplier is high, he 
may be able to extract parts of the downstream profit that accrue due to an innovative 
product, for instance. The corresponding hypotheses for the effect of bargaining power 
in vertical relationships on the profitability of suppliers’ R&D activities read: 
Hypothesis 3: The profitability of R&D investment increases with the strength of a sup-
plier’s market position. 
Hypothesis 4: The profitability of R&D investment decreases with the concentration of 
a supplier’s buyer portfolio. 
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2.1.4 Empirical study 
2.1.4.1 Data 
In order to test the hypotheses empirically I employ firm level data from the Mannheim 
Innovation Panel (MIP) which provides information on enterprises from both manufac-
turing and services located in Germany and employing at least 5 employees. The data is 
annually collected by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of 
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The survey focuses on enterprises’ 
innovative activities but also includes questions on their competitive environment.4 
The 2011 wave of the MIP provides valuable information on supplier-buyer relation-
ships and enterprises’ market environment. Since the question regarding the supplier-
buyer relationship is not part of the regular questionnaire, it is not possible to construct a 
panel dataset. The wave 2011 also contains general information, e. g. the profit over 
sales, the number of employees or the sales, but also information on the innovation be-
haviour and R&D spending. In order to have a lag between the dependent profit variable 
and the explanatory variables the wave 2011 is merged with the wave 2013 since the 
question regarding the profit is included biannually. I restrict the sample to manufactur-
ing firms because services comprise rather heterogeneous industries. Additionally, R&D 
does more frequently occur in manufacturing. There are 1,411 firms for which the 
merge was successful representing Nace 2-digit industries 10-17 and 20-33.5 To avoid 
outlier problems I drop all three observations with an R&D intensity of larger than 2, i. 
e. a firm’s R&D expenditures exceed the sales by 100 % leading to an initial sample of 
1,408 firms. The further steps of data cleaning are described in the next section. 
2.1.4.2 Variables 
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable is a supplier’s profit over sales (PROFIT). This variable is 
available for both years 2012 and 2011 and thus provides an interesting opportunity to 
check if the impact of R&D investments in 2010 on supplier’s profitability does have a 
time lag as suggested by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1982).6 
4 For a more detailed description of the MIP see Peters (2008) and Peters and Rammer (2013). 
5 The Nace codes refer to the Nace Rev. 2. The breakdown of industries is presented in Table A 1 in Ap-
pendix A. 
6 Using US data they find a mean lag of 4 to 6 years. 
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The profit over sales variable was surveyed as categorical variable. Table 2.1 provides 
an overview of the different categories. Although provided with a category “don’t 
know”, some of the participating firms did not answer the question at all. 
Table 2.1: Surveyed categories of the return on sales 
Return on sales Class Return on sales Class Return on sales  Class 
< -5% 1 [2, 4%) 5 >15% 9 
[-5, -2%) 2 [4, 7%) 6 Do not know 10 
[-2, 0%) 3 [7, 10%) 7   
[0, 2%) 4 [10, 15%) 8   
From the initial sample of 1,408 firms, 111 answered “don’t know” to the profit in 2011 
while 120 firms did so to the profit in 2012. Another 238 firms did not respond at all to 
the profit in 2011 (2012: 249 firms). Since the profit over sales variable is sensitive in-
formation and firms may be reluctant to provide information on it, I follow Czarnitzki 
and Kraft (2010, 2012) and perform an analysis if there are systematic differences be-
tween respondents and non-respondents. The detection of systematic differences would 
indicate that the estimations presented in next subsection suffer from a selection bias. 
Therefore I generate two dummy variables: the first takes unit value if the firm did not 
respond to the question at all while the second indicates if a firm did not respond or 
checked the “don’t know” category. Then, Probit models are estimated for each year 
separately, regressing the dummy variables on all explanatory variables presented be-
low. After deleting all observations with missing values in the explanatory variables, I 
eventually arrive at a sample of 570 observations, of which 472 do report profit over 
sales in both years 2011 and 2012.7 I perform Wald-Tests to check if the coefficients are 
jointly significant. The test statistics take the value 19.79 (2011) and 21.59 (2012) for 
the model using the first and 16.52 (2011) and 18.08 (2012) for the model using the 
second dummy variable. All test statistics are distributed with 23 degrees of freedom. 
The corresponding p-values are 0.60, 0.49, 0.83 and 0.75 respectively, implying that 
there are no systematic differences between responding and non-responding firms. Ob-
viously, this procedure controls for selection on observables. Given the various control 
7 Missing values in the dependent and explanatory variables would have led to a final sample of 676 ob-
servations. I decided however to exclude another 204 firms which indicated to have a market share of less 
than 0.1 % or a share of sales generated by the largest three customers of less than 1 %. The reasons are 
explained when describing the variables buyer concentration and market share. 
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variables which were applied, I conclude however that selection is not a concern in the 
final sample. 
The profit over sales represents the excess return on sales and expresses the profits 
(sales – labour cost – capital cost – material cost) over sales. Czarnitzki and Kraft 
(2010, 2012) show that under certain assumptions the return on sales represents the Ler-
ner index.8 As the return on sales is net of capital costs, there is no need to include an 
additional explanatory variable controlling for the costs of capital. 
Explanatory variables 
The goal of this study is to explore the relationship between profitability and R&D in-
vestments taking into account the distribution of bargaining power in vertical relation-
ships. Hence, R&D investments are measured by R&D intensity (RDINT) of the supply 
firm in 2010 which is defined as R&D expenditure over sales. It is unclear though if the 
effect of RDINT can be expected to be positive or negative (see subsection 2.1.2). The 
latter can occur if it is true that R&D performing firms face difficulties to find external 
capital lenders (see e. g. the survey of Hall and Lerner, 2010 and the references cited 
therein). As a result, risky and uncertain R&D projects are predominantly financed with 
internal financial means, implying a reduction of the supplier’s profitability. 
The bargaining power of the supplier is represented by the supplier’s market position 
and the concentration of his buyer structure. The concentration of the buyer structure 
(BUYCON) is derived from a question regarding the share of sales generated by the 
largest three buyers in 2010, which could be filled in by respondents directly. Obvious-
ly, it would be preferable to have the share of each single buyer in the supplier’s sales 
but the measure still allows testing of hypothesis 1 as a large value of BUYCON should 
indicate also large shares for single buyers.9 In addition, the questionnaire included a 
check box which could be ticked if the share of sales with the largest three buyers is 
below 1 %. I chose to drop all observations with a sales share of the largest three buyers 
below 1 % as I am interested in intermediate markets and I assume that these firms ra-
ther work on final product markets. 
8 These assumptions are that firms are in the long-run equilibrium and produce with constant returns to 
scale. Then the returns on sales of a firm represent on average across the product portfolio the Lerner 
index since average costs equal marginal cost when returns to scale are constant. 
9 Note that the observed share reflects the share of sales generated by three customers. If firms have less 
than three buyers, the share equals 100 %. 
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A supplier’s profitability should be also affected by the concentration in the downstream 
market as a high concentration does not allow for easy switching of buyers. Since the 
dataset contains only limited information about the buyers, I cannot observe the product 
markets they are active in. This is clearly a limitation of this study. However, down-
stream concentration should be captured at least partly by industry dummies controlling 
for differences in suppliers’ industry characteristics, if suppliers in a particular industry 
are affected equally by downstream concentration. 
The market position of the supplier which was identified as determining the supplier’s 
bargaining power is captured by several variables. Recall that the market position de-
pends on the switching costs of buyers and reflects market structure and the substituta-
bility of the supplied product. For instance, switching costs should be low if the inter-
mediate good is homogenous and durable and numerous suppliers produce it. In con-
trast, they should be high if the good is very customer-specific. Hence, the number of a 
supplier’s competitors (COMP) is included to control for switching opportunities of 
buyers. COMP is a dummy variable indicating whether the number of competitors is 
within the range of 1 to 5.10 The reference category thus is to have no or more than 5 
competitors.11 In order to control for substitutability, I use the assessment of the supplier 
whether the firm’s product is easy to substitute by competitors’ products on a 4-point-
Likert-scale.12 I construct a dummy variable (SUBSTIT) taking unit value if the firm 
agrees or fully agrees to the above statement. 
The main variable reflecting a supplier’s market position is the supplier’s market share 
in the main product market (MSHARE). Firms were asked directly for their market share 
with the most important product in 2010 and could check a box, if it was below 0.1 %. 
The share of responding firms in the initial sample with a market share below 0.1 % was 
about 30 % which seems remarkably high. Further inspection showed that some quite 
large firms were within this group.13 This is surprising as larger firms should report 
larger market shares. As the questionnaire did not provide an option to answer “don’t 
10 The corresponding question asks for the number of competitors on the main product market and pro-
vided the categories “None”, “1 to 5”, “6 to 10”, “11 to 15”, “16 to 50” and “more than 50” to answer. 
11 I also experimented with the inclusion of a dummy variable indicating if the supplier is a monopolist. 
The estimated coefficient of the variable was however highly insignificant while all other results were 
unchanged. Hence, I refrain from using this variable. 
12 The respondent could assess the statement with “do not agree”, “somewhat disagree”, “somewhat 
agree” and “fully agree“. 
13 About 10 % of these firms reported to have more than 100 employees. 
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know” for the market share, it seems reasonable that a significant share of firms ticked 
the threshold box because they did not know how large their market share is. Hence, as 
a measure of precaution and since I do not have the opportunity to cross check the in-
formation with other data, I excluded all firms reporting market share below 0.1 %. 
Apart from the fact that market share is a more objective measure, it is also more de-
tailed compared to SUBSTIT and should in addition capture factors like buyer loyalty or 
the strength of a brand which have impact on the substitutability of a product. However, 
the choice of the market share as measure of a supplier’s bargaining power deserves 
further discussion. The underlying assumption is that if a supplier’s market share is 
large, then – from the perspective of a buyer – there are fewer alternative suppliers to 
turn to in case the negotiations with the supplier fail. Hence, the supplier has higher 
bargaining power compared to a supplier with low market shares. What is more, the 
market share can also be interpreted as a sign of higher efficiency. This interpretation 
goes back to the “Chicago School” (see e. g. Demsetz, 1973 or Peltzman, 1977) and 
builds on the assumption that there are productivity differences between firms within a 
market. Competition between these firms leads to a reallocation of market shares from 
inefficient to efficient firms. Hence productive firms grow, increase their market share 
and are more profitable while less productive firms shrink and eventually exit the mar-
ket. That is, the efficiency argument would imply a stronger bargaining position for a 
supplier with a high market share since the outside option for a buyer would be to turn 
to a supplier operating on a higher cost curve. 
Using the market share as a measure of a supplier’s bargaining power comes with a ca-
veat though. According to the simple Cournot model with homogenous goods, the mar-
ket share determines the price-cost margin of a firm, i. e. the higher the market share, 
the higher a firm’s profitability (see e. g. Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). This would 
imply a relationship between market share and firm profitability which is detached from 
bargaining. However, the model neglects at the same time both vertical interaction and 
the existence of transaction costs. As I have shown in the previous section transaction 
costs may play an important part in vertical relationships. Also an overwhelming part of 
the transactions on intermediate markets are sealed by bargaining.14 Hence, the interpre-
tation of the market share as a determinant of bargaining power seems to be reasonable. 
14 Björnerstedt and Stennek (2007) cite an estimation of The Economist that about 80 to 90% of all inter-
mediate goods are traded through extended term contracts and that spot markets play a fairly minor role. 
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Even though I consider BUYCON and MSHARE to be the main variables of interest in 
measuring suppliers’ bargaining power, there are other factors affecting the contractors 
bargaining position and thereby influencing a supplier’s profit. The elasticity in demand 
may be an important factor as a supplier could make up the loss of a buyer or conces-
sions in prices with increasing the prices for remaining buyers.15 The leeway for such 
price increases should be the larger, the less price elastic demand. To control for that, 
three dummy variables are included in the estimation equation, indicating to what extent 
the supplier agrees with the statement, that an increase in prices leads to an immediate 
loss of customers on a 4-point-Likert-scale. If they strongly agree, I assume the price 
elasticity of demand to be high (ELAST_H), while it is assumed to be medium, if the 
supplier somewhat agrees (ELAST_M). The price elasticity of demand is assumed to be 
low if the supplier somewhat disagrees (ELAST_L). Consequently, the reference catego-
ry consists of firms which strongly disagree with the above statement and therefore face 
a relatively inelastic demand. Finally, a high degree of product diversity offers more 
outside options to the supplier compared to a single-product-supplier. In the question-
naire firms where asked for the share of sales with their most important product. In or-
der to control for a firm’s product diversity, I include a variable (DIVERS) that is de-
fined as 100 minus the share of sales with the most important product. DIVERS thus 
reflects the share of sales a firm generates with others than its most important product.  
Further firm specific characteristics that may affect a supplier’s profitability are also 
considered. Firms involved in international trade are likely to be more competitive as 
they are able to enter foreign markets. Moreover, after entering they serve presumably 
larger markets. Thus a variable indicating the export intensity (EXPORT) is included 
which is defined as the share of exports in sales. To capture size effects the firm size 
(SIZE) measured as the log of the number of employees in full time equivalents is in-
cluded. Another dummy variable is included in order to control if the firm is part of a 
multinational enterprise group (FOREIGN). Further control variables are whether the 
firm is located in Eastern Germany (EAST) and 10 industry dummies (IND) with the 
furniture/sport/toys industry as reference. 
15 The observation of low prices for large or powerful buyers while the remaining buyers’ prices increase, 
is described as “waterbed effect” (see Inderst and Valletti, 2008, Smith and Thanassoulis, 2012). 
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2.1.4.3 Estimation strategy16 
Given the theoretical framework and the variables identified in the previous section, the 
empirical strategy is formulated according to equation (2.5). 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (2.5) 
Vector X includes all variables which were identified to affect the bargaining power of 
the supplier and thus profitability, i. e. the substitutability of the supplier’s product 
(SUBSTIT), the price elasticity of the demand (ELAST_H, ELAST_M, ELAST_L), the 
number of competitors (COMP) and the supplier’s degree of diversification (DIVERS). 
In addition, vector X contains further variables capturing firm characteristics, i. e. EX-
PORT, SIZE, FOREIGN, EAST and the industry dummies. 
Since the dependent variable is categorical, an ordered Probit model is estimated to ob-
tain the influence of R&D investments and the supplier’s bargaining power on profita-
bility. Hence, equation (2.5) defines our latent model of the unobserved dependent vari-
able 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗. The observed profit over sales relationship is defined by: 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 =
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧
1 if  𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇1          2 if  𝜇𝜇1 < 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇2
⋮8 if  𝜇𝜇7 < 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇89 if  𝜇𝜇8 < 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇910 if  𝜇𝜇9 < 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖∗        
 (2.6) 
The values of 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 with 𝑖 = 1, … ,9 define the thresholds of the respective categories. Such 
models are commonly used for dependent categorical variables with unknown thresh-
olds values. The fact that the questionnaire provides observable threshold parameters 
allows the identification of the variance which is usually unidentified. Consequently we 
can exactly quantify the marginal effects of the explanatory variables (Verbeek, 2004). 
This is in contrast to an ordered Probit model with unknown threshold values or a bina-
ry Probit model in which the estimated parameters are always scaled with the unidenti-
fied variance.17 
16 A similar approach is used by Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010, 2012). 
17 See Verbeek (2004, pp. 205-207) for an illustrative example of an ordered Probit model with known 
threshold values.  
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I also test for additive groupwise heteroscedasticity within the sample using a likelihood 
ratio (LR) test. Heteroscedasticity may lead to inconsistency of the estimated coeffi-
cients. Therefore I model a heteroscedasticity term allowing the variance to vary by 
location in East Germany and industry affiliation. The location of the firm is captured 
by EAST while 10 industry dummies (IND) control for a firm’s industry affiliation. The 
LR tests reject the hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Therefore, I will only present the 
estimation results of the heteroscedastic models. 
Endogeneity issues may be of concern for the explanatory variables R&D intensity, 
market share and size as they may be determined simultaneously with profitability. I 
could not identify suitable instruments for these variables which would allow elimina-
tion of endogeneity. However, I can rule out short-term endogeneity as I lag the explan-
atory variables by 2 periods. Longer time lags or instruments would be needed in order 
to take account of long-term endogeneity, which are unfortunately unavailable. 
In addition, I analyse correlations among the explanatory variables which should not 
affect the estimated coefficients, but may inflate the estimated standard errors. Both 
pair-wise correlations and variance inflation factors are calculated but there is no indica-
tion for multicollinarity issues when applying conventional standards from the relevant 
literature (Chatterjee and Hadi, 2006).18 
2.1.5 Results 
2.1.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the full sample differentiated by a firm’s R&D status are shown 
in Table 2.2. The share of R&D performers in the full sample is 59 %. It is apparent that 
in many aspects the group of R&D performers is similar to the non-R&D performers. 
The mean profit of all groups of suppliers is between the categories 5 and 6 which imply 
return to sales between 2% to lower than 7%. The means for both groups are slightly 
higher in 2011 than in 2012. Between the groups there is however no large gap, even 
though the difference between R&D performers and non-performers is significant for 
2011. The R&D performers have an average R&D intensity of 3.8 %. Taken together 
with the non-R&D performers the average R&D intensity drops to 2.3 % which is close 
to the 2.7 % reported in Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010) who use a similar dataset. 
18 The correlation matrix and the variance inflation factors can be found in Table A 5 in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics differentiated by suppliers’ R&D status 
  
Full Sample  R&D 
performer 
 Non-R&D 
performer 
 T-test 
  Mean SD  Mean SD 
 
Mean SD      
PROFIT 2012 5.42 2.04 
 
5.51 2.14 
 
5.29 1.89 
 
-1.15 
 PROFIT 2011 5.69 1.97 
 
5.85 2.03 
 
5.46 1.86 
 
-2.08 ** 
RDINT 2.26 5.20 
 
3.81 6.31 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-8.37 *** 
MSHARE 26.35 27.28 
 
26.38 24.86 
 
26.31 30.54 
 
-0.03 
 BUYCON 36.91 24.08 
 
36.50 23.58 
 
37.52 24.85 
 
0.45 
 SUBSTITa 0.59 0.49 
 
0.55 0.50 
 
0.65 0.48 
 
2.28 ** 
ELAST_La 0.35 0.48 
 
0.36 0.48 
 
0.34 0.47 
 
-0.49 
 ELAST_Ma 0.45 0.50 
 
0.45 0.50 
 
0.46 0.50 
 
0.37 
 ELAST_Ha 0.11 0.32 
 
0.11 0.31 
 
0.11 0.32 
 
0.13 
 COMPa 0.49 0.50 
 
0.52 0.50 
 
0.44 0.50 
 
-1.61 
 DIVERS 33.20 24.59 
 
36.18 24.06 
 
28.86 24.77 
 
-3.21 *** 
EXPORT 29.88 28.25 
 
36.99 29.05 
 
19.52 23.52 
 
-6.92 *** 
SIZE 239.79 591.55 
 
331.49 741.89 
 
106.06 169.24 
 
-4.14 *** 
FOREIGNa 0.10 0.31 
 
0.12 0.32 
 
0.08 0.28 
 
-1.21 
 EASTa 0.28 0.45 
 
0.29 0.46 
 
0.25 0.43 
 
-1.02 
 N 472     280     192         
a Dummy variable. Columns with heading SD display standard deviations. The last two columns display t-statistics whether a T-test 
on mean difference between the group of R&D performers and non-R&D performers rejects the Null hypothesis of no difference. 
The asterisks indicate the corresponding level of significance (* 10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 %). The variable SIZE is presented in original 
values. Descriptive statistics of the remaining variables are presented in Table A 2 in Appendix A. 
Non-R&D performers do not exhibit significantly lower market shares with the average 
market share being about 26 %. Also both groups do not differ in respect to the share of 
sales with the three largest customers. Across both groups the share of sales generated 
with the largest three buyers is between 37 and 38 %. The group of R&D performers 
exhibits a significantly lower share of firms indicating easy substitutability while there 
are no differences to non-R&D performers in the measures of the demand elasticity. 
This implies that even though the products of R&D performers are less easy to substi-
tute, the demand elasticity limits the scope for quasi-monopoly pricing as otherwise 
buyers will go elsewhere. There is also no indication for R&D performers to be more 
frequently active in an oligopolistic market. Instead they are significantly more diversi-
fied, generate a much higher share of sales by exports and are also considerably larger 
compared to non-R&D performers. Both groups do not show any differences with re-
spect to foreign ownership and location in Eastern Germany. The high overall share of 
firms located in East Germany (28%) is due to oversampling of these firms in the MIP. 
Regarding the industries there are no surprises in the differences between R&D and 
non-R&D performing firms. The share of non-R&D performers is significantly higher 
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in the Food/Tobacco, Textiles and Wood/Paper/Print industries while R&D performers 
constitute a significantly higher share in Chemicals, Machinery, and Electronics. 
2.1.5.2 Regression results 
I estimate equation (2.5) and present the results of the heteroscedasticity consistent or-
dered Probit model in Table 2.3. Columns I and II report estimation results for the profit 
in 2011 and the profit in 2012, without taking account of the interaction effects between 
R&D intensity and the variables indicating a supplier’s bargaining power (BUYCON 
and MSHARE). The estimation results including interaction effects are presented in col-
umns III and IV for the profit in 2011 and the profit in 2012 respectively.  
Let us first have a look at the results without interaction terms in order to check how the 
buyer variables affect suppliers’ profit (see Table 2.3, column I and II). The most im-
portant result is that a supplier’s bargaining power does indeed affect his profitability 
significantly. As expected, the market share, as a measure of the strength of a supplier’s 
market position and thus stronger bargaining power, exerts a positive effect on profita-
bility. The share of sales with the largest three buyers, as a measure of buyer concentra-
tion and thus lower supplier bargaining power, does exert a negative effect on a suppli-
er’s profitability. The effects remain constant regardless the dependent variable. This 
supports the hypotheses 1 and 2, which state that higher buyer concentration should 
affect profits negatively, while a higher market share should have a positive effect on 
suppliers’ profits. 
Let us now turn to the results of the model including interaction terms between the vari-
ables reflecting the bargaining power of a supplier and R&D intensity (see Table 2.3, 
column III and IV). The results clearly show a positive relationship between bargaining 
power of the supplier and R&D investments. First, a higher market share, as a measure 
of the strength of a supplier’s market position and thus its bargaining power, is related 
to larger R&D investments. Second, higher buyer concentration which indicates lower 
bargaining power of a supplier is connected with lower R&D investments. The highly 
significant interaction terms take explanatory power from the direct measures of 
RDINT, MSHARE and BUYCON. This demonstrates that profitability of R&D invest-
ments strongly depends on a supplier’s bargaining position. A Wald-Test on the joint 
significance of RDINT, MSHARE, and BUYCON and their interactions rejects the hy-
pothesis of all coefficients being jointly zero at the 5 % confidence level for the profit in 
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2011 and at the 1 % significance level for the profit in 2012. These findings support 
hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Table 2.3: Estimation results of heteroscedasticity consistent ordered Probit models 
 Dependent variable: Profit over sales 
 
2011 2012 2011 2012 
  I II III IV 
RDINT -0.078     -0.104 *   -0.030     0.017     
                                           (0.062)     (0.060)     (0.110)     (0.108)     
MSHARE 0.023 *** 0.023 *** 0.016 *   0.015 *   
                                           (0.008)     (0.008)     (0.009)     (0.009)     
BUYCON -0.019 *   -0.021 **  -0.010     -0.008     
                                           (0.011)     (0.010)     (0.011)     (0.011)     
MSHARE x RDINT 
    
0.007 *** 0.007 *** 
                                           
    
(0.002)     (0.002)     
BUYCON x RDINT 
    
-0.007 **  -0.009 *** 
                                           
    
(0.003)     (0.003)     
SUBSTITa -1.388 *** -1.379 *** -1.363 *** -1.358 *** 
                                           (0.514)     (0.499)     (0.512)     (0.496)     
ELAST_La -2.042 **  -2.811 *** -1.897 *   -2.592 *** 
                                           (0.995)     (0.978)     (0.989)     (0.971)     
ELAST_Ma -2.641 *** -2.880 *** -2.606 *** -2.782 *** 
                                           (0.982)     (0.954)     (0.979)     (0.948)     
ELAST_Ha -3.153 *** -3.626 *** -3.108 *** -3.510 *** 
                                           (1.137)     (1.122)     (1.129)     (1.107)     
COMPa 0.959 **  1.203 **  0.940 **  1.187 **  
                                           (0.483)     (0.486)     (0.477)     (0.480)     
DIVERS -0.013     -0.026 **  -0.013     -0.027 *** 
                                           (0.011)     (0.010)     (0.010)     (0.010)     
EXPORT  0.019 *   0.018 *   0.017 *   0.016     
                                           (0.010)     (0.010)     (0.010)     (0.010)     
SIZE -0.151     -0.377 *   -0.133     -0.376 *   
                                           (0.199)     (0.197)     (0.198)     (0.196)     
FOREIGNa -0.51     -1.469 *   -0.444     -1.402 *   
                                           (0.826)     (0.813)     (0.821)     (0.809)     
EASTa 0.447     0.236     0.629     0.439     
                                           (0.538)     (0.528)     (0.535)     (0.520)     
Constant 7.427 *** 9.406 *** 7.240 *** 9.152 *** 
 (1.681)     (1.598)     (1.666)     (1.584)     
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝜎𝜎� 1.390 *** 1.298 *** 1.347 *** 9.152 *** 
 (0.151)     (0.152)     (0.153)     (1.584)     
Industry dummies included yes   yes   yes   yes   
Wald - Test: joint significance 
of industry dummies 
31.45 *** 39.97 *** 33.60 *** 43.64 *** 
        R2 McFadden 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.80 
N 472 472 472 472 
Log likelihood -919 -916 -915 -910 
LR-test on heteroscedasticity 
 
LRχ2 
(11) = 
49.95 *** 
LRχ2 
(11) = 
54.79 *** 
LRχ2 
(11) = 
50.91 *** 
LRχ2 
(11) = 
54.41 *** 
a Dummy variable. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) respectively. Heteroscedasticity term includes East and 10 industry dummies. Estimation results of the industry dummies are 
presented in Table A 3 in Appendix A. 
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To get an idea about the magnitude of the effect of RDINT, MSHARE, and BUYCON, let 
us consider an average supplier among the group of R&D performers with group aver-
ages of market share (value equals 26 %) and buyer concentration (37 %). As a bench-
mark, unconditional profits over sales in the manufacturing sector are estimated, which 
were 5.5% in 2011 and 4.7% in 2012.19 On average, an increase in R&D investments 
2010 by one percentage point would reduce the average supplier’s profit by 0.11 per-
centage points in in 2012. 
In contrast, let us now consider the profitability of the same supplier if the largest three 
buyers account for 100 % of the sales. Then an increase in R&D investments in 2010 
would reduce profitability in 2012 by 0.67 percentage points. Given the average profit 
of 4.7% in 2012 a reduction by 0.67 percentage points would decrease the profit over 
sales by about 14 %. This result highlights the substantial negative effects that may re-
sult from buyer concentration on supplier profitability. It indeed seems that suppliers 
facing low bargaining power in vertical relationships cannot fully appropriate the re-
turns of their R&D investments. 
For comparison let us consider the effect if the supplier is a monopolist, i. e. his market 
share is 100 %. Then an increase in R&D investments in 2010 would increase profita-
bility in 2012 by 0.49 percentage points. This corresponds to an increase in profit over 
sales by 10 %. 
With respect to the other explanatory variables influencing a supplier’s profitability, I 
find across all specifications negative results for the substitutability of the produced 
good, the strength of the demand elasticity and oligopolistic competition which is in line 
with microeconomic theory. Given the results of the columns III and IV, if a supplier’s 
product is easy to substitute, the return on sales is on average 1.4 percentage points low-
er when compared to suppliers who state that their products are not easy to substitute, 
all else equal. Similarly, an increase in demand elasticity from relatively inelastic to 
highly elastic implies ceteris paribus a reduction in profitability about 3.1 percentage 
points in 2011 and 3.5 in 2012. The profit in 2012 of suppliers which face oligopolistic 
competition in 2010 is on average 1.2 percentage points higher compared to suppliers 
who face more or less competitors. 
19 That was done by estimating an ordered Probit model with a constant only. 
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For the variables indicating the degree of diversification, the export intensity, the firm 
size and affiliation to a foreign enterprise group the results are not significant across all 
model specifications but the coefficients point into the same direction. All else equal 
suppliers with a more diverse product portfolio exhibit lower profits while exporters 
have larger profits. Firm size does negatively affect profitability as does the affiliation 
to a foreign enterprise group. The estimated coefficients of EAST are insignificant 
throughout all estimations. 
Robustness Tests 
It has been argued before that larger firms are likely to be more efficient, to have higher 
market shares and thus to be more profitable (see also subsection 2.1.4.2). In addition, 
as R&D intensity is defined as R&D expenditure over sales, smaller firms tend to have 
higher values of RDINT since their sales numbers are smaller compared to larger firms. 
This would result in higher values of RDINT for a given amount of R&D expenditure. 
Small sales numbers also promote high sales shares with the largest three customers. 
Therefore, one could presume that the negative effect of RDINT and BUYCON on prof-
itability and also the negative interaction term between RDINT and BUYCON are main-
ly driven by small firms. In order to test for this, all firms having fewer employees than 
the firm on the 25 % quantil (value equals 23 employees) are excluded from the sample. 
As this reduces the small sample further to 357 firms, I drop the explanatory variables 
COMP, EXPORT and SIZE since a Wald-test on joint significance could not reject the 
Null hypothesis of these coefficients being jointly zero. Moreover, I restrict myself to 
the presentation of estimations using the profit in 2012 as dependent variable in Table 
2.4 for reasons of simplicity. 
The results show that in the model specification without interaction terms the coeffi-
cients of RDINT and BUYCON turn insignificant. In contrast, all variables indicating 
substitutability and demand elasticity are highly significant and in about the same mag-
nitude as in the estimations with the full sample. Inclusion of the interaction terms 
shows however that the interaction term of BUYCON and RDINT loses statistical signif-
icance as well, while the interaction term of MSHARE and RDINT more than triples in 
magnitude from 0.007 in Table 2.3 (column IV) to 0.023 in Table 2.4 (column II).  
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Table 2.4: Estimation results of heteroscedasticity consistent ordered Probit models for a 
sample excluding small firms and a sample of R&D performing firms 
 Dependent variable: Profit over sales 2012 
 
Small firms excluded R&D performing firms 
  I II III IV 
RDINT 0.036     -0.166     -0.070     0.097     
 
(0.080)     (0.131)     (0.069)     (0.129)     
MSHARE 0.037 *** 0.014     0.054 *** 0.040 **  
 
(0.009)     (0.010)     (0.014)     (0.016)     
BUYCON -0.013     -0.005     -0.012     0.013     
 
(0.012)     (0.013)     (0.014)     (0.017)     
MSHARE x RDINT   0.023 ***   0.006 **  
                                             (0.004)       (0.003)     
BUYCON x RDINT   -0.007 **    -0.009 *** 
 
  (0.003)       (0.003)     
SUBSTITa -1.57 *** -1.507 *** -1.629 *** -1.472 **  
 
(0.528)     (0.510)     (0.614)     (0.618)     
ELAST_La -2.547 **  -2.485 **  -0.629     -0.921     
 
(1.052)     (1.018)     (1.434)     (1.444)     
ELAST_Ma -2.983 *** -3.119 *** -1.422     -1.877     
 
(1.026)     (0.988)     (1.322)     (1.345)     
ELAST_Ha -3.077 **  -3.391 *** -2.713 *   -3.049 *   
 
(1.232)     (1.185)     (1.627)     (1.651)     
DIVERS -0.025 **  -0.025 **  -0.034 **  -0.031 **  
 
(0.011)     (0.011)     (0.014)     (0.014)     
EXPORT 
    
0.024 **  0.022 **  
 
(0.011)     (0.011)     
FOREIGNa -1.673 *   -1.862 **  
    
 
(0.861)     (0.858)     
EASTa -0.672     -0.255     0.227     0.398     
 
(0.561)     (0.539)     (0.725)     (0.716)     
Constant 8.439 *** 8.824 *** 4.589 **  4.354 **  
 (1.547)     (1.513)     (2.117)     (2.121)     
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝜎𝜎� 1.543 *** 1.493 *** 2.262 *** 2.148 *** 
 (0.177)     (0.178)     (0.363)     (0.352)     
Industry dummies included yes   yes   yes   yes   
Wald - Test: joint significance of 
industry dummies 
26.02 ** 32.28 ** 21.44 ** 20.73 ** 
R2 McFadden 0.52  0.75  0.59  0.65  
N 357  357  280  280  
Log likelihood -687  -670  -530  -526  
LR-test on heteroscedasticity LRχ2 (11)= 
38.56 
*** LRχ2 (11) = 
 37.49 
*** LRχ2 (16) =  
68.91 
*** LRχ2 (16) =  
66.64 
*** 
a Dummy variable. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) respectively. Heteroscedasticity term for the sample in columns I and II includes East and 10 industry dummies while it 
includes 5 size dummies, East and 10 industry dummies for the sample in columns III and IV. Estimation results of the industry 
dummies are presented in Table A 4 in Appendix A. 
Therefore it seems that small firms indeed have a strong impact on the empirical analy-
sis of bargaining power and the profitability of R&D. However, excluding them from 
the sample still shows the effect of bargaining power on R&D profitability. The Wald-
Test on joint significance of RDINT and both interaction terms is rejected to the 0.1 % 
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confidence level. For the average R&D performing supplier this implies that with a 
buyer concentration of 36 % and a market share of 26 %, a one percentage point in-
crease in R&D investments in 2010 would now increase profitability by 0.68 percentage 
points whereas the estimate with the full sample predicted a reduction of 0.36.  
The average of the unconditional profit distribution in this sample of firms equals 4.5 %. 
The increased coefficient of the interaction between RDINT and MSHARE implies, that 
a percentage point increase in R&D intensity in 2010 would increase profitability for 
the average R&D performing supplier in 2012 by 0.18 percentage points. The corre-
sponding effect for a monopolist with average buyer sales share is 1.9 while the fully 
dependent supplier with an average market share experiences a drop in profits by 0.3 
percentage points. This corresponds to an increase in profits of 43 % and a decrease of 
7 % respectively. 
Strongly related to the size of a firm is the likelihood of being a R&D performer. Hence 
one could argue in a similar vein, that non-R&D performing firms drive the results from 
the full sample since they are less competitive and therefore hold lower market shares. 
Hence, the positive effect of MSHARE on profitability could be caused by non-R&D 
performers which in addition may also affect the positive slope of the interaction term 
between MSHARE and RDINT since they have a R&D intensity of zero. 
To check this, all non-R&D performing firms are dropped. As the number of observa-
tions drops to 280, the number of explanatory variables is reduced. COMP, FOREIGN 
and SIZE are excluded after the Wald-Test rejected that all three coefficients together 
are jointly significant. The results are presented in Table 2.4 columns III and IV. 
In the specification without interactions the same pattern emerges as if all small firms 
were dropped. That is, RDINT and BUYCON turn insignificant. If the interaction terms 
are included, the interaction between RDINT and MSHARE loses a level of significance 
while the other cross term is strongly significant but does not substantially increase in 
magnitude. Notice instead, that the exclusion of the non-R&D performing firms drove 
the confidence levels of the demand elasticity coefficients either insignificant or close to 
insignificance. Hence, it seems that within the group of R&D performers demand elas-
ticity is not as important in determining profitability as in a sample including non-R&D 
performers as well. In this sample the average estimated unconditional profit over sales 
in 2012 is 5 %. A percentage point increase in R&D investments 2010 would decrease 
profitability of the average R&D performing supplier with a buyer concentration of 
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36 % and a market share of 26 % by 0.05 percentage points on average. This corre-
sponds to a 1 % decrease in profits. This is considerably lower than in the full sample. 
The effect for a monopolistic supplier is again positive. A percentage point increase in 
R&D intensity 2010 would increase profitability by 0.4 percentage points and corre-
sponds to an increase in profits by 8 %. Contrastingly, a fully dependent supplier, i. e. 
with a share of sales by the largest three buyers of 100 %, would experience a drop in 
profitability 2012 by 0.61 percentage points due to a percentage point increase in R&D 
intensity 2010. This implies a profit loss of about 12 %. 
2.1.6 Concluding remarks 
Section 2.1 explores the effect of bargaining power in vertical relationships on the prof-
itability of suppliers’ R&D investments. Studies on the relationship between R&D, in-
novation and firm profitability mostly concentrate on the impact of horizontal market 
structure which follows traditional industrial organization literature that emphasizes the 
importance of market concentration and entry barriers for firm profitability. While 
providing inconclusive results, none of the existing studies takes vertical interactions of 
R&D performers into account. 
Building on theoretical and empirical evidence about the effects of bargaining power in 
vertical relationships on a supplier’s profitability, the crucial determinants of a suppli-
er’s bargaining power are identified as the market position and the degree of concentra-
tion in the buyer portfolio. With respect to R&D profitability the latter is expected to 
diminish returns from R&D, while the former is expected to increase it. 
The hypotheses are tested using a sample of 472 German firms from manufacturing 
sectors. The empirical findings support all hypotheses and therefore highlight the im-
portance of taking bargaining power occurring in vertical relationships into account 
when measuring R&D profitability. The estimated effects are considerable: for an aver-
age R&D performing supplier an increase of R&D intensity in 2010 by a percentage 
point would reduce profits by about 14 % in 2012 given the supplier depends complete-
ly on the largest three buyers and does hold an average market share. Contrastingly, a 
monopolist R&D performing supplier with average buyer concentration would experi-
ence a profit increase by 10 % in 2012. What is more, the findings support the hypothe-
sis of a lagged impact of R&D investments on a supplier’s R&D profitability (Ra-
venscraft and Scherer, 1982). 
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The findings are an important contribution to the existing literature for several reasons. 
First, because this is the first study that analyses the effects of supplier’s bargaining 
power on the profitability of R&D. Second, the sheer magnitude of the effects indicates 
that further research with respect to the R&D incentives for suppliers facing bargaining 
power is needed. 
There are opportunities for improvement – both theoretically and empirically – which 
are left to future research. From a theoretical point of view, it would be useful to have a 
model explaining how R&D incentives are shaped by bargaining. Therefore, R&D 
should be integrated in the existing bargaining framework as it was pioneered by the 
model of Inderst and Wey (2007). In addition, bargaining models concerned with buyer 
power are often limited to monopoly in the supply market and separate downstream 
markets. It would be useful for empirical purpose – and especially for the question how 
bargaining power affects R&D profitability – if upstream competition is introduced. 
Empirically, it would be worthwhile to gather information for each of the suppliers’ 
buyers instead using aggregated shares. In contrast to this study, it would allow the gen-
eration of buyer-specific outside option values. In addition, it would help to have infor-
mation on all products which are supplied to the buyer and the respective market share 
of the supplier in all according markets. With that information it would be possible to 
render a suppliers’ outside options even more precisely. Moreover, it would be interest-
ing to collect information about factors which are likely to determine the buyers’ out-
side options, e. g. the share of inputs sourced from a particular supplier, product markets 
the buyers are active in, the concentration level in the respective market and so on. 
Thus, more information on the nature of the buyers would be invaluable and would al-
low for the analysis of countervailing power for instance (Galbraith, 1956). Finally, it 
may be helpful to have data on vertical relationships over a longer period of time. This 
would improve on one hand the analysis of the interaction between suppliers’ R&D 
activities and their bargaining power as there may be a considerable time lag between 
the implementation of successfully developed products or production technologies and 
their impact on suppliers’ bargaining power. On the other hand observations of vertical 
relationships over a longer time period would also allow for an analysis of effects 
emerging from downstream activities e. g. increasing concentration through merger, 
firm entries or exits. 
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2.2 Buyer power and suppliers’ incentives to innovate20 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The impact of market structures on innovation activities has received much attention in 
innovation research. The vast majority of the literature concentrates on the effects of 
horizontal competition on innovation incentives and neglects the incentives resulting 
from vertical interactions in markets. With many industries experiencing concentration 
processes suppliers are often confronted with powerful buyers. Yet, relatively little is 
known about how powerful buyers may affect innovation incentives of upstream firms. 
A common belief is that exertion of buyer power negatively affects innovation decisions 
of suppliers because buyer power will lead to decreasing profits of suppliers, which at 
the same time lowers their investment incentives. This is expected to reduce the variety 
in suppliers' range of products (OECD, 1998; European Commission, 1999a; Inderst 
and Shaffer, 2007). However, recent theoretical findings suggest that buyer power might 
have positive impacts on suppliers' innovation incentives (Inderst and Wey, 2007; In-
derst and Wey, 2011). 
So far, the role of suppliers' innovation incentives in the presence of powerful buyers 
has been discussed largely from a theoretical perspective.21 Moreover, theoretical results 
on the effect of buyer power on suppliers’ innovation incentives are inconclusive. From 
an empirical point of view, only a few studies exist that analyse suppliers' incentives to 
innovate when facing a powerful buyer. These studies often lack an objective measure 
for buyer power on firm level but rather use either aggregated industry measures or 
firms' subjective assessment whether they are confronted with powerful buyers. Fur-
thermore, analyses of the relationship between buyer power and suppliers' incentives to 
innovate are mostly focused on particular industries which are perceived to be heavily 
affected by concentration processes among buyers. Besides, all these studies tend to 
neglect the impact of buyer market characteristics. 
For our empirical study we make use of a dataset containing 1,036 observations from 
German firms across manufacturing and service sectors based on the German Innova-
tion Survey. It contains rich information on aspects of bargaining power in vertical rela-
20 An earlier version of section 2.2 has been published as ZEW Discussion Paper: Köhler, C. and C. 
Rammer (2012), Buyer power and suppliers’ incentives to innovate, ZEW Discussion Paper 12-058. 
21 For a comprehensive review of the theoretical development on buyer power see e. g. Inderst and Maz-
zarotto (2008). 
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tions and suppliers’ innovation activities. In contrast to existing studies the dataset ena-
bles us to apply objective measures for buyer power. What is more, we are able to dif-
ferentiate different degrees of buyer power which is a further novelty of this study. 
Competition and technology intensity in buyer industries are likely to impact suppliers’ 
innovation incentives as well. Thus our study takes these downstream characteristics 
into account and provides a first attempt to explore joint effects between buyer power 
and downstream industry environment. Finally, we contribute to the literature by disen-
tangling the effects of buyer power on the suppliers' innovation incentives into the effect 
on the decision to start innovation activities and the effect on the amount of resources 
spent on innovation. 
Section 2.2.2 reviews the theoretical literature on the effects of buyer power on suppli-
ers' innovation incentives while section 2.2.3 provides an overview of existing empirical 
literature in this context. The following section presents the data, the variable specifica-
tion and our estimation strategy. Descriptive statistics as well as estimation results and 
robustness checks are presented in section 2.2.5 while section 2.2.6 provides first evi-
dence on the joint effects of buyer power and downstream industry characteristics. Sec-
tion 2.2.7 concludes and offers possible ways for further research. 
2.2.2 Theoretical framework 
Literature provides different approaches to the emergence and impacts of buyer power. 
In contract theory it is assumed that supplier and buyer negotiate bilaterally over prices 
and quantities of the respective good or service to be traded. Given that contracting be-
tween the supplier and the buyer leads to joint profit, the split of the profit then depends 
on the bargaining position of each contracting party. The strength of the bargaining po-
sition and hence bargaining power is determined by the profits to be realised when the 
contract is made with an alternative supplier or buyer. The higher such disagreement or 
outside-option payoffs in relation to the counterparts payoffs the stronger the bargaining 
position of the respective contractor. According to this approach, buyer power results 
from the fact that more valuable outside options are at the disposal of the buyer thereby 
allowing the buyer to extract a larger share of joint profits (Inderst and Valletti, 2007; 
Dobson and Inderst, 2008). In this paper we adopt the view of buyer power being a con-
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sequence of bargaining power exerted by the downstream firm (buyer) on the upstream 
firm (supplier) (Dobson and Inderst, 2008; Inderst and Mazzarotto, 2008).22 
When deciding on investment in innovation efforts a supplier will consider the dis-
counted value of future rents collectable from this activity and whether these rents are 
appropriable. Given that buyer power results from a stronger bargaining position of the 
buyer relative to the supplier, the effect of buyer power on suppliers' innovation incen-
tives seems to be clear-cut: When facing powerful buyers, the supplier has less incentive 
to innovate, as the appropriability of innovation rents is too low. Recent theoretical 
studies show, however, that buyer power may provide additional innovation incentives 
for suppliers. Suppliers facing large buyers have an incentive to invest in both product 
and process innovations, given that size is the sole source of buyer power (Inderst and 
Wey, 2007). While process innovation allows lower unit costs at high volumes com-
pared to a supplier facing many smaller buyers, product innovation renders higher reve-
nues compared to the old product. Either way, supplier innovation leads to a devaluation 
of the buyer's outside options and in turn strengthens the bargaining position of the sup-
plier allowing for a larger share of joint profits. 
Given the life-cycle hypothesis of Utterback and Abernathy (1975), a positive effect of 
buyer power on suppliers' innovation incentives might also occur since suppliers with 
few buyers may suffer less from uncertainty over innovation demand of buyers and 
therefore have a declined risk of innovation failure (Klepper, 1996). In addition, a larger 
size of orders might induce higher incentives for suppliers to engage in R&D as there is 
more certainty in the sales of new products (Peters, 2000). 
In contrast, merger in buyer markets may reduce incentives for product differentiation 
by suppliers. Product differentiation is often linked to innovation since entering new 
product markets typically constitutes an innovation activity. In case of a buyer merger, 
the consolidated buyer may be better off using a single sourcing strategy, i.e. to stock 
only goods of one supplier. If the likelihood of a buyer merger is increasing, this strate-
gy will lead to a lower degree of product differentiation of suppliers (Inderst and Shaf-
fer, 2007). Large buyers may have an incentive to force their suppliers into contracts 
which constitute an exclusive relationship between supplier and buyer. Such supply 
22 One could also study buyer power in the framework of monopsonistic behaviour (see e. g. Mas-Colell 
et al., 1995). The main argument of this approach is that monopsonistic firms strategically reduce demand 
in order to maximise profits. However, this may not apply for most supplier-buyer relationships. 
                                                 
Bargaining in vertical relationships 36 
 
contracts will reduce upstream innovation incentive because suppliers will bear disad-
vantages of low-scale production and have less incentive to innovate (Stefanadis, 1997). 
What is more, larger buyers can more credible threat to integrate backwards and may 
intensify competition on supplier markets (Katz, 1987). By breaking up collusion 
among suppliers they lower suppliers' profits (Scherer and Ross, 1990). This effect is 
increasing in the size of the buyer (Snyder, 1996; Snyder, 1998). Also, they are in a po-
sition to alleviate market entries on the supply side, e.g. by overtaking fix costs of oth-
erwise unprofitable entrants or pre-committing some of their purchases (Dobson and 
Inderst, 2008). 
The concern about negative effects of buyer power on innovation incentives of suppliers 
led the UK Competition Commission (CC) to conduct a market investigation focusing 
on adverse effects on competition in the supply for groceries in the UK due to the be-
haviour of retailers. One part of the investigation examined whether buyer power of 
retailers may "impose excessive risks and unexpected costs on suppliers, which reduces 
suppliers' incentive or ability to invest and innovate. This could lead to reduced capaci-
ty, reduced product quality and fewer new product offerings" (Competition Commis-
sion, 2008; p. 157). Although the CC did not find evidence that UK grocery suppliers 
exhibit less innovation efforts, they expect the innovation performance to be decreasing 
in future if consequences of buyer power, e.g. retrospective price adjustments or exces-
sive transfer of risks, continue at the observed level (Competition Commission, 2008; 
p. 173). 
The results of recent theoretical literature regarding the impact of buyer power on sup-
pliers’ innovation incentive are inconclusive. Hence, the question how buyer power 
affects a supplier’s innovation incentives can only be answered empirically. Therefore, 
we formulate two rivalling hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Buyer power will positively affect the innovation incentives of a suppli-
er. 
Hypothesis 1b: Buyer power will negatively affect the innovation incentives of a sup-
plier. 
2.2.3 Earlier Research 
Empirical studies frequently find a negative relationship between buyer power and in-
novation activities of suppliers. Existing studies follow quite different approaches to 
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capture buyer power and innovation incentives of suppliers. Farber (1981) analysed the 
effect of market structure in the buyer market on R&D efforts in supplier industries us-
ing cross-sectional industry level data of 50 4-digit manufacturing SIC-industries from 
the US. Market structure in both supplier and buyer markets is measured by concentra-
tion ratios, reflecting the share of industry sales generated by the four largest enterpris-
es. Employing a simultaneous equation model which explains the share of scientists and 
engineers in the workforce, the advertising intensity and the seller concentration rate, he 
finds evidence that concentration in the buyer market affects R&D incentives of suppli-
ers. The sign of this effect depends on the concentration in the supplier market. If the 
supplying industry is weakly concentrated, an increase in concentration of the buyer 
industry will have a negative effect on the share of scientists and engineers in the work-
force. Conversely, this effect is positive if the market concentration in the supplier in-
dustry is sufficiently high. 
The findings are in line with the results of Peters (2000) who investigates the effect of 
market structure in the buyer market both on suppliers' innovation inputs and innovation 
outputs using firm level data consisting of 401 German automotive suppliers. Innova-
tion inputs are measured by R&D expenditure divided by sales as well as by total inno-
vation expenditure divided by sales.23 Innovation output is captured by the introduction 
of product or process innovations within a two year span. Market structure in the buyer 
industry is represented by the industry's concentration ratio (CR3) and by an additional 
dummy variable indicating whether the supplier has 10 or more customers. Regarding 
innovation intensity, the result indicates that firms supplying to highly concentrated 
buyer industries exhibit lower levels of innovation intensity. The negative correlation is 
mitigated, however, if suppliers are operating in a concentrated industry. With respect to 
R&D intensity, market structure in the buyer industry is found to moderate the effect of 
market structure in the supplier industry. Suppliers operating in a concentrated industry 
and supplying highly concentrated buyer industries exhibit a significantly higher R&D 
intensity. Conversely, suppliers operating in a concentrated industry and supplying buy-
er industries with a low degree of concentration show significantly lower R&D intensi-
ties. There is no evidence that the market structure of buyer industries has a significant 
impact on the supplier's probability to introduce new products. Also, the supplier's 
23 Innovation expenditure includes expenses not only for R&D but also for other activities aiming at the 
introduction of new products or processes, such as design, marketing, training and purchase of machinery, 
equipment, software and intellectual property. 
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probability to introduce process innovations is not affected by the concentration in the 
buyers industry but by the number of customers. 
Weiss and Wittkopp (2003a; 2003b) use survey data from German food manufacturers. 
Innovative activity is measured by the overall number of new products introduced with-
in a three year time span (Weiss and Wittkopp, 2003b) and by the number of new prod-
ucts with either regular or superior quality introduced within a three year time span 
(Weiss and Wittkopp, 2003a). Market power of the retailers is captured by firms' as-
sessment whether retailers are able to exert pricing pressure on them on a scale ranging 
from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). Using a small sample of 88 and 87 firms, respective-
ly, they observe that suppliers experiencing very high pricing pressure of retailers intro-
duce significantly less new products. With respect to quality differences among the 
newly introduced products they yield mixed results. While they observe a negative rela-
tionship between retailers' pricing pressure and the number of new products with regular 
quality, retailers' pricing pressure does not have a significant effect on the number of 
new products with premium quality. 
2.2.4 Empirical study 
2.2.4.1 Data 
The empirical part of our study employs firm level information from the MIP which 
consists of a representative stratified random sample of German firms. Data collection is 
carried out by the ZEW on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. 
The MIP provides annual information on innovative behaviour in the German manufac-
turing sector since 1992 and in the service sector since 1994 and is at the same time the 
German contribution to the European CIS. Definitions of innovation and innovative 
activities are taken from the OECD’s Oslo Manual. The target population of the MIP 
are enterprises located in Germany with at least five employees.24  
The survey wave 2005 of the MIP offers unique information on firms' market environ-
ment, their R&D spending, R&D cooperation and several other informations which are 
described in more detail in the following section. The wave 2005 is merged with data 
from the survey wave 2006 to observe innovation behaviour of firms in the following 
period. Since we are interested in business-to-business relationships, we drop all obser-
24 For a more detailed description of the MIP see Peters (2008) and Peters and Rammer (2013). 
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vations of firms indicating that private households or public institutions are the largest 
customers. Additionally, we exclude firms from the sectors energy, mining, recycling, 
sewage and radio and television as firms in these sectors may behave significantly dif-
ferent in terms of investment behaviour due to strong regulations. Moreover, firms sup-
plying R&D services are usually small but exhibit high R&D intensities and supply few 
firms. As they conduct R&D not necessarily for own purpose but on behalf of their con-
tractors we exclude them as well. After removing all outliers and deleting all observa-
tions with missing values in the variables required to estimate the model, we eventually 
arrive at a sample of 1,036 firms representing the Nace 2-digit industries 15-22, 24-36, 
51, 60-67, 72 and 74.25 
2.2.4.2 Variables26 
2.2.4.2.1 Innovation incentives 
A number of authors have proposed different concepts for measuring innovation activi-
ties.27 Since we are interested in innovation incentives we choose an input measure as a 
proxy, as it represents discounted future rents attached to innovative efforts no matter 
whether these efforts are successful. We use the R&D intensity (RDINT) which is de-
fined as the expenditure on R&D activities divided by employees. It is widely used as 
measure of innovation input in the literature (see e. g. Cohen and Levin, 1989; Crepon 
et al., 1998). As a large share of firms does not have any R&D expenditure the distribu-
tion of the R&D intensity is heavily skewed. In order to normalize it, the logarithm is 
taken, i. e. R&D intensity enters the estimation in logs. 
2.2.4.2.2 Buyer power 
Our main explanatory variable of interest is buyer power. As we define buyer power to 
result from a relatively stronger bargaining position of the buyer compared to the sup-
plier, we have to construct a measure which captures whether a supplier is confronted 
with buyer power or not. One of the factors determining a supplier’s bargaining position 
is the share of sales generated by one buyer, as this can indicate substantial economic 
dependency. Once "a buyer accounts for sufficiently large fraction of a supplier's overall 
25 Nace is the industrial classification system used in European Union statistics. This chapter makes use of 
Nace Rev. 1.1. The breakdown of industries is presented in Table B 1 in Appendix B.2. 
26 For an overview of all applied variable definitions see Table B 2 in Appendix B.2. 
27 For an overview see Haagedorn and Cloodt (2003). 
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business, this may lead to a more-than-proportional reduction in the value of the suppli-
er's profits outside a relationship with the particular buyer" (Dobson and Inderst, 2008; 
p.339). This is due to the fact that in case the supplier loses the contract with the buyer, 
the supplier's economic viability could be undermined. Losing a large contract will re-
sult in free capacity on the supplier's side and will require the supplier to significantly 
lower prices in order to sell the excessive capacity to remaining buyers (Inderst and 
Wey, 2007). Therefore, our measure includes the extent to which a supplier's sales de-
pend on the three largest customers. Section 2.1 provides evidence, that this measure is 
correlated with lower profitability of suppliers. Hence, suppliers with a concentrated 
buyer structure may suffer from the exertion of buyer power. 
The degree to which a supplier is confronted with buyer power also depends on the 
buyer’s opportunities to switch to another supplier. The ease of switching is determined 
by the market structure in the supply market on the one hand and the substitutability of 
the demanded product on the other. A monopoly in the supply market does not allow for 
an outside option of the buyer, resulting in a powerful bargaining position of the suppli-
er, even if the buyer is a monopsonist.28 Conversely, a polypolistic supply market and a 
monopsonistic buyer market enable the buyer to behave opportunistically and might 
lead to hold-up (Klein et al., 1978). That is, after the supplier carried out necessary in-
vestments to fulfil contracted obligations, the buyer may initiate ex-post negotiations 
and force the supplier to accept conditions which reduce profit margins or even lead to 
losses (Williamson, 1975). Thus, our measure has to include information about the con-
centration in the supplier's market and the substitutability of the supplied products. 
We consider different degrees of buyer power and subsequently define two measures 
(see Table 2.5) combining information from several questions in the survey 2005. First, 
we use a question on the share of sales with the three largest customers which was sur-
veyed as a categorical variable. Categories were defined as less than 20 %, 20-49 %, 50-
99 % and 100 %. Another categorical variable we make use of is the number of compet-
itors in the supplier’s main market. Here categories were defined as none, 1-5, 6-15 and 
more than 15. Finally, we use the supplier’s assessment whether products of competitors 
are easy to substitute with own products. The statement was given with a 4-point-Likert 
28 Such circumstances, characterized by highly concentrated markets on both sides, have been described 
as a countervailing power situation by Galbraith (1956). 
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scale allowing to choose between the assessments “fully applies”, “somewhat applies”, 
“applies very little” and “applies not at all”. 
Table 2.5: Definitions of buyer power measures 
Measure of 
buyer power 
Share of sales generated with 
the three largest customers 
Number of a suppli-
er’s competitors 
Degree of substitutability of 
a supplier’s product 
BP_L ≥50%    
BP_H ≥50%                      AND >5 OR High substitutability (agree, fully agree) 
Our first measure for being exposed to buyer power (BP_L) is a dummy variable reflect-
ing the fact that the three largest customers of a supplier account for 50 or more percent 
of the sales. We interpret this as a degree of buyer concentration which could seriously 
undermine the economic viability of a supplying firm.29 Hence it is included in all two 
measures of buyer power. Our second measure (BP_H) equals BP_L but takes unit val-
ue only, if additionally the supplier has either more than 5 competitors or products are 
easy to substitute. Compared to BP_L, this definition reflects an even weaker bargaining 
position of the supplier since it not only covers concentration in terms of sales but also a 
buyer’s opportunities to switch to other suppliers. Accordingly, we expect a stronger 
effect of BP_H on a supplier’s incentive to innovate compared to BP_L as it captures 
buyer power even more precisely.30 
Note that this operationalization of buyer power deviates in two important ways from 
existing studies. First, it measures the impact of buyer concentration on firm level and 
not on industry level as it is the case in most other studies (Farber, 1981; Peters, 2000). 
This is an important distinction because it may be sufficient for the execution of buyer 
power to have a large share in the business of the supplier regardless of the concentra-
29 One might object that this measure is not providing a sufficiently accurate degree of buyer power, as 
the share of sales generated by the largest single customer could be considerably lower. Given that the 
largest three buyers contribute equal shares, the smallest possible share generated by one buyer is roughly 
17%. If they contribute unequal shares of sales, than at least for one buyer the share must be higher than 
17%. In the merger case Rewe/Billa and Meinl, the European Commission established that a supplier 
whose business with the two merging chains accounted for more than 22% has to be considered as "eco-
nomically dependent" on them. A survey among grocery producers provided evidence that this was the 
most suppliers could afford to lose without a serious danger of bankruptcy. Hence, we consider our meas-
ure to be sufficiently precise in order to correctly reflect serious economic dependency from buyers (Eu-
ropean Commission, 1999b). 
30 Note that if supplier and buyer cooperate for R&D, it is likely that we observe high R&D expenditure 
together with a high buyers’ sales share. This would lead to biased results as we are interested in the ef-
fect of buyer power outside of R&D cooperation. Hence, we exclude all firms which indicated to have 
R&D cooperation with customers. 
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tion in the buyer industry. This is highlighted by the results presented in section 2.1 
which show that buyer concentration has an adverse effect on firms’ profitability. Sec-
ond, our measure is likely to be more objective than measures from other studies based 
on survey data (e.g. Weiss and Wittkopp, 2003a; 2003b) which exploit information 
from a question asking for the supplier’s assessment on retailers’ market power or pric-
ing pressure. In contrast to existing studies the richness of our dataset allows the explo-
ration of different degrees of buyer power. Therefore, our analysis provides a valuable 
contribution to the empirical literature on buyer power and supplier’s innovation incen-
tives. Finally, our study builds on a sample of firms from various industries, while the 
firm-level studies of Peters (2000) and Weiss and Wittkopp (2003a, 2003b) deal with 
suppliers in a particular industry. 
2.2.4.2.3 Competition and R&D intensity in the buyer’s industry 
It is likely that R&D incentives provided by powerful buyers differ according to charac-
teristics of the industry they are active in. 
An important attribute of the buyer’s industry to affect suppliers’ R&D incentives is the 
intensity of competition. Recall that according to the bargaining literature the joint prof-
it is the sum of the downstream and the upstream profit generated by the contract be-
tween supplier and buyer (e. g. Chipty and Snyder, 1999). If competition in the down-
stream market is strong, margins in the downstream market are low.31 Holding the up-
stream profit constant, this implies that the joint profit shrinks. Hence, the profit of a 
supplier from the contract with a buyer under intense competition will be lower. Under 
such circumstances the expected rents of innovating may be too small to induce R&D 
investments on the suppliers' side, especially against the background of high uncertainty 
and the financial burden attached to an innovation project. One could therefore expect a 
negative effect of strong downstream competition on suppliers’ innovation incentive. 
On a different note, high downstream competition can also lead to increasing down-
stream demand for innovative products which allows the buyer to gain a competitive 
advantage over competitors. That is, buyers in very competitive markets may be willing 
to invest into intermediary products allowing them to lower the costs of production and 
distribution, to differentiate away from competitors or to enter new markets. According 
to the demand-pull hypothesis this attracts also innovations directed towards such de-
31 This holds no matter whether competition is a la Bertrand or Cournot. 
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mand (Schmookler, 1966; Scherer, 1982b). This would imply a positive effect of strong 
downstream competition on suppliers’ innovation incentive. 
Besides downstream competition intensity, supplier’s R&D incentives should also be 
affected by the buyer’s R&D intensity. If competition in the downstream market is driv-
en by technology development, buyers are urged to invest heavily into the development 
of new products and new process technology. This in turn, reduces their profits. In the 
context of patent races, some part of this investment may not be turned into commercial 
success but is sunk hurting profits further (Fudenberg et al., 1983). Given bargaining 
over the joint profit between supplier and buyer, this would again imply a negative ef-
fect which is similar to the argumentation regarding the impact of strong competition. 
Additionally, the start of own R&D activities often requires considerable investments 
due to a minimum size of such projects. The minimum size of projects aiming at the 
supply of R&D intensive industries may well be larger, thereby lowering the incentives 
to start R&D activities at all, given the risk, uncertainty and high cost attached to them. 
In contrast, demand-pull due to high investments in R&D may have a positive effect on 
suppliers’ R&D incentives. 
Hence, it is necessary to control for differences in the buyers’ industries with respect to 
both competition and R&D intensity. To derive measures for the intensity of competi-
tion and R&D in the buyer market, it is desirable to have information about the identity 
of the most important buyers. Such data is extremely difficult to obtain through volun-
tary surveys since most firms will refrain from disclosing such information, and some-
times confidentiality agreements with buyers restrict disclosure at all. In the MIP survey 
2005, firms were asked to name the sector of the largest three customers. Questionnaire 
instructions helped firms to provide buyer sector information that corresponds to a Nace 
3-digit level, though firms did not give industry codes but a short description of sectors 
which have been coded to Nace 3-digits. Based on this sector information, we construct 
industry level measures of competition. For the degree of competition intensity we use 
an industry's price cost margin (BUYPCM) since it gives an indication whether firms are 
able to achieve margins high above their marginal costs. For the sake of interpretation, 
we transform the variable to 1–PCM, i.e. values close to zero indicate low price compe-
tition in the buyer market and values close to one refer to very intense price competi-
tion. As an indicator of technological competition we use a sector’s R&D intensity 
(BUYRDINT: R&D expenditure over sales) since firms will dedicate a higher share of 
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their resources to R&D if keeping pace with technological change is crucial for compet-
ing within the market. 
We do not have information on the location of the largest buyers which implies that we 
do not know whether they are domestic or international buyers. We do know the firms’ 
export share in total sales however. Thus, we calculate both BUYPCM and BUYRDINT 
for Germany and for OECD countries, to capture the intensity of competition and R&D 
on domestic and foreign markets. We weight the values by the respective share of a 
supplier’s domestic and international sales.32 In addition, we also introduce dummy var-
iables indicating the position of the buyer industry in the value chain (BUYIND). We 
distinguish between the production of raw materials, intermediaries, capital goods, con-
sumer goods, producer services and consumer services.33 
2.2.4.2.4 Competitive environment of the supplier 
A supplier’s incentive to invest in innovation activities may be shaped by the competi-
tive environment in their own market as well. Therefore, we control for concentration in 
the supplier's market since a monopoly or oligopoly may allow for higher margins and 
thus for higher investments in R&D or conversely for lower incentives to invest in 
R&D.34 Concentration in the supplier's market is measured by two dummy variables 
capturing the number of main competitors. The first dummy takes the value one if the 
firm responded to have no competitors and zero otherwise (NOCOMP). The second 
dummy takes the value one if the firm indicated to have at most 5 main competitors and 
zero otherwise (COMP). For descriptive purposes we construct a dummy variable for 
the reference category of firms with 6 or more competitors (COMP6+). 
What is more, a high degree of product diversification offers more outside options to the 
supplier. Hence the degree of a supplier’s product diversification is included, measured 
as the share of sales which is not generated by a supplier’s main product line (DIVERS). 
2.2.4.2.5 Further control variables 
Following the literature on firms propensity to innovate (see e. g. Cohen, 1995; Crepon 
et al., 1998), we also include firm size measured by the number of employees in logs 
32 For a detailed description of buyer market measures see Appendix B.1. 
33 The definition of the industry groups can be found in Table B 3 in Appendix B.2. 
34 For an overview of the extensive literature dealing with the effects of market structure on innovation 
see e.g. Cohen (2010). 
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(SIZE), firm age in logs (AGE) and whether a firm belongs to an enterprise group 
(GROUP) as explanatory variables. Moreover, we also control for a firm's sector affilia-
tion (IND) and whether a firm is located in East Germany (EAST). 
2.2.4.3 Estimation strategy 
Innovation incentives of suppliers are shaped by a supplier's bargaining position vis-à-
vis its buyers and by the characteristics of buyer industries. Accordingly, we model the 
innovation decision of a supplier to be dependent on a measure reflecting the supplier’s 
bargaining position, the attributes of downstream industries and further determinants. 
Since we measure innovation incentives by R&D intensity, we have to take a possible 
selection bias into account as this variable is only observable for firms that engage in 
research and development activities. To control for this we apply the well-known gener-
alised Tobit model (Heckman, 1979). 
This approach furthermore enables us to separate the effect of buyer power and buyers’ 
industries’ characteristics on the supplier's probability to start R&D activities from the 
effect on the decision on how much to invest in R&D once the supplier decided to start 
R&D. This constitutes an interesting extension to existing studies on this topic. 
As many authors point out, when using a generalised Tobit model one needs to make 
sure to have an exclusion restriction which explains the selection but not the structural 
equation and is not correlated to the error term of the latter. We use firm size as exclu-
sion restriction for several reasons. First, there are numerous studies which find that 
firm size will positively affect the probability to start R&D activities as larger firms 
have an advantage in spreading the fixed costs of R&D over larger output.35 Second, 
empirical research on the relationship between firm size and R&D efforts among R&D 
performers shows that a linear relationship between R&D expenditure and firm size fits 
data mostly best (Bound et al., 1984; Cohen et al., 1987; Scherer, 1984). This implies a 
proportional relationship between firm size and R&D which should disappear if R&D 
intensity is scaled by size. Third, related research frequently uses firm size as an exclu-
sion restriction in this context (see e. g. Griffith et al., 2006a).36  
35 This reason corresponds to stylized fact 1 presented in Cohen and Klepper (1996). See also the refer-
ences cited therein. 
36 We also experimented with the inclusion of the firm size in the structural equation but it turned out that 
for each model specification the estimated coefficient of size is insignificant while the other coefficient 
estimates do not change substantially. 
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In the first stage we estimate the probability of a supplier to spend a positive amount on 
R&D activities in the next period. In the second stage we estimate R&D intensity in the 
next period, given the supplier started R&D activities.37 Analogous to Crepon et al. 
(1998) we assume that firms take up R&D activities if discounted future profits from 
R&D activities are positive. Let RD*i,t+1 be the discounted future profits from R&D of 
supplier i in period t+1. We observe that firms invest in R&D in t+1 if RD*i,t+1 is posi-
tive. Furthermore we assume the true R&D intensity (RDINT*i,t+1) of supplier i in period 
t+1 is determined by an identical set of explanatory variables with the exception of firm 
size. Then our estimated model is described by equation (2.3) denoting the selection 
equation and equation (2.4) denoting the intensity equation. 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖+1∗       = 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 (2.3) 
  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖+1∗ = 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌2𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 (2.4) 
  
While BP reflects our set of dummy variables capturing buyer power, the vector BUY 
contains the elements BUYPCM and BUYRDINT, i. e. the intensity of competition and 
R&D in the buyer industry, respectively. The vector SUP contains the elements NO-
COMP, COMP and DIVERS. All other variables are captured by a vector of control 
variables (X). The unobserved error term are represented by ε and µ, respectively. Note 
that vector X is identical to vector Y with the exception of firm size, since we need to 
take the exclusion restriction into account. Due to the fact, that RDINT*i,t+1 is only ob-
servable when RD*i,t+1 is positive, we assume joint normality of both disturbance terms 
εi,t and  µi,t. 
2.2.5 Results 
2.2.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.6 shows descriptive statistics of the variables of interest differentiated by the 
supplier’s R&D status. The descriptive analysis reveals strong differences between 
R&D performers and non-R&D performers. The share of R&D performing firms in the 
37 We use the R&D activities in t+1 to avoid simultaneity problems, which may occur from the fact that 
R&D investments of a supplier can also have an effect on a supplier’s exposure to buyer power as well as 
a supplier’s market environment. 
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sample is about 46 % with an average R&D intensity of 10,000 DM38 per employee. 
The average R&D intensity in the full sample is 4,000 DM per employee. 
Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics differentiated by a supplier’s R&D status 
                                           
  
Full Sample  R&D 
performer 
 Non-R&D 
performer 
 T-test 
 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD   
RDINT 
 
0.004 0.013 
 
0.010 0.017 
 
  
 
  
BP_La 
 
0.330 0.470 
 
0.275 0.447 
 
0.377 0.485 
 
3.482 *** 
BP_Ha 
 
0.244 0.430 
 
0.191 0.394 
 
0.289 0.454 
 
3.684 *** 
BUYPCMb 
 
0.638 0.128 
 
0.657 0.131 
 
0.621 0.123 
 
-4.574 *** 
BUYRDINTb 
 
1.891 2.379 
 
2.086 2.425 
 
1.725 2.329 
 
-2.446 ** 
NOCOMPa 
 
0.026 0.159 
 
0.008 0.091 
 
0.041 0.199 
 
3.303 *** 
COMPa 
 
0.580 0.494 
 
0.620 0.486 
 
0.546 0.498 
 
-2.387 ** 
COMP6+a  0.394 0.489  0.372 0.484  0.413 0.493  1.334  
DIVERS 
 
0.285 0.238 
 
0.327 0.235 
 
0.249 0.235 
 
-5.328 *** 
SIZE 
 
163 376.59 
 
228 484.23 
 
107 237.88 
 
-5.226 *** 
AGE 
 
18 17.808 
 
19 19.324 
 
18 16.423 
 
-0.481 *** 
GROUPa 
 
0.562 0.496 
 
0.641 0.480 
 
0.495 0.500 
 
-4.771 *** 
EASTa 
 
0.337 0.473 
 
0.313 0.464 
 
0.357 0.480 
 
1.497 
 N  1,036   476   560     
a Dummy variable. b For details on the calculation see Appendix B.1. Columns with heading SD display standard deviations. The last 
two columns display t-statistics whether a T-test on mean difference between the group of R&D performers and non-R&D perform-
ers rejects the Null hypothesis of no difference. The asterisks indicate the corresponding level of significance (* 10 %, ** 5 %, 
*** 1 %). The variables RDINT, SIZE and AGE are presented in original values. The variable COMP6+ indicates the reference 
category of 6 or more competitors. Descriptive statistics of the remaining variables are shown in Table B 4 in Appendix B.2. 
With respect to our measures of buyer power, we observe significantly lower shares of 
enterprises being subject to buyer power among the group of R&D performers. For 
BP_L the share among non-R&D performers is about 38 % while in the group of R&D 
active firms it is only 28 %. The share of firms captured by the stronger measure of 
buyer power BP_H is smaller compared to BP_L. The share for BP_H among non-R&D 
performers is 29 % compared to 19 % among the R&D performers. Also, R&D active 
firms supply to more competitive and technology intensive buyer markets. At the same 
time, they seem to be exposed to stronger horizontal competition. Their share among 
firms holding a monopoly is significantly smaller while it is vice versa among the group 
of oligopolists. 
In addition, R&D active suppliers are more diversified in their product range, have more 
employees, belong more frequently to an enterprise group and are less often located in 
Eastern Germany. 
38 The unit of currency in the MIP is for historical reasons still Deutsche Mark (DM). 1 DM corresponds 
to 0.51 Euros. 
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With respect to industry differences, we observe a significantly higher share of R&D 
performers in chemicals, machinery, electronics, furniture/toys/sports and 
IT/telecommunication (see Table B 4 in Appendix B.2). On the contrary, the share of 
non-R&D performers is higher in wholesale, transportation, media services and consult-
ing/advertising. Regarding the buyers industry, there is a higher share of R&D perform-
ers supplying to buyers producing industry intermediaries and capital goods while non-
R&D performers make up a higher share among the firms supplying to buyers affiliated 
to enterprise services. 
2.2.5.2 Regression results 
Table 2.7 shows the estimated coefficients of the empirical model presented in section 
2.2.4.3. For better exposition of the results regarding the different measures of buyer 
power, columns I and II present the coefficient estimates of the selection equations 
while estimation results from the intensity equations are reported in columns III and IV, 
respectively. BP_i corresponds to BP_L in column I and III and to BP_H in column II 
and IV. Note that the table displays coefficients not marginal effects for the Probit mod-
els in columns I and II. 
Let us first consider the results of the selection equations which explore the determi-
nants of a supplier’s decision to invest in R&D. With respect to our measures of a sup-
plier’s exposure to buyer power we find significantly negative coefficient estimates for 
both BP_L and BP_H. The magnitude is larger for BP_H. The predicted probability to 
be an R&D performer in the next period is on average 48 % for a supplier which is un-
affected by buyer power as defined by BP_H. Being exposed to buyer power reduces 
the likelihood to 35 % which corresponds to a marginal effect of a discrete change, cal-
culated at the means of all other variables, by about 13 percentage points. In case of 
BP_L the drop in probability is 11 percentage points. Hence, a switch from no buyer 
power to strong buyer power (BP_H) reduces the likelihood of a supplier to take up 
R&D activities by 27 %. This is a substantial reduction and provides strong support for 
hypothesis 1b. What is more, the results are in line with previous empirical studies. 
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Table 2.7: Estimation results of generalised Tobit models using different specifications of 
buyer power 
                                             Selection: RDi,t+1   Intensity: RDINT i,t+1 
    I II  III IV 
  BP_L BP_H  BP_L BP_H 
BP_ia  -0.269 *** -0.330 ***  -0.256     -0.366 **                                             
 
(0.100)     (0.107)     
 
(0.170)     (0.186)     
BUYPCMb  0.268     0.252      0.907     0.890     
  
(0.424)     (0.424)     
 
(0.652)     (0.651)     
BUYRDINTb  -0.020     -0.022      0.025     0.023     
  
(0.025)     (0.025)     
 
(0.035)     (0.035)     
NOCOMP a  -0.730 **  -0.879 ***  -0.626     -0.763     
  
(0.335)     (0.336)     
 
(0.719)     (0.728)     
COMP a  0.050     0.009      0.122     0.082     
  
(0.091)     (0.091)     
 
(0.137)     (0.138)     
DIVERS  0.360 *   0.363 *    0.426     0.415     
  
(0.196)     (0.196)     
 
(0.317)     (0.318)     
SIZE  0.232 *** 0.234 ***      
  
(0.034)     (0.034)     
     AGE  -0.072     -0.071      -0.130    -0.128    
  
(0.056)     (0.056)     
 
(0.082)     (0.082)     
GROUP a  0.176 *   0.180 *    0.162     0.174     
  
(0.094)     (0.094)     
 
(0.162)     (0.163)     
EAST a  0.043     0.031      0.139     0.130     
  
(0.098)     (0.098)     
 
(0.149)     (0.149)     
Mills Lambda       1.135 *** 1.148 *** 
       
(0.389)     (0.385)     
Constant  -2.513 *** -2.472 ***  -10.873 *** -10.848 ***     (0.412)     (0.413)       (1.058)     (1.047)     
Industry dummies 
 
yes  yes   yes  yes  Wald-Test: joint signifi-
cance of industry dummies 
 
156.36 *** 155.81 *** 
 
80.24 *** 80.84 *** 
N                                          
 
1,036 
 
1,036 
  
1,036 
 
1,036 
 LR/Wald χ2                               112  111   112  111  P-value                                    0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000   
a Dummy variable. b For details on the calculation see Appendix B.1. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors in 
column III and IV are corrected for the inclusion of the inverse Mills Ratio. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% 
(**) and 1% (***) respectively. Estimation results of the industry dummies are presented in Table B 5 in Appendix B.2. 
In addition, we find that horizontal market structure matters. Being a monopolist reduc-
es the likelihood of being an R&D performer. A switch from a polypolistic market 
structure to monopoly decreases the probability to be an R&D performer on average by 
about 30 percentage points ceteris paribus. As we will see in the next section however, 
this result is not robust to the exclusion of service firms. We find no significant effect of 
downstream industry characteristics to affect a supplier’s R&D decision. 
Finally, the supplier’s degree of substitutability, the supplier’s size and whether the sup-
ply firm belongs to an enterprise group increase the probability of being an R&D per-
former. The latter finding is in line with Cohen and Klepper (1996) who argue that it is 
beneficial if a firm can spread the fix costs of R&D over larger output. Also the industry 
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affiliation of the supplier does have significant impact on a supplier’s likelihood to be 
an R&D performer (see Table B 5 in Appendix B.2).  
Let us now turn to the results of the structural equation estimations, where the R&D 
intensity is estimated given a supplier engages in R&D (see Table 2.7, columns III and 
IV). Regarding the measures of buyer power we find a negative but insignificant coeffi-
cient of BP_L while BP_H has a significant negative effect on a supplier’s R&D intensi-
ty. The implication of this finding is that supplier’s with a sales share generated by the 
largest three buyers of 50 % or more do not exhibit lower R&D intensities compared to 
suppliers with lower buyer shares. If however, a high sales share is accompanied by 
easy substitutability or a high number of competitors, the R&D intensity is significantly 
lower. Being a supplier exposed to strong buyer power decreases R&D intensity on av-
erage by 37 %. We again find support for hypothesis 1b stating that buyer power will 
have a negative effect on suppliers’ innovation incentives. As in the selection equation 
we find no impact of the buyer’s industries’ characteristics. 
Overall both buyer power measures affect the R&D decision of a supplier negatively. 
As argued before, the effect of BP_H is stronger compared to BP_L. Thus, we conclude 
that buyer concentration does have a negative effect on a supplier’s R&D incentives. 
This effect is even stronger if the supplier is facing numerous competitors or sells a 
product that is easy to substitute. 
Our findings constitute an important contribution to the existing literature as we show 
negative effects of buyer power on suppliers’ innovation incentives differentiated by the 
stages of a supplier’s R&D decision for a large sample of firms in various industries. 
What is more, the estimated negative effects of buyer power are substantial. According 
to the results from the estimations using BP_H, the likelihood of being a R&D perform-
er decreases by 27 % while R&D intensity decreases by 37 %. The magnitude of the 
effects implies a serious impediment to suppliers’ innovation incentives if powerful 
buyers are present and at the same time the supplied good is substitutable or provided 
by more than 5 competitors. In addition, our results complement the findings of Farber 
(1981) and Peters (2000) who find concentration in the buyer industry to have adverse 
effects on suppliers’ R&D spending. Besides, we show that also concentration in the 
buyer portfolio can be sufficient to generate buyer power. 
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2.2.5.3 Robustness checks 
In order to test whether the results are driven by one particular sector group, we split the 
sample in manufacturers and service firms and test our model for each of the subsam-
ples again. The sample of manufacturers comprises 660 firm observations while the 
sample of service firms consists of 376 firms. It turns out that the drop in the number of 
observations leads to a rejection of the estimated model in the case of service firms. 
Therefore, we only present the results of the estimations using the manufacturing sam-
ple. 
Table 2.8: Estimation results of generalised Tobit models for a sample of manufacturing 
firms using different specifications of buyer power 
                                             Selection: RDi,t+1   Intensity: RDINT i,t+1 
  I II  III IV 
  BP_L BP_H  BP_L BP_H 
BP_ia  -0.233 *   -0.302 **   -0.184     -0.384 **                                             
 
(0.122)     (0.130)     
 
(0.178)     (0.195)     
BUYPCMb  1.816 *** 1.825 ***  1.566 *   1.609 *   
  
(0.648)     (0.649)     
 
(0.898)     (0.897)     
BUYRDINTb  -0.053 *   -0.055 *    0.054     0.052     
  
(0.031)     (0.031)     
 
(0.038)     (0.038)     
NOCOMP a  -0.690     -0.804 *    -0.516     -0.610     
  
(0.443)     (0.440)     
 
(0.801)     (0.805)     
COMP a  0.055     0.014      0.121     0.085     
  
(0.114)     (0.115)     
 
(0.152)     (0.152)     
DIVERS  0.596 **  0.593 **   0.573 *   0.546     
  
(0.245)     (0.245)     
 
(0.348)     (0.348)     
SIZE  0.268 *** 0.270 ***      
  
(0.043)     (0.043)     
     AGE  -0.071     -0.071      -0.110    -0.104    
  
(0.068)     (0.068)     
 
(0.086)     (0.086)     
GROUP a  0.239 **  0.248 **   0.035     0.053     
  
(0.118)     (0.118)     
 
(0.183)     (0.184)     
EAST a  0.122     0.115      0.238     0.247     
  
(0.125)     (0.125)     
 
(0.166)     (0.165)     
Mills Lambda       0.818 **  0.844 **  
       
(0.397)     (0.392)     
Constant  -2.109 *** -2.092 ***  -7.628 *** -7.665 *** 
  
(0.576)     (0.576)     
 
(0.939)     (0.932)     
Industry dummies  yes  yes   yes  yes  
Wald-Test: joint signif-
cance of industry dummies 
 
69.92 *** 70.25 *** 
 
44.52 *** 44.83 *** 
N                                          
 
660 
 
660 
  
660 
 
660 
 LR/Wald χ2                              76  77   76  77  P-value                                    0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000   
a Dummy variable. b For details on the calculation see Appendix B.1. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors in 
column III and IV are corrected for the inclusion of the inverse Mills Ratio. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% 
(**) and 1% (***) respectively. Estimation results of the industry dummies are presented in Table B 6 in Appendix B. 
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With respect to buyer power, the findings from the full sample are robust to the exclu-
sion of service firms (see Table 2.8, column I for BP_L and II for BP_H). As expected 
BP_H is larger compared to BP_L and the negative effects of buyer power remain sub-
stantial. Being exposed to buyer power according to BP_H reduces the likelihood of a 
supplier to invest in R&D by about 12 percentage points. Given that the probability of 
the average manufacturing firm to invest in R&D is about 60 %, this implies a reduction 
of almost 20 %. 
Regarding downstream industry characteristics we find significant effects upon suppli-
ers’ innovation incentives for the sample of manufacturing firms. Downstream competi-
tion intensity is now significant and positive concerning the probability of being an 
R&D performer. The coefficients are roughly equal regardless of the measure of buyer 
power. For illustrative reasons let us assume that profits in the downstream industry 
drop by 10 %.39 Given the estimation results using BP_H, this drop in downstream prof-
its increases a supplier’s likelihood to invest in R&D by roughly 5 percentage points, 
which corresponds to an increase of about 8 %.40 The latter finding is interesting since it 
shows how closely related supplier’s innovation incentives and downstream competition 
in manufacturing industries apparently are. 
Also downstream R&D intensity does now exert a significantly negative effect on a 
supplier’s decision to invest in R&D. As it was the case for downstream competition 
intensity, the coefficients roughly equal each other regardless of the measure of buyer 
power. The effect is quite small compared to the other determinants though. An increase 
in downstream R&D intensity by one percentage point from the subsample mean of 
1.4 % to 2.4 %, results in a decrease of the supplier’s likelihood to invest in R&D by 
about 2 percentage points. Note however that an increase of an industries’ R&D intensi-
ty of a percentage point is highly unlikely. 
The strong effect of being a monopolist observed in the full sample is apparently driven 
by service firms as it is not robust to the sample split. All other effects of the supplier’s 
degree of substitutability, the supplier’s size and whether the supply firm belongs to an 
enterprise group hold also for the subsample. 
39 For an average firm in our sample this implies that downstream competition intensity increases from 
0.675 to 0.743. 
40 This is calculated with all other variables taking mean value. 
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The results of the intensity equations are also robust to the exclusion of service firms 
(see Table 2.8 Column III for BP_L and Column IV for BP_H). The marginal effect of 
being exposed to buyer power according to BP_H is now slightly higher, implying a 
reduction in R&D intensity by 38 %. We also see a weakly significant positive effect of 
competition intensity on a supplier’s R&D intensity. 
Summarizing, the results from the robustness check show that results from the full sam-
ple are robust to the exclusion of service firms. With respect to the effect of downstream 
industry characteristics we observe now interesting effects on suppliers’ R&D incen-
tives. We find evidence that in manufacturing industries the demand-pull argument ap-
plies, i. e. stronger competition leads to higher demand for innovative intermediate 
goods. This increases not only the likelihood of R&D investments but also the intensity 
of R&D investment on the supply side. In addition, if the R&D intensity in the buyer’s 
industry is high, suppliers have a lower likelihood to start own R&D activities. This is a 
reasonable finding if one considers that R&D projects often require a minimum invest-
ment. The minimum threshold should be higher if buyers in R&D intensive industries 
are supplied since they demand highly innovative intermediaries. Given the fact that 
R&D is mostly financed using cash-flow, the likelihood of own R&D activities decreas-
es as suppliers are not able to bear this cost. 
2.2.6 Buyer power and the intensity of competition and R&D in the downstream 
industry 
So far we have analysed the impact of buyer power and downstream industry character-
istics on suppliers’ innovation incentives separately. This may draw an incomplete pic-
ture of the resulting effects on suppliers’ innovation incentive because the effects of 
buyer power and downstream industry characteristics are likely to be intertwined. We 
will base the discussion of possible interaction effects on the empirical findings for the 
sample of manufacturing firms.  
Let us first consider the case of a powerful buyer facing intense downstream competi-
tion. As we have seen in the previous section, downstream competition increases inno-
vation incentives of suppliers. This is due to demand-pull, i. e stronger downstream 
competition leads to higher demand for innovation. Such innovative inputs allow buyers 
in very competitive markets to lower the costs of production or distribution, to differen-
tiate away from downstream competitors or to enter new markets. Accordingly, a large 
buyer will exploit the fact that he accounts for a large share in a supplier’s business by 
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steering the R&D of the supplier towards own needs and preferences. In order to make 
use of the buyer's innovation impulses, R&D investments of the supplier are necessary, 
since internal R&D investments generate new knowledge on the one hand and create 
absorptive capacity on the other (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). The latter allows evalua-
tion and exploitation of externally available knowledge, i. e. the successful integration 
of knowledge spillovers into the own knowledge stock. This exchange of knowledge 
will result in the building of co-specialised assets (Teece, 1986). Such a situation obvi-
ously increases innovation incentives on the supply side as the supplier's bargaining 
position relative to the buyer improves and allows a more favourable split of the joint 
profit. In fact, many studies found buyers to be a main source for technological advance 
in upstream firms (Klevorick et al., 1995). Also in the presence of a large buyer there is 
less uncertainty in the sales of new products (Peters, 2000). Against this background we 
expect a positive effect of strong downstream competition and buyer power on suppli-
er’s R&D incentives. 
Let us now turn to the effect of downstream R&D intensity. For manufacturing firms we 
find a negative effect of high downstream R&D intensity on suppliers’ innovation in-
centives which can be explained with higher thresholds of minimum investment for 
R&D projects aiming at buyers in highly R&D intensive industries. Once this threshold 
is overcome, one should observe higher investments of firms supplying to R&D inten-
sive sectors. This is related to the observation that there is a positive relationship be-
tween higher R&D investments carried out in the buyer market and the upstream de-
mand for innovative products (Scherer, 1982b). This is also observed in the results of 
section 2.2.5.2 and 2.2.5.3 although the coefficients are insignificant. If competition in 
the downstream market is driven by technology development however, buyers are urged 
to invest heavily into the development of new products and new process technology. 
This in turn reduces their profits. As a result these buyers organize R&D within the sup-
ply chain more efficiently and along their own business strategy. For instance, car man-
ufacturers have reduced the number of suppliers in order to realize economies of scale 
(Peters, 2000). In addition, suppliers are highly involved in new product development, 
receive more technical information and are supported by their buyers more intensively 
(Becker and Peters, 1997). Even though this should increase innovation incentives of 
suppliers, car manufacturers could increase their bargaining power due to global sourc-
ing (Peters, 2000). Hence, suppliers may try to save their margin by reducing own effort 
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which should result in a negative relationship between downstream R&D intensity, buy-
er power and suppliers’ innovation incentive. 
Table 2.9: Estimation results of generalised Tobit models including interactions between 
buyer power and downstream industry characteristics 
                                             Selection: RDi,t+1   Intensity: RDINT i,t+1 
    I II  III IV   BP_L BP_H  BP_L BP_H 
BP_ia  -2.303 *** -1.737 **   -1.840     -0.822                                                
 
(0.793)     (0.845)     
 
(1.135)     (1.196)     
BUYPCMb  0.701     1.209      0.835     1.146     
  
(0.770)     (0.737)     
 
(0.943)     (0.913)     
BUYRDINTb  -0.037     -0.043      0.063     0.088 **  
  
(0.036)     (0.034)     
 
(0.041)     (0.039)     
BUYPCM x BP_i  3.311 *** 2.320 *    2.580     1.446     
  
(1.231)     (1.305)     
 
(1.677)     (1.760)     
BUYRDINT x BP_i  -0.055     -0.046      -0.041     -0.212 *** 
  
(0.053)     (0.058)     
 
(0.070)     (0.078)     
NOCOMP a  -0.745 *   -0.846 *    -0.561     -0.511     
  
(0.447)     (0.442)     
 
(0.805)     (0.800)     
COMP a  0.043     0.001      0.111     0.100     
  
(0.115)     (0.116)     
 
(0.152)     (0.150)     
DIVERS  0.573 **  0.583 **   0.560     0.472     
  
(0.246)     (0.245)     
 
(0.346)     (0.342)     
SIZE  0.275 *** 0.272 ***  -0.117     -0.115     
  
(0.044)     (0.043)     
 
(0.086)     (0.085)     
AGE  -0.071     -0.070      0.036     0.063     
  
(0.069)     (0.069)     
 
(0.183)     (0.181)     
GROUP a  0.249 **  0.255 **   0.237     0.273 *   
  
(0.118)     (0.118)     
 
(0.166)     (0.162)     
EAST a  0.129     0.114      -0.659     -0.746     
  
(0.126)     (0.125)     
 
(0.548)     (0.545)     
Mills Lambda       
0.816 **  0.765 **  
       
(0.395)     (0.387)     
Constant  -1.355 **  -1.660 ***  -7.092 *** -7.296 *** 
  
(0.640)     (0.626)     
 
(0.917)     (0.908)     
Industry dummies   yes   yes     yes   yes   
Wald-Test: joint signifi-
cance of industry dummies 
 
72.47 *** 72.08 *** 
 
44.94 *** 44.09 *** 
Wald-Test: joint signifi-
cance of RDINT, PCM, BP 
and their interaction terms 
 
19.61 *** 17.38 *** 
 
10.39 ** 18.03 *** 
N                                          
 
660 
 
660 
  
660 
 
660 
 LR/Wald χ2                              77  86   77  86  P-value                                    0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000   
a Dummy variable. b For details on the calculation see Appendix B.1. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors in 
column III and IV are corrected for the inclusion of the inverse Mills Ratio. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% 
(**) and 1% (***) respectively. Estimation results of the industry dummies are presented in Table B 7 in Appendix B.2. 
Table 2.9 presents the results of the estimation results for the sample of manufacturing 
firms. BP_i corresponds to BP_L in column I and III and to BP_H in column II and IV. 
Note that the table displays coefficients not marginal effects for the Probit models in 
columns I and II.  
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We observe that the coefficients of the buyer power variable, the measures of down-
stream industry characteristics and their respective interactions are jointly significant in 
all estimations to the 1 % significance level except in the intensity equation employing 
BP_L (see Table 2.9, column III). In the selection equation we find both measures of 
buyer power and additionally the interactions between buyer power and the downstream 
competition intensity to be separately significant. Calculating the predicted probabilities 
with respect to a supplier’s exposure to buyer power, we interestingly observe that 
strong downstream competition is compensating the negative effect of buyer power. Let 
us first consider the case of a buyer who is active in a highly competitive industry. We 
take the value representing the 90th percentile in the sample (value equals 0.79) while all 
other explanatory variables are at their means and predict the probability of a supplier to 
invest in R&D. For BP_H the predicted probabilities of starting R&D do not differ be-
tween suppliers being exposed to buyer power and those who are not. That is, there is 
no difference between firms with respect to buyer power if downstream competition is 
strong. If we calculate the marginal effect of BP_L for the same values, the effect is still 
negative, i. e. a supplier’s probability to invest in R&D decreases by 7 percentage 
points. 
Let us now turn to the case of a buyer who is active in an industry with low competition. 
We therefore use the value representing the 10th percentile in our sample (value equals 
0.53). In case of BP_H this corresponds to a drop in the probability of doing R&D of 23 
percentage points. The corresponding effect when applying BP_L is even higher result-
ing in a decrease of 26 percentage points. 
Note that the marginal effect of buyer power calculated at the means of all other varia-
bles (which was reported for the previous estimation results) decreases. Being affected 
by buyer power according to BP_H would result in an 11 percentage points decrease 
whereas the corresponding effect of BP_L is a reduction by 8 percentage points. 
Considering the results of the intensity equation we find separate significant effects only 
in the estimation employing BP_H. Here the downstream R&D intensity now has a pos-
itive effect while its interaction with BP_H is negative. That is, on average a one per-
centage point increase in downstream R&D intensity results in a 9 % increase of suppli-
er’s R&D intensity if the supplier is not confronted with buyer power. If in turn there is 
buyer power, the effect would be a decrease by 12 %. 
Bargaining in vertical relationships 57 
 
Given the findings in this section we conclude that the negative effect of buyer power 
on a supplier’s R&D probability is robust to the inclusion of interaction terms. In addi-
tion, our findings reveal that interactions between buyer power and downstream indus-
try characteristics exist. The negative effect of buyer power on a supplier’s R&D proba-
bility is mitigated by downstream competition. This finding is consistent with the argu-
ment that large buyers in a highly competitive environment use their influence on a sup-
plier’s business to exchange market knowledge with the supplier. This will result in the 
building of co-specialised assets and in turn improve the bargaining position of the sup-
plier. Consequently, the supplier has a higher incentive to innovate. 
We also find the negative effect of buyer power on a supplier’s R&D intensity still to be 
present after the inclusion of interaction terms. This effect seems to be closely related to 
downstream R&D intensity. That is, buyers who invest heavily into R&D but at the 
same time have bargaining power exert negative effects on suppliers’ innovation incen-
tives. 
Note however that our measures of downstream industry characteristics are aggregated 
on Nace 2-digit level and thus capture competition and R&D intensity comparatively 
rough. It would thus be an interesting extension of our work to conduct the analysis 
with more disaggregated data for buyer industries. This could significantly improve our 
understanding of the interdependencies between buyer power and buyer market condi-
tions on supplier’s innovation incentives. 
2.2.7 Concluding remarks 
Section 2.2 examines the effects of buyer power on suppliers’ innovation incentives. As 
theoretical evidence on this relationship is inconclusive, we conduct an empirical study. 
Existing studies operationalized buyer power either by industry level concentration or 
relied on subjective assessments of suppliers whether they are exposed to pricing pres-
sure of buyers. This study in contrast uses firm level information on the concentration in 
the supplier’s sales with respect to the largest three buyers. Compared to existing studies 
this provides us with a more objective measure of buyer power. Moreover, we exploit 
information on the number of competitors in the main product market and the substitut-
ability of a supplier’s product in order to capture an even stronger degree of buyer pow-
er. Furthermore, our econometric approach enables us to disentangle the effects of buyer 
power on suppliers' innovation incentives into (i) the effect on a supplier’s decision to 
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start innovation activities and (ii) the effect on the amount of resources spent on innova-
tion. 
Against the background of an increasing interest in the effects of buyer power in vertical 
relationships, our study provides valuable new insights concerning suppliers’ innovation 
incentives. Based on a sample of 1,036 firms across manufacturing and service indus-
tries, we find a negative effect of buyer power on a supplier’s likelihood to invest in 
R&D for both measures applied. As one would expect, the effect is more pronounced 
for the measure indicating strong buyer power. We estimate that a switch from no buyer 
power to strong buyer power decreases the probability of a supplier to establish R&D 
activities on average by 27 %. Furthermore strong buyer power also reduces a supplier’s 
R&D intensity. Here a switch from no buyer power to strong buyer power leads on av-
erage to a reduction by 37 %. 
These effects are robust in sign and magnitude after service firms are excluded from the 
sample. In addition, using a sample of manufacturing firms revealed that also down-
stream industry characteristics have an impact on supplier’s R&D incentives. We dis-
tinguish between downstream competition and downstream R&D intensity which is to 
the best of our knowledge a novelty in the literature on buyer power and supplier’s in-
novation incentives. We find evidence that in manufacturing industries the demand-pull 
argument applies. That is, stronger competition leads to higher demand for innovative 
intermediate goods, thereby increasing not only the likelihood of R&D investments but 
also the intensity of R&D investment on the supply side. In contrast, we find that sup-
pliers have a lower likelihood to take up R&D activities if downstream R&D intensity is 
high. This is a reasonable finding considering that R&D projects often require a mini-
mum investment. On one hand, the minimum investment is likely to be higher if buyers 
are strongly involved in R&D while it on the other hand has to be financed with internal 
cash-flow. Hence, this implies a lower likelihood of investing in R&D. 
Finally, we also explore whether there are joint effects of buyer power and downstream 
industry characteristics on suppliers’ innovation incentives. We interestingly find for the 
sample of manufacturing firms that the negative effect of buyer power on a supplier’s 
R&D probability is mitigated by downstream competition. This can be explained by 
spillovers from powerful buyers in a highly competitive environment to their suppliers. 
Absorbation and exploitation of the spillovers improves the bargaining position of the 
supplier. Consequently the supplier has a higher incentive to innovate. We also find a 
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negative joint effect of buyer power and downstream R&D intensity on a supplier’s 
R&D intensity. This is in line with the argument that suppliers facing powerful buyers 
who invest heavily into R&D reduce their efforts in order to maintain their profitability. 
From an empirical point of view, section 2.2 provides various links for future research. 
First, it would be worthwhile to extend the analysis on innovation outputs. That may 
include the questions whether the presence of powerful buyers affects innovation suc-
cess and whether such buyers promote particular types of innovation. Second, suppliers 
which are confronted with buyer power may choose specific ways to appropriate a suf-
ficient share of innovation rents, patenting for instance. Hence, in such circumstances 
suppliers may exhibit a different patenting behaviour. What is more, longer time series 
data would be extremely helpful since there may be a significant time lag between buyer 
power, the decision to invest into R&D, and both the corresponding innovation output 
as well as the use of protection methods for intellectual property. 
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3 Market incentives to innovate 
3.1 Introduction 
Innovation is widely considered to be a key long-term driving force for economic 
growth.41 Hence, stimulating business innovation is given a high importance on the po-
litical agenda. Government policies can actually take two main routes: they can either 
directly trigger innovation, for instance by granting subsidies or by public procurement; 
or they can affect the framework conditions in which firms operate, aiming to make 
them more favourable to innovation. Among the latter, the intensity and the type of 
product market competition are major factors. Product market competition in turn re-
sults from a complex process involving, among others, technological conditions, trade 
policy, competition policy per se, and innovation and structural policies in general. 
The way product market competition impacts innovation has been studied for a long 
time. Different arguments and models have been put forward leading to theoretical pre-
dictions that range from negative, over positive to curvilinear. Empirical studies so far 
have been inconclusive either. Comparing these studies to explore the differences in 
results across countries and industries, it turns out that the empirical studies vary a lot in 
the use of data, measurement of competition and innovation and econometric approach. 
This section contributes to the existing research by analysing the nexus between product 
market competition and innovation at the firm level in Germany. Our study makes use 
of panel data from 1997-2005 for about 1,015 German manufacturing companies. We 
compare two measures for product market competition: traditional price-cost margins 
and the profit elasticity which was recently proposed by Boone (2007) as a better indi-
cator to capture competitive behaviour. 
Our econometric approach deviates from most prior research in several aspects. We do 
not only consider the impact on R&D expenditure but distinguish the effect of product 
market competition on the decision to invest in R&D and on the amount of R&D given 
that the firm has decided to conduct R&D. Though this distinction has become popular 
as the first stage in the model by Crèpon et al (1998) that links innovation and produc-
41 See e.g the survey by Hall (2010) and the references cited therein. 
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tivity and has been employed in many cross-sectional studies, to the best of our 
knowledge, a similar approach to examine the relationship between competition and 
innovation using longitudinal data is only adopted by Artes (2009) for Spanish firms. 
Recent contributions furthermore argue that the effect of competition on R&D also de-
pends on firms’ technological distance to the frontier as well as on the technological 
spread within an industry (Aghion et al., 2005, Brouwer and van der Wiel, 2010; Alder, 
2010). This section contributes to the empirical literature on competition and innovation 
since our estimation strategy takes account of both these factors as well. 
We briefly review the existing theory and empirical tests on the relationship between 
market structure and innovation in the next two sections. Section 3.4 sets out the empir-
ical approach. The results of our estimations are presented in the subsequent section. 
Concluding remarks are presented in section 3.6. 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
3.2.1 Competition and innovation 
From a theoretical point of view the relation between product market competition on the 
one hand and innovation on the other hand is not clear-cut. Depending on the assump-
tions about the type of innovation (e.g. cost-reducing vs. demand enhancing, step-by-
step vs. non-step-by-step), the type of market structure before and after the innovation, 
the strength of patent protection or the dynamics of the innovation process, it is possible 
to establish negative, positive, u-shaped or inverted u-shaped relations between product 
market competition and innovation (Gilbert 2006; Schmutzler 2009, 2010; Artes 2009). 
Traditional theory predicts a negative relationship due to the following three arguments: 
(i) competition reduces profits and hence internal funds for innovation projects; (ii) 
competition lowers the rewards from innovation (rent dissipation), and (iii) competition 
increases the uncertainty about potential reactions of competitors on own innovation 
activities. Hence, firms with ex ante market power have a higher incentive to innovate. 
This is called the Schumpeterian effect or Schumpeter hypothesis II (see e. g. Schum-
peter, 1942; Dasgupta and Stieglitz, 1980).42 Arrow (1962) emphasized that competition 
might encourage innovation. In order to keep their position ahead of established com-
42 Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) also modelled a negative relation between competition 
and innovation in their endogenous growth models. 
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petitors or to avoid market entry of new competitors, incumbents are forced to innovate. 
This effect of competition on innovation is also called “the escape competition effect”. 
In two recent papers, Aghion et al. (2001, 2005) argue in favour of an inverse u-shaped 
relationship. They emphasise that not the amount of post-innovation rents per se incen-
tivize firm to innovate but that it is the likely difference between post-innovation and 
pre-innovation rents that encourages a firm to invest in innovation. According to their 
model, innovation activity would rather be low on markets with perfect competition or 
in a monopoly situation whereas it would be very intense on oligopoly markets. This is 
due to the two countervailing effects at work: the escape competition effect and the 
Schumpeterian effect. 
Both effects shape a firm’s innovation incentives depending on the level of competition 
and the technological spread within an industry. If the initial level of product market 
competition is low, an industry is mostly in a technologically levelled state. This is due 
to the fact, that the less productive firm – the laggard – has a high incentive to catch up. 
The benefit of innovation exceeds the profits as laggard. When incumbent firms are 
operating at similar technological levels (neck-to-neck competing incumbents), it is 
more likely that the escape competition effect dominates if competition intensifies.43 
The escape competition effect is characterized by a lower reduction in post-innovation 
rents due to an increase in competition than the reduction in pre-innovation rents. This 
increase in incremental profits incentivizes firms to foster innovation in order to escape 
competition. As a consequence, the industry becomes more and more unlevelled with 
increasing competition, since a laggard’s incentives to catch up diminish because of 
high costs and lower post-innovation rents. At this stage the Schumpeterian effect is 
dominating. 
As the extent of collusion in a product market is mostly not observable to the researcher, 
empirical studies in this context frequently interpret increasing competition according to 
observable measures of competition either on industry level (Aghion et al., 2005; for a 
recent study applying the profit elasticity see Brouwer and van der Wiel, 2010), firm 
level or both (e. g. Tingvall and Poldahl, 2006; Artes, 2009; Alder, 2010). Hence, com-
petition is broadly defined and captures for instance entry of new firms, intensifying 
conduct, a decrease in substitutability, breakdown of cartels and a lot more effects. 
43 The model of Aghion et al. (2005) studies innovation incentives in a duopoly framework. They model 
an increase of competition as a reduction in the degree of collusion. That is, no competition corresponds 
to perfect collusion, while perfect competition corresponds to no collusion. 
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Some studies also instrument the increase of competition by changes in regulation. This 
is done for instance by Aghion et al. (2005) or Griffith et al. (2006b). Notwithstanding 
their diversity, empirical measures of competition are successfully applied to test the 
inverted u-shape relationship between competition and innovation. Accordingly, we 
formulate the first hypotheses for our empirical part of the paper as: 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between competition and innovation is inverse u-
shaped. That is, for low levels of competition, an increase in competition will lead to 
higher innovation incentives. Beyond a certain level of competition a further increase of 
competition will reduce the innovation incentives.  
3.2.2 Technological distance and innovation 
The question whether technological conditions within an industry have an impact on a 
firm’s incentives to innovate was firstly raised by Aghion et al. (2005). Their theoretical 
model assumes a duopoly and postulates a higher incentive to innovate when firms are 
technologically similar or levelled. An increase in competition then reduces pre-
innovation profits which makes technological leadership due to innovation more profit-
able for the firm. In contrast an increase in competition does not spur innovation incen-
tives if both firms are technologically different, i. e. the sector is unlevelled. The leading 
firm does not have an incentive to innovate since the difference between pre- and post-
innovation profits is the same. The lagging firm faces a decreasing incentive to innovate 
as with increasing competition the difference between pre- and post-innovation profits 
declines. It remains unclear, however, what is meant by a levelled sector in case of more 
than two firms. For instance it is possible that one firm within an industry is operating at 
the technological frontier while the majority of firms is lagging behind. In contrast to 
the predictions of Aghion et al. (2005) laggards then may have an incentive to innovate 
as well since most of their competitors are technologically similar even though they do 
not operate at the frontier. This leads to the conclusion that it is possible to describe a 
sector as levelled if the distribution of the firms with respect to their technological dis-
tance is narrow. We will therefore formulate our hypotheses according to the distribu-
tion of firms’ technological proximity.  
Hypothesis 2: Increasing technological differences between firms within an industry, i. 
e. the sector becomes unlevelled, will lead to lower innovation incentives.  
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In a similar vein, Acemoglu et al. (2006) argue that firms, in order to improve their 
productivity may either imitate or invent production technology to raise their produc-
tivity. However, the application of the latter strategy requires high-skilled firms and 
entrepreneurs which are most efficiently selected under intense competition. Higher 
competition and a closer position to the technological frontier should foster R&D efforts 
as the only way to become more productive than competitors is to innovate. 
Hypothesis 3: If competition intensifies, firms operating far away from the technologi-
cal frontier will reduce their innovation efforts compared to frontier firms. 
Note that the latter hypothesis is often derived from the results of Aghion et al. (2005) 
when they are adapted to the firm level (see e. g. Tingvall and Poldahl, 2006 or Brouwer 
and van der Wiel, 2010). Again, this interpretation neglects the distribution of firms’ 
technological proximity as the predictions of Aghion et al. (2005) are derived from a 
duopoly case. 
The presented theoretical evidence mostly assumes that R&D is carried out as soon as 
incentives are sufficiently high. If the incentives decrease beyond a threshold value, the 
firm abandons R&D. In reality this is somewhat different, because usually the decision 
to start R&D activities requires long-term planning and the formation of expectations 
about the possible return from these activities. In addition, it is costly pausing R&D 
activities as they have high fixed costs and cannot be adapted on the short-run (Hall, 
1992; Sutton, 1998). Given this long-term horizon when R&D activities are taken up, it 
is likely that e. g. competition does not only affect the innovation incentives of a firm 
already performing R&D but also the incentives of a non-R&D performing firm. Hence 
we will explore the impact of competition, technological distance and technological 
proximity on different stages of the innovation decision. First, we will analyse the deci-
sion to start R&D which is followed then by the exploration of the decision how much 
to invest into R&D.  
3.3 Related Literature 
Similar to the theoretical work, empirical studies on the relationship between competi-
tion and innovation have not been conclusive either. Many studies pointed to a negative 
relationship between competition and R&D although these results were sensitive to the 
inclusion of industry effects (see e. g. Levin et al., 1985; Scott, 1984). Blundell et al. 
(1999) or Geroski (1995) ascertained a positive relationship between product market 
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competition and innovation. Many recent studies found evidence for an inverted u-
shaped relationship between product market competition and innovation; e.g. Aghion et 
al. (2005) for a panel of UK industries, Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) for Swedish firm 
level data and Brouwer and van der Wiel (2010) for Dutch firms. Nonetheless, it turns 
out that the results are rather fragile. They are not robust to changes in the innovation 
measure (R&D intensity instead of citation weighted number of patents; Aghion et al. 
2005) or in the competition measure (Tingvall and Poldahl 2006).44 Similarly, Brouwer 
and van der Wiel (2010) find support for the inverted u-relationship only in the manu-
facturing sector but not for services. 
Crepon et al. (1998) emphasize the existence of a selection problem since merely a mi-
nority of firms is engaged in R&D which is a non-random sample of the firm popula-
tion. Using a selection model, they find for a sample of French firms monopoly power 
to have a positive effect on both a firm’s decision to conduct R&D and the decision on 
the intensity of R&D effort. Artes (2009) took this approach further by testing for a non-
linear relationship. Using a panel of Spanish firms, he corroborates a positive effect for 
the decision to perform R&D. Moreover he provides evidence for an inverted u-
relationship between competition and likelihood to start R&D. Yet, when analysing the 
decision over the extent of R&D activities, he finds monopoly power to have either a 
negative or no effect at all. 
Also Aghion et al. (2009) argue in favour of lower innovation efforts by technologically 
distant firms. In their empirical model the impact of competition on innovation is differ-
ent with respect to the technological proximity of firms. A higher threat of entry leads to 
both higher innovation expenditures and higher productivity growth of already highly 
efficient incumbents in order to prevent entry. Unlike the technological leaders, firms 
far away from the technological frontier invest less on innovation when entry threat 
increases because chances to become the industry’s technological leader are lower com-
pared to the chances of the leader to maintain his position. This holds despite the fact 
that costs of innovation are the same for all firms. Aghion et al. (2005) provide empiri-
cal evidence that an increase in competition leads to higher innovation efforts in sectors 
with a high share of technologically equal firms when compared to sectors with une-
44 Correa (2012) finds in the dataset of Aghion et al. (2005) a structural break in the early 1980’s. Taking 
this break into consideration, the inverted u-shape relationship between competition and innovation does 
not hold. Instead, he finds a positive relationship for the pre-break period and no relationship at all for the 
post-break period. 
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qually distributed firms. This result has been replicated for Sweden by Tingvall and 
Poldahl (2006). Brouwer and van der Wiel (2010) however do not find support for a 
steeper inverse U in neck-and-neck sectors for the Netherlands. Acemoglu et al. (2006) 
find countries with lower competition to slow down significantly more in terms of eco-
nomic growth when they converge to the technological frontier than countries with in-
tense competition because they fail to switch from the investment (i. e. imitation) to the 
innovation strategy.45 Aghion et al. (2009) find incumbent firms to react with higher 
innovation activity on entry thread of technologically advanced firms in sectors that are 
initially close to the technological frontier, whereas incumbents in sectors further behind 
the frontier are found to be discouraged by increased entry thread. Alder (2010) ob-
serves that firms being technologically advanced compared to their main competitors 
are more innovative. For low initial levels of competition an increase in competition is 
associated with a stronger increase in innovation. The inverted u-shaped relationship 
between innovation and competition depends however on the measure of innovation. He 
finds an ambiguous influence of the technological level on the relation between compe-
tition and innovation which also seems to depend on the measure of competition. 
3.4 Empirical study 
3.4.1 Data 
For our empirical analysis we employ data from different sources. We derive the profit 
elasticity from data provided by the German Cost Structure Survey (CSS). Since 1996 
the CSS is carried out on annual basis by the Federal Statistical Office and consists of a 
representative stratified random sample of German manufacturing firms employing at 
least 20 employees. As the participation in the survey is mandatory, the dataset provides 
information on roughly 18,000 firms per wave including e. g. sales, employment and 
several cost structure variables. For the remaining variables we use firm level infor-
mation from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) which also consists of a representa-
tive stratified random sample of German firms. Data collection is carried out by the 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research. The MIP provides annual information on innovative behaviour 
45 Acemoglu et al. (2006) measure competition by the ease of entry. High competition is hence character-
ized by a low number of procedures to open up a new business. 
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in the German manufacturing sector since 1992 and is at the same time the German con-
tribution to the European Community Innovation Survey. The target population of the 
MIP are firms with at least five employees having their headquarters in Germany. Due 
to reasons of data availability, we restrict the analysis to data from 1997-2005 for the 
Nace 2-digit industries 15-35. Moreover, we deflated all variables with respective price 
indices.46 
We excluded all firms reporting to have no sales or no employees. In order to avoid 
outlier problems we also drop all observations with an R&D intensity of larger than 2, i. 
e. a firm’s R&D expenditures exceed the sales by 100 %. This is likely to be the case if 
e. g. start-ups are observed. Additionally, we restrict the PCM to values between 0 and 1 
in order to avoid (i) firms making losses which exceed their R&D expenditure and (ii) 
firms which spend more on R&D than on material and workforce.47 The latter case is 
likely to occur if firms spend substantial resources for external R&D. As we are inter-
ested in the effect of competition on internal R&D activities since this is typically con-
sidered in the theoretical models presented in previous sections, we exclude these firms. 
The first case is excluded to ensure the comparability between the two measures of 
competition. We measure competition by the price cost margin (PCM) and the profit 
elasticity (PE) as defined by Boone et al. (2007) (see also section 3.4.2.2). As the profit 
elasticity is estimated in a log-log specification, it is not possible to include firms report-
ing losses. Therefore, we exclude these firms as well. Finally, we restrict our sample to 
firms with at least 3 consecutive observations in the panel in order to exploit the varia-
tion within the individual firm in our estimations. After cleaning the data we are left 
with an unbalanced panel of 3,085 observations from 1,015 firms between 1997-2005. 
46 To deflate output figures, we use producer price indices on a 3-digit Nace level for manufacturing. For 
a few 3-digit Nace classes no indices are published; here, the producer price indices on the corresponding 
2-digit Nace level are used as proxy. (In Germany, no producer price indices are published for the classes 
17.3,18.3, 20.5, 21.1, 22.3, 23.3, 28.5, 28.6, 29.6, 33.3, 35.3, 35.4, 35.5, 37.1, 37.2.). Investments and 
physical capital were deflated using the investment goods price index (at a 2-digit level). Material goods 
were deflated using the price index on intermediate goods (at a 2-digit level). For labour costs we use a 
weighted index on wage development in labour costs (at a 2-digit level). We furthermore construct an 
R&D deflator based on the breakdown of R&D expenditure according to R&D investments, expenses for 
R&D employees and R&D material costs (at a 2-digit level). All indices are elaborated and published by 
the German Statistical Office (Destatis). 
47 The PCM is defined as sales – material cost – personnel costs + R&D expenditure divided by sales. 
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3.4.2 Variable specification48 
3.4.2.1 Innovation activity 
A firm’s long-term innovation decision is captured by a dummy variable (RD) which 
takes unit value if a positive amount of money is spent on R&D activities in period t. 
The innovative effort (RDINT) is measured by a firm’s R&D intensity (in log) which is 
defined as R&D expenditure over employees. This relative measure of innovative effort 
corrects for size effects and captures the resources spent on R&D activities per employ-
ee. 
3.4.2.2 Measuring horizontal competition 
The most commonly used measures for competition are the PCM and concentration 
measures, e. g. the Herfindahl-Index. Both measures have a long tradition in empirical 
studies on industrial organization. The use of concentration indices emerged with the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm in which the structure of an industry deter-
mines the interaction between firms which in turn determines firms’ profitability. High-
ly concentrated industries are perceived to promote higher prices and hence higher mar-
gins.49 The PCM captures the extent of the mark up, i. e. the difference between price 
and marginal cost as percentage of the price. Similar to the concentration ratio, high 
values of PCM are related to low competition because mark ups are high. 
Both measures are grounded on theoretical foundations. In the simple Cournot model 
with homogenous goods, the PCM of a firm is determined by the market share and the 
inverse price elasticity of demand. If the firm level PCM is averaged over all firms in 
the market and weighted with market shares, it represents the Herfindahl-Index (see e. 
g. Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). In this case the Herfindahl-Index reflects average prof-
its in the market and provides hence a good indication of market power. In addition, 
both measures are easily availably or can be computed from readily available data. 
However, the theoretical foundations of both measures are possibly shaky.50 What is 
more, both types of measures may be misleading when competition increases due to 
intensified conduct (Boone et al., 2007). The PCM is often used as weighted average of 
firms’ PCM’s with the weights indicating the firm’s market share (see e. g. Nickell, 
48 For an overview of all applied variable definitions see Table C 5 in Appendix C.4. 
49 For a review of empirical studies in this fashion see Scherer and Ross (1990). 
50 See e. g. Stiglitz (1989) for an example of intensifying competition that leads to higher PCM. 
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1996). Boone et al. (2007) show that an increase of competition caused by intensified 
conduct leads to a reallocation of market shares between efficient and less efficient 
firms resulting in a higher weight for the PCM of an efficient firm. This may cause the 
PCM to increase, thereby wrongly indicating a decrease in competition. In addition, 
under constant competitive conditions PCM increases when firm’s costs decrease. This 
is rather a sign for efficiency gains or positive supply shocks than an indication of a 
decrease in competition. 
Alternatively, many microeconomic studies draw upon concentration measures to indi-
cate the level of competition (see e. g. Aghion et al., 2003; Blundell et al., 1999; Disney 
et al., 2003). Concentration is then measured on a more or less detailed industry level. 
However, these measures are afflicted with an aggregation problem as they reflect the 
mean of a large number of product markets which is not necessarily indicating the real 
competitive environment of the firm. All in all, concentration ratios and market shares 
will be lower in heterogeneous industries comprising a large number of different prod-
uct markets than in homogenous industries including only a few or merely one product 
market. Moreover, an increase in competition due to a more aggressive conduct of in-
cumbents leads either to exit or to decreasing market shares for inefficient firms. Ulti-
mately this will result in higher concentration measures, hence wrongly suggesting that 
competition is decreasing. 
Recently Boone et al. (2007) proposed the profit elasticity (PE) as an alternative meas-
ure for competition. PE is measured on industry level and is defined as the percentage 
fall in profits due to a percentage increase in costs. They argue that “in a more competi-
tive market, firms are punished more harshly in terms of profits for being inefficient” 
(Boone et al., 2007; p. 7) implying a higher profit elasticity on markets with a higher 
intensity of competition. Contrasting the results of PE with those of (industry level) 
PCM and Herfindahl-Index they show empirically that changes in conduct are picked up 
by PE while the other measures fail to do so. Yet, applying the PE does not solve the 
aggregation problem which is also of concern for concentration measures since it is 
measured on industry level. If an industry comprises a large number of product markets, 
the PE may not necessarily indicate the real competitive environment of the firm. 
Therefore this paper will employ two measures of competition. First we use the PCM as 
a measure of the competitive pressure on firm-level. It is complemented by the PE in 
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order to contrast the results obtained with a firm specific competition measure by an 
industry level competition indicator.  
PCM is measured as difference between sales and costs of both material and employees 
plus R&D expenditure divided by sales. We add the R&D expenditure in order to make 
R&D and non-R&D performers comparable. The underlying assumption is that costs of 
R&D activities, e. g. for personnel or material, are already included in the firm’s costs. 
If we do not add the R&D expenditure this would lead to the situation, that two identical 
firms which are competing in one product market with otherwise same costs and sales 
would have different PCM values if one is a R&D performer while the other is not. For 
the ease of interpretation we use absolute values of the PE and transform the PCM to 1-
PCM. This ensures that we can interpret the coefficient as an increase in competition. 
PE is estimated on Nace 3-digit level and we apply the specification suggested by 
Boone et al. (2007)51. 
3.4.2.3 The individual distance to the technology frontier 
Innovation activities are – apart from competition – further explained by a firm’s dis-
tance to the technological frontier (DTF). Depending on the technological distance firms 
R&D activities may be either intensified or hampered. Our measure of technological 
distance is calculated on the basis of the total factor productivity (TFP) and departures 
from a firm’s production function. TFP is defined as residual between the logs of out-
puts and inputs. This method is well described in the relevant literature (see the over-
view by Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991).52 To control for technological distance we have 
to define the frontier firm. We calculate the TFP on firm level and define the frontier 
firm to represent the 95th percentile of TFP per industry on Nace 2-digit level and year 
to avoid outlier problems. Then, we calculate the individual distance to the frontier as 
the difference in TFP’s of the frontier and the individual firm. Finally, dividing the indi-
vidual distance by the frontier firm’s TFP provides a measure of technological distance 
which is scaled between 0 and 1, indicating a high distance to the technological frontier 
when it takes values close to 1 and a close distance when it takes values close to 0. 
51 A detailed description of how we estimate the PE is given in Appendix C.1. 
52 A detailed description of how we estimate TFP is given in Appendix C.2. 
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3.4.2.4 The technological spread within an industry 
As mentioned before, Aghion et al. (2005) argue that the effect of competition on inno-
vation depends on the technological proximity of the firms within an industry. However, 
they measure the technological spread by the mean of the technological distance to the 
frontier across the firms within the industry. In our view this measure might be impre-
cise as outliers could pull the mean either upwards or downwards. Hence we would ex-
pect the standard deviation of the technological distance within an industry to be a more 
precise measure of the technological spread. Therefore, we additionally construct a var-
iable indicating the standard deviation of the technological distance within a Nace 2-
digit industry per year (SDDTF) to capture the technological spread. 
3.4.2.5 Other control variables 
Finally, we include several control variables in our empirical model to account for other 
factors that may influence innovation activities. Innovation may also be affected by the 
availability of resources. As a result we control for liability of size or smallness by add-
ing the firm’s workforce (full time employees) in logs (SIZE). Moreover, we control for 
the capital intensity (CAP) which reflects barriers to entry of competitors. It is calculat-
ed as tangible assets divided by the number of employees (in logs).53 High entry barriers 
may allow appropriating the returns of innovation to a larger extent compared to a situa-
tion with low entry barriers. Hence they can be considered as an important signal for the 
long term profitability of innovation activities. Therefore we assume that barriers to 
entry have an effect on the long term decision to engage in R&D activities but not on 
the short term intensity decision. 
All mentioned control variables are lagged by one period to alleviate potential simulta-
neity problems. Furthermore we add a control variable whether a firm is part of an en-
terprise group (GP) as this may allow spreading fixed costs of R&D over larger output, 
thereby facilitating the decision to invest in R&D (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). We also 
control for the fact whether an enterprise is located in East Germany (EAST) to control 
53 Note that MIP does not provide information on the firms’ capital stock for the years 1999 and 2000. 
Hence, we interpolated the missing values by using the mean of the capital intensity (in logs) in the firm’s 
Nace 2-digit industry per year. 
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for regional differences. Finally, we include both industry dummies (IND) and time 
dummies (YEAR).54 
3.4.3 Estimation strategy 
We employ a modified version of the model by Griffith et al. (2006b) which was origi-
nally proposed and estimated at the industry level. It relates a firm’s innovation effort to 
the prevailing intensity of competition and the firm’s distance to the technological fron-
tier. It also analyses possible interactions between competition intensity and technologi-
cal distance. Adapting the approach to the firm level requires taking account of a possi-
ble selection problem since only the R&D intensity of R&D performers is observable. 
This may lead to inconsistent estimation results, especially in the context of panel data 
as the selection may be related to the error term of the individual effect. Consequently, 
we perform a test for sample selection bias as proposed by Wooldridge (2010, p. 
833f.).55 As the test rejects sample selection for both of our competition measures, we 
therefore continue to estimate the decision to start R&D and the decision of how much 
to invest as separate models. 
As mentioned before, we will use lagged variables in order to alleviate endogeneity 
problems occurring from the fact that innovation activity may affect competition. In 
order to model a firm’s R&D investment decision, we assume that 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  represents a 
latent variable of firm i in period t which can be interpreted as a threshold value, e. g. 
the expected present value of revenues due to a firm’s R&D activities in period t. The 
latent variable 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  is determined by a vector of explanatory variables from the previ-
ous period (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1) and an error term (𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). As a firm’s threshold value is unobservable 
to us, we furthermore assume that we observe firm i to invests in R&D if 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  is posi-
tive, i. e. 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ > 0 and zero otherwise. Consequently, we estimate in the 
first step the following equation: 
54 Our reference industry is Food/Tobacco (Nace 2 15-16) while the reference year is 1998. The break-
down of industry dummies and the according Nace 2-digit industries can be found in Table C 6 in Ap-
pendix C.4. 
55 The test is on the Null hypothesis that 𝑆𝑆(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖| 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖) = 0 which rules out partial correlation of the 
idiosyncratic error term 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  with the selection indicator 𝑠𝑖𝑖. To this end, we first estimate a Probit model as 
given in (3.1). We derive the inverse Mills ratio and use it as regressor in a fixed effects model similar to 
the equation in (3.2). Since the coefficient is insignificant, we cannot reject the Null hypothesis that idio-
syncratic errors are strictly exogenous on the selection indicator. For a detailed description of the test on 
sample selection see Wooldridge (2010, p. 833ff.) 
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 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ =  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1′𝛽𝛽 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3.1) 
The true R&D intensity is then determined by the following intensity equation: 
 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ =  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1′𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3.2) 
Moreover, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  is determined by the same vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 which explains also equa-
tion (3.1), i.e. the decision to invest into R&D or not. Our choice of explanatory varia-
bles to be included in X has been explained in the previous section.  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a binary variable, so we estimate equation (3.1) using a Probit model. Moreover 
we allow for random individual effects. Then the error term is defined as 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
with 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2). The random individual effects require us to assume that all explana-
tory variables are uncorrelated with the individual effect. To relax this assumption we 
apply a procedure suggested by Mundlak (1978) and Zabel (1992) and define a time 
constant individual effect to be 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋′� 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 with 𝑋𝑋� being a vector including the indi-
vidual means of the explanatory variables and 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2�. We now assume a condi-
tional normal distribution of the individual effect, i. e. 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁�𝑋𝑋′� 𝛿𝛿,𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2�.56 Hence, the 
the individual effect and the explanatory variables are now allowed to be correlated. 
Equation (3.1) changes to: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ =  𝑋𝑋′𝛽𝛽 + 𝑋𝑋′� 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖+ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3.3) 
Analogously we include a random individual effect in the intensity equation. We define 
the error term to be 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 with 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜏𝜏2). Then the time constant individual 
effect is defined as 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋′�𝜑𝜑 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 with 𝑋𝑋� including the same individual means as above 
and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2�. Equation (3.2) changes to: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ =  𝑋𝑋′𝛾𝛾 + 𝑋𝑋′�𝜑𝜑 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3.4) 
Note that our specification allows for a separate analysis of (i) the effects of the time 
invariant level of competition via the individual effect and (ii) the effects due to an in-
crease of competition beyond the average level. For a better exposition of our results, 
we will interpret the impact of 𝑋𝑋� as “constant” effect while the effects from X are re-
56 A similar approach is taken by Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) who model life cycle labor supply be-
havior and define the individual effect to be a function of time constant variables and mean values of time 
varying variables. 
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ferred to as “deviation” effect as they represent effects occurring due to the deviation of 
the mean. 
Our approach might be prone to endogeneity issues as the innovative effort of the firms 
may reversely influence the competition intensity. We tackle this problem by employing 
a specification using lagged values of competition as instrument. One can argue that the 
competition intensity in t-1 affects a firm’s R&D expenditure in t but that in turn the 
R&D expenditure in t will not affect the competition intensity in t-1. Hence the inclu-
sion of lagged values of competition intensity will alleviate the problem of simultaneity. 
Furthermore, we could use longer lags in order to instrument competition. This would 
reduce the number of observations in our sample considerably, hence we refrain from 
using longer lags. In addition, to avoid endogeneity we may profit from our short panel. 
The majority of firms in our sample are observed for 3 consecutive periods.57 It is very 
unlikely, that R&D investments undertaken within this period have an impact on com-
petition intensity, the distance to the technological frontier, the technological spread 
within an industry or the firm size. The study of Mansfield et al. (1971) shows, that 
there is a considerable time lag between investment in R&D and returns from it. Ra-
venscraft and Scherer show that the mean time lag is between 4 and 6 years. Taking into 
account that we use lagged variables to explain observed R&D behaviour, we conclude 
that endogeneity issues are unlikely to occur. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 shows the overall descriptive statistics of our sample with respect to R&D 
activity. 63 % of the observations conduct R&D activities with a mean R&D intensity 
of about 4550 DM per employee.58 T-tests show that for each explanatory variable de-
scripted, the observations from the group of R&D performers differs significantly from 
the group of non-R&D performers.  
Regarding the technological distance we observe for the group of non-R&D performers 
a higher mean of DTF and a higher mean of SDDTF. Therefore, non-R&D performers 
57 We observe roughly 44 % of the panel firms for 3 consecutive years. 
58 For historical reasons the unit of currency in the MIP is Deutsche Mark (DM). 1 DM equals roughly 
0.51 EURO. 
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in our sample are further away from the technological frontier and operate in industries 
with a larger technology spread when compared to their R&D performing counterparts. 
Moreover our data shows that non-R&D performers are on average significantly small-
er, less capital intensive and less often part of a company group. Firms in East and West 
Germany do not differ regarding their R&D activities. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics differentiated by firms‘ R&D status 
 Full Sample  R&D performer  Non-R&D 
performer 
 T-test 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD   
RDa 0.633 0.482 
 
1 0 
 
 
    RDINT (ln) 
   
-5.393 1.394 
      1-PCM t-1 0.703 0.155 
 
0.691 0.155 
 
0.724 0.153 
 
5.79 *** 
PE t-1 2.497 0.778 
 
2.548 0.756 
 
2.409 0.807 
 
-4.78 *** 
DTF t-1 0.579 0.241 
 
0.542 0.240 
 
0.641 0.229 
 
11.21 *** 
SDDTF t-1 0.244 0.023 
 
0.242 0.022 
 
0.247 0.025 
 
5.08 *** 
SIZE (ln) t-1 4.519 1.537 
 
4.910 1.508 
 
3.843 1.339 
 
-19.71 *** 
CAP (ln) t-1 -2.928 1.075 
 
-2.876 1.013 
 
-3.019 1.171 
 
-3.57 *** 
GPta 0.398 0.490 
 
0.464 0.499 
 
0.285 0.451 
 
-9.94 *** 
EASTta 0.374 0.484 
 
0.373 0.484 
 
0.377 0.485 
 
0.20 
 N 3,085     1,954     1,131         
a Dummy variable. Columns with heading SD display standard deviations. The last two columns display t-statistics whether a T-test 
on mean difference between the group of R&D performers and non-R&D performers rejects the Null hypothesis of no difference. 
The asterisks indicate the corresponding level of significance (* 10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 %). Descriptive statistics of the remaining 
variables are presented in Table C 7 in Appendix C.4. 
Regarding the competition variables our data show an overall mean of 1-PCM of 0.70 
which indicates a moderate level of competition. This corresponds to average operating 
profits (PCM) of 30 % of the sales for the full sample.59 Non-R&D performers exhibit a 
slightly lower share of operating profits (28%) compared to the sample of R&D per-
formers (31%). This indicates a slightly lower level of competition for the sample of 
R&D performers compared to the sample of non-R&D performers. Interestingly, this 
observation is reversed when we consider PE. Here we find a higher level of competi-
tion for the sample of R&D performers when compared to the sample of non-R&D per-
formers. This result is likely driven by the fact that PE is measured on industry-level 
while 1-PCM is measured in firm-level. The overall sample mean of the absolute values 
of profit elasticity is 2.5 which corresponds to a reduction of profits by 2.5 % if variable 
costs increase by a percentage point. 
59 Note that the true profit may be significantly smaller as the PCM is calculated net of capital cost. 
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The minimum value of profit elasticity is measured in 2002 and 2003 for the manufac-
turers of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel. Here a percentage increase 
in variable costs resulted in a profit reduction of 0 %. In contrast the maximum value is 
measured for manufacturers of wood and wood products in 1999 where a percentage 
cost increase resulted in roughly 5 % lower profits. 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of the measures of competition 
Competition measure Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observationsa 
1-PCM overall 0.70 0.15 0.01 1 N = 3,085 
 
between 
 
0.14 0.03 0.98 n = 1,015 
 
within 
 
0.08 0.23 1.14 T = 3.04 
        PE overall 2.50 0.78 0 4.91 N = 3,085 
 
between 
 
0.74 0 4.80 n = 1,015 
  within   0.34 1 3.72 T = 3.04 
a N in this column denotes the number of total observations, n denotes the number of firms and T represents the average number of 
observations per firm.  
Table 3.2 provides further descriptive statistics with respect to our measures of competi-
tion. We see that total variance in both variables is largely due to the variance between 
firms whereas variance within firms is considerably lower. For both measures the within 
standard deviation is about half of the between standard variation. This implies that the 
effects of a change in competition will be largely identified through the variation be-
tween the firms, as the variation within is fairly low. This is especially the case for the 
PE which is not surprising as it is a measure on industry level. 
3.5.2 Regression results 
For the sake of exposition we will report results of estimations employing the 1-PCM 
only. This is due to the fact that the results for the competition measure on firm level are 
stronger than for PE which measures competition on industry level. The main results 
from the estimations applying PE are presented in Appendix C.3 in Table C 1 and Table 
C 3 and will be discussed jointly with the results from 1-PCM. 
Table 3.3 reports the results of the different specifications used for the estimation of the 
Random Effects Probit on a firm’s decision to invest in R&D. Recall that the individual 
effect is characterized by group means. We interpret the mean value as “constant” effect 
while we refer to the single value as “deviation” effect because it represents effects oc-
curring due to the deviation of the mean. 
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The results for the test on an inverse u-shaped relationship between competition and 
innovation incentives are reported in column I of Table 3.3. It turns out that we find no 
evidence of an inverted u-shape relationship between the level of competition and the 
decision to invest into R&D for German manufacturing firms. Thus we do not find evi-
dence for hypothesis 1. Consequently, we test for a linear effect (see Table 3.3, column 
II). Again we do not find a significant effect for the deviation effect. There is however a 
strongly significant constant effect of competition on the probability to engage in R&D, 
which is reflected by the mean of 1-PCM. It is strongly significant across all specifica-
tions. Holding all else equal, this implies that high average levels of competition are 
related to a lower likelihood of investing in R&D. Therefore, our result supports the 
argument of Schumpeter (1942) who argues that competition reduces profits which are 
in turn required to finance innovation projects internally. If the average level of compe-
tition is high, expected returns on R&D investment will be lower. Hence, the likelihood 
of doing R&D decreases. For PE we find no effect of competition on the probability to 
invest in R&D (see Table C 1 in Appendix C.3). 
Another significant determinant of the likelihood to invest in R&D is the technological 
distance to frontier. Here both effects –constant and deviation – are strongly significant 
but show contrary signs. That is, the mean of DTF does negatively affect the likelihood 
to invest in R&D holding all else equal, while the estimated coefficient for the effect of 
an increase beyond the mean level is positive. This is found to be a fairly robust obser-
vation, as it also appears in all the estimation using the PE (see Table C 1 in Appendix 
C.3). Therefore, we conclude that a rise in DTF above the mean level on average in-
creases the likelihood to perform R&D, all else equal. This is likely in order to catch up 
and close the technological gap to rivals. If the average DTF is too large however, on 
average the likelihood to perform R&D reduces, since the present value of future reve-
nues from R&D activities decreases. 
We find  that the technological spread within an industry affects the R&D decision of a 
firm negatively as expected, but the deviation from the mean as well as the constant 
effect of SDDTF are insignificant. For the estimations using the PE the effect of the 
constant technology spread within an industry is weakly significant though. This sug-
gests that a high constant level of differences in productivity between firms in an indus-
try, on average decreases the incentives to do R&D, all else equal. Hence, our results 
provide in part support for hypothesis 2. 
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Table 3.3: Estimation results of the Random Effects Probit using 1-PCM 
  Dependent variable: RDit 
I II III IV 
1-PCM t-1 1.152     -0.190     0.631     0.253     
 
(1.077)     (0.211)     (0.507)     (2.221)     
1-PCM t-1 x 1-PCM t-1 -1.048                                            
 
(0.834)                                
DTF t-1 0.650 **  0.666 **  1.632 *** 0.664 **  
 
(0.301)     (0.302)     (0.613)     (0.305)     
SDDTF t-1 -1.026     -0.974     -1.081     0.329     
 
(1.050)     (1.045)     (1.046)     (6.613)     
1-PCM t-1 x DTF t-1                           -1.385 *                
 
                  (0.749)              
1-PCM t-1 x SDDTF t-1                                        -1.81     
 
                           (9.029)     
CAP (ln) t-1 0.000     0.001     -0.001     0.001     
 
(0.043)     (0.043)     (0.043)     (0.043)     
GPa t -0.087     -0.086     -0.087     -0.086     
 
(0.089)     (0.089)     (0.089)     (0.089)     1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃������������  -1.388 *** -1.367 *** -1.390 *** -1.365 *** 
 
(0.395)     (0.396)     (0.402)     (0.397)     
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷������  -0.835 **  -0.823 **  -0.849 **  -0.820 **  
 
(0.394)     (0.395)     (0.394)     (0.397)     
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷����������  -3.381     -3.600     -3.350     -3.576     
 
(2.800)     (2.787)     (2.801)     (2.795)     
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�������  0.390 *** 0.394 *** 0.390 *** 0.394 *** 
 
(0.038)     (0.038)     (0.038)     (0.038)     
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃������  0.063     0.063     0.061     0.063     
 
(0.060)     (0.060)     (0.060)     (0.061)     
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅�������  0.310 *** 0.304 *** 0.309 *** 0.305 *** 
 
(0.090)     (0.090)     (0.090)     (0.090)     
Constant -0.185     0.202     -0.369     -0.127     
  (0.824)     (0.764)     (0.813)     (1.854)     
Wald-Test: joint significance of 
1-PCM, DTF/SDDTF and inter-
action terms 
χ2 (2) =  
1.68 
   
χ2 (3) = 
8.25 ** 
χ2 (3) = 
1.82 
 
N 3,085  3,085  3,085  3,085  
Wald Chi 361  362  363  362  
Log likelihood -1,542  -1,543  -1,541  -1,543  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
a Dummy variable. Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. Estimation includes 7 time dummies and 9 mean industry variables. Results of the remaining 
variables are presented in Table C 8 in Appendix C.4. 
The results of the estimation testing for an interaction effect between DTF and 1-PCM 
are presented in column III of Table 3.3. We find a negative interaction effect which is 
weakly significant. The Wald-Test on joint significance rejects the Null hypothesis of 
DTF, 1-PCM and their interaction to be jointly zero to the 5 % significance level. Thus, 
we find support for hypothesis 3 which states that if competition increases, firms operat-
ing far away from the frontier will have less innovative incentives compared to frontier 
firms. Note, that this result is also found for the PE (see Table C 1 in Appendix C.3).  
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Column IV of Table 3.3 shows the results of the estimation testing for an interaction 
effect between the technological spread and competition. The interaction effect between 
1-PCM and SDDTF is negative, but insignificant. Also a Wald-Test on joint signifi-
cance of PCM and SDDTF cannot reject the Null hypothesis of all coefficients being 
jointly zero. This is also observed applying PE as measure of competition. 
Regardless of competition measure we find the mean values of firm size, location in 
East Germany and industry affiliation to be influential determinants of a firm’s likeli-
hood to do R&D. 
Let us now turn to the results of the correlated Random Effects OLS estimations in Ta-
ble 3.4, where we estimate the level of RDINT for the sample of R&D performers. We 
do not account for a possible selection bias in our estimation, as we test for it but could 
not find evidence for it.60 Again, the results of the non-linear specification are presented 
in column I. Column II provides the estimation results for a linear specification while 
columns III and IV report coefficient estimates for specifications including interactions 
of 1-PCM with technological distance and the technological spread, respectively. 
By and large, the results confirm our findings from the correlated Random Effect Probit. 
We cannot find evidence for an inverted u-shape relationship between competition and 
R&D intensity in the data, as expected in hypothesis 1. The mean of 1-PCM does again 
have a strong and significant negative impact on a firm’s R&D intensity, while the devi-
ation effect is insignificant (see Table 3.4, columns I and II). To find merely a signifi-
cant effect of the mean value of 1-PCM, is not much of a surprise, considering the fact 
that the within variance of the competition variables is relatively small (see Table 3.2). 
Consequently, the mean explains already a considerable share of within variation. 
60 The test on selection bias proceeds as suggested by Wooldridge (2010, p. 833f.). For further details see 
section 3.4.3., fn. 55)  
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Table 3.4: Estimation results of the Random Effects OLS using 1-PCM 
  Dependent variable: RDINTit 
I II III IV 
1-PCM t-1 -0.751     0.370     1.988 *** 1.908     
 
(1.210)     (0.241)     (0.544)     (2.230)     
1-PCM t-1 x 1-PCM t-1 0.903                                            
 
(0.942)                                
DTF t-1 -0.761 **  -0.753 **  1.205 *   -0.770 **  
 
(0.311)     (0.310)     (0.635)     (0.310)     
SDDTF t-1 -0.319     -0.355     -0.546     4.183     
 
(1.226)     (1.236)     (1.269)     (6.781)     
1-PCM t-1 x DTF t-1                           -2.890 ***              
 
                  (0.837)              
1-PCM t-1 x SDDTF t-1                                        -6.306     
 
                           (9.118)     
CAP (ln) t-1 0.034     0.033     0.031     0.034     
 
(0.040)     (0.040)     (0.040)     (0.040)     
GPa t 0.087     0.088     0.087     0.089     
 
(0.092)     (0.092)     (0.092)     (0.092)     1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃������������  -2.467 *** -2.499 *** -2.548 *** -2.492 *** 
 
(0.451)     (0.446)     (0.442)     (0.445)     
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷������  -0.289     -0.310     -0.338     -0.294     
 
(0.403)     (0.403)     (0.397)     (0.402)     
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷����������  5.162 *   5.412 *   5.363 *   5.502 *   
 
(3.037)     (3.047)     (3.064)     (3.045)     
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�������  -0.056     -0.060     -0.057     -0.060     
 
(0.041)     (0.042)     (0.041)     (0.042)     
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃������  -0.035     -0.034     -0.027     -0.032     
 
(0.060)     (0.060)     (0.059)     (0.060)     
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅�������  0.312 *** 0.315 *** 0.315 *** 0.315 *** 
 
(0.092)     (0.092)     (0.092)     (0.092)     
Constant -5.099 *** -5.420 *** -6.369 *** -6.551 *** 
  (0.925)     (0.849)     (0.910)     (1.936)     
Wald-Test: joint significance of 
1-PCM, DTF, SDDTF and inter-
action terms 
F(2,705) 
= 1.68 
   
F(3,705) 
= 5.95 *** 
F(3,705) 
=  0.99 
 
N 1,945  1,945  1,945  1,945  
R2 0.31  0.31  0.32  0.31  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
a Dummy variable. Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively Estimation includes 7 time dummies and 9 mean industry variables. Results of the remaining 
variables are presented in Table C 9 in Appendix C.4. 
We find that an increase of DTF beyond the individual mean reduces on average the 
R&D intensity significantly, all else equal. The individual average of the DTF does not 
affect RDINT significantly. Recall that we find the likelihood of doing R&D to be nega-
tively affected by the individual mean of the DTF, while upward deviations from the 
mean slightly increase the probability to invest in R&D. 
This finding highlights the fact, that the R&D investment decision is likely to have a 
long-term perspective, while the decision upon the amount of R&D expenditure is af-
fected by short-term deviations of the DTF from its individual mean. If the technologi-
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cal distance is too large, the expected returns of R&D may be too small to justify an 
R&D investment in general. Once the R&D investment is carried out, then rather short-
term changes in technological distance affect firms’ innovation incentives.  
The estimations using PE confirm our results for 1-PCM. In addition, there is also a 
weakly significant negative effect of the mean individual level of DTF on R&D intensi-
ty (see Table C 3 in Appendix C.3).  
We observe a weakly significant and positive coefficient of the mean of the technology 
spread within an industry (SDDTF) across all specifications. That is, if a sector is highly 
unlevelled in terms of productivity, firms have a higher incentive to invest in R&D giv-
en they are already R&D performer. The innovation incentives of R&D performers in 
unlevelled sectors are larger because the presumably larger productivity gaps in un-
levelled sectors allow for higher returns on R&D compared to levelled sectors with sim-
ilarly productive firms. We also observe this to be the case in the estimations applying 
the PE (see Table C 3 in Appendix C.3).  
A look at the interaction term in column III shows that the effects of 1-PCM and DTF 
on RDINT are closely intertwined. We find evidence for a negative and significant in-
teraction effect between 1-PCM and DTF. While an increase in DTF provides positive 
innovation incentives to firms under low competition, the effect turns negative if the 
level of competition increases. This is in line with the argument, that the incremental 
profit of innovating is higher than the cost of R&D at low levels of competition (Aghion 
et al.; 2005) and supports hypothesis 3. As the level of competition increases, the in-
cremental profit in relation to the cost of R&D decreases. We do not find this effect 
however for the PE (see Table C 3 in Appendix C.3). 
Our estimation results provide no evidence for a joint effect of the technological spread 
within an industry and the level of competition regardless of the measure of competi-
tion. Besides, we find that firms located in East Germany have a significant larger R&D 
intensity than firms located in West Germany. This can be explained by the substantial 
amount of subsidies that was provided to firms in East Germany in order to smooth the 
transformation process from a centrally planned economy towards a market economy. 
To summarize, our results do not provide evidence of an inverse u-shaped relationship 
between competition and R&D incentives as proposed by Aghion et al. (2005). Using 
data from German manufacturing firms we are not able to reproduce the findings of 
Aghion et al. (2005) for the UK, of Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) for Sweden and 
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Brouwer and van der Wiel (2010) for The Netherlands who all found an inverted u-
shape between competition and innovation.  
It rather seems that there is a linear negative relationship between the level of competi-
tion and R&D incentives for manufacturing firms in Germany. Our findings support the 
traditional argument of Schumpeter (1942) that competition reduces profits and ulti-
mately internal funds for innovation projects. As R&D is often financed with operating 
profits, the negative effect of the 1-PCM ‘s mean value is highly plausible and in line 
with the empirical findings of e. g. Crepon et al. (1998) and Artes (2009). Crepon et al. 
(1998) find monopoly power to positively affect the R&D decision of a firm using 
French data. However Crepon et al. (1998) use an average market share of the firm to 
proxy the degree of competition intensity which is rather an indicator of market struc-
ture. Artes (2009) uses firm level profit margins and also different measures of market 
structure and competition, e. g. the concentration ratio, and the number of competitors 
to explain the start of R&D activities and the intensity decision. 
We do find weak support for hypothesis 2 which states that increasing technological 
disparity between firms in a sector results in diminishing innovation incentives when 
applying the PE. Our results show interestingly, that this is only valid for the R&D de-
cision. Given a firm in a highly unlevelled sector decides to perform R&D we find a 
higher R&D intensity of firms in unlevelled sectors. This finding can be explained by 
the strong productivity advantage of R&D performers in unlevelled industries. The 
technological disparity provides strong incentives to increase R&D as future returns are 
likely to be higher compared to a situation in which the majority of rivalling firms is 
equally productive. 
Furthermore, our results support the view that not only the degree of technological prox-
imity within an industry matters for innovation incentives, but also the individual dis-
tance to the frontier firm. Hypothesis 3 states that if competition intensifies, firms oper-
ating far away from the technological frontier will reduce their innovation efforts com-
pared to frontier firms. This is found for both stages of the innovation decision. We find 
strongly significant effects for both the individual constant level of DTF as well as the 
deviation from the individual mean. This also holds in the estimations employing the 
PE. 
Furthermore our results highlight how sensitive an analysis of the relationship between 
competition and innovation incentives is to the applied measures of competition. Using 
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the firm level measure 1-PCM, we find robust results while for the industry level meas-
ure PE we basically find results for the first stage only, i.e. the decision whether or not 
to invest in R&D. The observed difference in the quality of the results may well be due 
to measurement issues. Firstly, 1-PCM is measured on firm level while PE is an aggre-
gation of different product markets on Nace 3 level. Hence 1-PCM should pick up 
changes in profits of a firm more accurately than an average measure of profit elasticity 
over an industry. This is even more so as the measurement of PE does not allow for the 
inclusion of firms making losses. Hence, the elasticity for the aggregate of several prod-
uct markets is likely to be underestimated. 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we analyse the interplay between competition, technological distance and 
innovation. Against the background of existing theoretical and empirical literature we 
expect (i) to find an inverted u-relationship between innovation and competition, (ii) 
firms in technologically very uneven sectors to invest less in innovation and (iii) frontier 
firms to invest more in R&D than technologically distant firms if competition increases. 
Major challenges when investigating the relationship between competition and innova-
tion are on one hand the appropriate definition and measurement of competition and a 
solution for the problem of reverse causality between innovation and competition 
measures on the other hand. In this chapter we use a widespread measure of competition 
intensity – the firm level PCM – and complement it with a recently proposed measure of 
industries’ profit elasticity (Boone et al., 2007) which is argued to capture the intensity 
of industry competition better than industry level PCM or concentration indices. What is 
more, the problem of reverse causality is attenuated by the use of lagged variables cap-
turing competition intensity. 
Using data of German manufacturing firms, we apply a two-step approach in order to 
estimate the impact of competition intensity and technological distance on a) a firm’s 
R&D decision and b) a firm’s decision on R&D intensity. We choose this procedure to 
include the non-R&D performers which are usually excluded from empirical studies on 
innovation and competition.  
We find that competition and technological distance play an important role for a firm’s 
R&D incentives. However, the results do not support a u-shaped relationship between 
competition and innovation. Instead, we find a high constant level of competition to 
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negatively affect innovation incentives which supports Schumpeter’s (1942) argument 
that intense competition reduces margins thereby reducing opportunities for financing 
innovation projects. 
We find weak evidence for firms in technologically unlevelled sectors having a lower 
probability of performing R&D which is in line with hypothesis 2. This is not the whole 
story however. The results of the random effects OLS estimates show that a high con-
stant level of technological disparity is linked to higher R&D intensities. This can be 
explained by stronger R&D incentives for R&D performers in unlevelled sectors due to 
larger productivity differences between the firms within an unlevelled sector compared 
to rather equally productive firms in a levelled sector. The large productivity gap trans-
lates into higher margins for R&D performers. Therefore, expected profits of R&D in 
an unlevelled sector are higher compared to a levelled sector given the R&D investment 
is sunk. 
A firm’s distance to the technological frontier does have a pronounced effect on innova-
tion incentives. We observe that a constantly high level of technological distance im-
plies a lower probability to engage in R&D activities which is countervailed by a posi-
tive effect of a short term increase in the technological distance. In contrast, the constant 
level of technological distance seems to be less important for the decision on the intensi-
ty of R&D. This finding highlights the different perspectives of both decisions. The in-
vestment decision will have a long-term perspective. Therefore, the constant effect of 
technological distance is highly relevant. In opposite to that the decision on the R&D 
intensity is rather a short-term decision. According to our results R&D spending de-
creases if a firm’s technological distance grows in the short-term. 
Moreover, the results show that both technological distance and competition are strong-
ly related to each other and that an effect of competition on innovation incentives should 
not be considered separately from technological distance. Our findings support the ar-
gument of Aghion et al. (2005) that technological laggards will be stronger negatively 
affected by an increase in competition than frontier firms which is consistent with hy-
pothesis 3. 
Our empirical findings for German manufacturers provide important implications for 
policy makers. Firstly, the results suggest that changes in competition policy aiming at 
an increase of competition in a market would lower innovation incentives if in response 
to the policy intervention the constant level of competition increases. Therefore, the 
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introduction of policy measures aiming at an increase in innovation and R&D spending 
by stimulating competition as postulated in the Horizon 2020 strategy could have nega-
tive effects on innovation incentives of German manufacturers. Second, an increase in 
competition beyond the average level, e. g. by entry, and its impact on firms’ innovation 
incentives will depend on the individual distance to the technological frontier. If the 
distance is too large, more competition will affect innovation incentives negatively. 
Therefore, careful assessment is needed when policies concerned with the stimulation of 
competition are applied to industries with a small fraction of highly productive firms. 
While the very productive firms are likely to respond positively in terms of R&D en-
gagement on intensifying competition, the less productive firms may either refrain from 
starting R&D or reduce their spending. 
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4 Selective search, sectoral patterns and the impact on 
product innovation performance 
4.1 Introduction61 
Research has frequently shown that firm success in technology-driven industries criti-
cally depends on the ability to invent and commercialize innovative technology embod-
ied in new products (e.g., Katila, 2002; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). In this respect, firms 
with the ability to create new technological knowledge have been praised for generating 
knowledge internally and combining it with external knowledge sources (Rosenkopf 
and Nerkar, 2001). However, the process of identifying knowledge to be integrated into 
the organization’s own knowledge base requires that firms deliberately search for and 
reach out to promising knowledge sources. Search has been characterized as the funda-
mental mechanism enabling firms to learn, evolve and refocus the organizational 
knowledge base. This goes beyond “local search”, which assumes that research and de-
velopment (R&D) activities are connected to the firm’s previous R&D (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). The literature has emphasized the importance for firms of moving be-
yond local search and reconfiguring the existing knowledge base (Kogut and Zander, 
1992; Teece et al., 1997). In fact, the type of knowledge search and the defining direc-
tion and priority of boundary-spanning search activities have been found to substantially 
impact innovation performance (Katila, 2002; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and 
Salter, 2006). 
In this chapter, we shed new light on the relationship between the type of knowledge 
search of a firm and its innovation performance. We propose that innovation manage-
ment requires a more nuanced understanding of the nature and effects of knowledge 
search to implement them successfully. Prior research has largely focused on the dimen-
sions of overall breadth and depth (e.g. Laursen and Salter, 2006). We argue that the 
description of knowledge search along its breadth and depth underestimates the degree 
of heterogeneity among the various knowledge sources they encompass. Instead, we 
61 Chapter 4 has been published as Köhler, C., W. Sofka and C. Grimpe (2012). “Selective search, sec-
toral patterns, and the impact on product innovation performance.” Research Policy 41 (8): 1344-1356. 
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suggest that the choice of a type of knowledge search is a selective process. Manage-
ment will choose certain directions for the firms’ knowledge search that target particular 
knowledge sources (e.g., product market, science, suppliers).  
Based on this conceptualization of selectivity in the knowledge sources that firms target 
through their particular search, we focus on the implications for a firm’s success with 
new product introductions, thereby leaving out potential effects on other types of inno-
vation like process or organizational innovations. In this respect, we suggest that these 
targeted types of knowledge search differ with regard to whether they generate new-to-
market innovations or imitations, i.e. new-to-firm only. Imitated product innovations are 
distinctively different from new-to-market innovations in their degree of novelty. Imita-
tions refer to existing products, services or processes that are adapted by the focal firm, 
for example through observing or reverse-engineering competitors’ innovations. They 
could be refined to reinforce their ability to create value for the firm (Ettlie, 1983) or to 
improve and exploit existing technological trajectories (Gatignon et al., 2004). Contrary 
to imitations, new-to-market innovations are novel in the sense that they initially do not 
have a directly competing innovation. Distinguishing between both types of innovation 
output is important for at least two reasons. First, many studies on innovation focus on 
patents as output measures that reflect new-to-market innovations because the patent 
office requires a certain “innovative step” in the novelty of an innovation for it to quali-
fy for a patent application. Nevertheless, a significant amount of business R&D is di-
rected towards imitations. Second, the role of search for external knowledge may be 
substantially different depending on the type of innovation output the firm seeks to 
achieve. 
Moreover, existing research has mostly focused on the manufacturing sector and, more 
specifically, on high-technology industries. Identifying how firms learn and how their 
knowledge evolves, though, should not be limited to manufacturing industries, particu-
larly given the increasing importance of service sectors for most modern economies. 
Therefore, we adopt a novel typology of sectoral patterns of innovation developed by 
Castellacci (2008, 2010), which provides an integrated view of innovation characteris-
tics in both manufacturing and services industries. The idea of a sectoral taxonomy is 
based on Pavitt’s (1984) seminal contribution to highlight major features of the innova-
tion processes and the distinct trajectories followed by industrial sectors. It is therefore 
fitting to integrate the role of search into particular sectoral patterns of innovation. Both 
the distinction between imitation and new-to-market innovation output and the sectoral 
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pattern of innovation have been largely neglected in the extant discussion of knowledge 
search (e.g. Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001), which is why they warrant further investigation. 
While we derive hypotheses for the effects of particular types of knowledge search on 
the two types of innovation output, we choose an exploratory approach, i.e. no ex-ante 
hypotheses, for differences of these effects within certain sectoral patterns of innova-
tion. Our empirical study is based on a comprehensive dataset of 4,933 manufacturing 
and service firms from five Western European countries. The data include measures on 
commercialized innovations, which can be considered superior to patents, an intermedi-
ary innovation output and typically only relevant in certain industries (Griliches, 1990). 
Moreover, the sample from five European countries provides close to representative 
information on manufacturing and service firms in major Western European economies. 
The next section details our theoretical framework to develop our hypotheses. Section 
4.3 describes our empirical methods. Results are presented in the subsequent section. 
Section 4.5 provides concluding remarks. 
4.2 Theoretical framework 
4.2.1 The role of search for innovation performance 
It is widely accepted that a firm’s ability to innovate is tied to the pool of knowledge 
available within the organization (e.g., Subramaniam and Venkatraman, 2001). The 
generation of new knowledge has traditionally been connected to a firm’s in-house re-
search and development (R&D) activities. Recent literature, however, points to the ad-
vantages of combining internal investments with external resources (e.g. Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006) to benefit from complementarities. In other words, firms have begun 
to open up their innovation processes to external knowledge. This trend of so-called 
“Open Innovation” allows firms to access and exploit external knowledge while internal 
resources are focused on core activities (Chesbrough, 2003). Both supply and demand 
oriented aspects put firms in a position to acquire knowledge externally. On the one 
hand, there is an increasing availability of external knowledge, e.g. from universities, 
customers and specialized suppliers (e.g., von Hippel, 1988; Link and Scott, 2005; 
Perkmann and Walsh, 2007; van Echtelt et al., 2008). On the other hand, firms are 
pushed to find new sources for external innovation impulses because of increasing com-
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petitive pressures, shorter product life cycles as well as technological opportunities be-
yond their traditional fields of expertise (e.g., Calantone et al., 1997; Chatterji, 1996; 
Kleinschmidt and Cooper, 1988; Ojah and Monplaisir, 2003). Several studies have iden-
tified positive performance effects of incorporating external knowledge (e.g. Gemünden 
et al., 1992; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Love and Roper, 2004). 
A crucial element in the open innovation activities of firms is a firm’s search for exter-
nal knowledge. A firm’s external knowledge search encompasses an “organization’s 
problem-solving activities that involve the creation and recombination of technological 
ideas” (Katila and Ahuja, 2002, p. 1184). Consequently, investments in problem-solving 
activities should result in favourable combinations and linkages of users, suppliers and 
other relevant actors in the innovation system. Laursen and Salter (2006) discuss the 
concepts of breadth and depth as important factors in a firm’s search. Leiponen and 
Helfat (2011) complement this view by extending the concept of breadth to innovation 
objectives. They find that the breadth of knowledge sources and of innovation objec-
tives positively influences innovation success at the firm level. Although a broader set 
of external sources and innovation objectives reduces the risk of unexpected develop-
ments, it has to be taken into account that a firm is constrained in terms of the capacity 
to absorb external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). These limitations 
include the level of overall attention a firm’s management can dedicate to these activi-
ties (Ocasio, 1997). A proper search for external knowledge should therefore concen-
trate on certain external sources as a vast number of information sources would hamper 
selection and in-depth exploration processes (Koput, 1997). Contrary to search breadth, 
search depth can be described as the extent to which firms draw deeply from various 
external sources for innovation impulses (Laursen and Salter, 2006). Both breadth and 
depth depict a firm’s openness to external innovation impulses (Chesbrough, 2003). 
Studying the UK manufacturing sector, Laursen and Salter (2006) find that the relation-
ship between search breadth and depth and innovation performance has an inverted u-
shape. This means that while search efforts initially increase a firm’s performance, there 
is a trade-off from “over-searching” the environment. At a certain threshold it requires 
too much management attention (Ocasio, 1997) and has a negative effect on innovation 
performance. 
In a similar vein, Katila and Ahuja (2002) focus on search depth and search scope in the 
search and problem-solving activities of firms in the robotics industry. Contrary to 
Laursen and Salter (2006), they define search depth as the extent to which a firm reuses 
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existing internal knowledge, while search scope indicates how widely a firm explores 
externally available knowledge. The latter largely corresponds to search breadth as de-
fined by Laursen and Salter (2006). However, Katila and Ahuja’s (2002) definition of 
search depth puts greater emphasis on exploiting the established knowledge base within 
the firm. Consistent with the results of Laursen and Salter (2006), Katila and Ahuja 
(2002) observe an inverted u-shaped relationship between the search effort and innova-
tion performance, which again points to the negative consequences of too extensive 
search activities. They also present evidence that the interaction of search breadth and 
depth is positively related to innovation performance because it increases the unique-
ness of resource recombinations: A deep understanding of firm-specific knowledge as-
sets that is extended towards a new application (scope) creates unique and more valua-
ble combinations of resources. 
4.2.2 Selection of knowledge sources 
The conceptualization of a firm’s knowledge search along the dimensions of its breadth 
and depth implies that the targeted knowledge is largely homogeneous with regard to its 
source. Following Laursen and Salter (2006), a firm focusing, for example, solely on 
lead customer knowledge may be assumed to conduct a knowledge search that is as 
broad and deep as a firm that concentrates its search for knowledge completely on uni-
versities. This assumption may be correct once the external knowledge has entered the 
firm and is already assimilated with existing knowledge stocks. However, we expect the 
homogeneity assumption of the knowledge of any firm’s knowledge search to fail as 
long as the knowledge remains unidentified outside the firm’s boundaries. This “scan-
ning” stage is crucial for the successful implementation of external knowledge sourcing 
(Doz et al., 2001). Todorova and Durisin (2007) point out that the transformation of 
external knowledge is one of the most important steps for absorbing it. This reflects the 
fact that external knowledge can be assumed to be highly heterogeneous in nature.62 
We argue that management will define a firm’s search for external knowledge based on 
its source. Put simply, we propose that management choice is not between breadth and 
depth; rather it provides certain directions for the firm’s own research efforts. These 
62 Typical categorizations of heterogeneity in knowledge include distinguishing between tacit and formal 
(e.g., Cowan et al., 2000; Dyer and Hatch, 2004; Polanyi, 1967), specific and generic (e.g., Breschi et al., 
2000), and embodied and disembodied (Romer, 1990), and whether it consists of information or know-
how (Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
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directions should reflect the potential value of a knowledge source and how easily it can 
be accessed and transferred. Focus is thus not so much on the recipient firm’s absorptive 
capacity but rather on the value of the knowledge source. The ultimate, economic value 
for the searching firm is ex-ante not clear. The value is significantly lower if the sourced 
knowledge is technologically premature, reflects myopic perspectives or is also readily 
available to competitors (Frosch, 1996; Katila and Chen, 2008; Mansfield, 1986). 
Hence, the ultimate value assessment of an external knowledge source depends on 
whether the knowledge will lead to a successful invention, whether this invention will 
generate economic returns and whether these returns can be appropriated by the firm 
making the investment in the first place. The perception of these factors can be expected 
to influence the selection of a particular type of knowledge search (March and Shapira, 
1987). In the following, we will discuss major differences between the knowledge 
sources of the product market, science, and suppliers. 
The product market side has received considerable attention particularly in the market-
ing literature as part of the “market orientation” of firms (for a review see Kohli and 
Jaworski, 1990). This broader conceptualization emphasizes a shift in corporate culture 
towards creating superior value for customers (e.g. Slater and Narver, 2000). Customers 
and competitors can be considered the primary elements of a product market driven 
knowledge search. Both groups are necessarily too important to be neglected as their 
actions have an immediate impact on a firm’s sales. Impulses from both groups have 
been found to propel innovation success. Customers significantly contribute to product 
innovations even with a high degree of novelty (Lukas and Ferrell, 2000). Moreover, 
they are especially valuable as knowledge sources when their specific demands are an-
ticipatory for larger market segments in the future (von Hippel, 1988; Beise-Zee, 2001). 
However, identifying these leading customers has been found to be challenging. Cus-
tomer knowledge is oftentimes tacit, unarticulated and focused on the customer’s own 
myopic needs (Frosch, 1996; von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002). Literature has there-
fore cautioned managers not to focus reactively on customers’ immediate needs. It is 
necessary to balance this narrow “consumer-led” approach with proactive measures for 
identifying long-term latent customer needs (Ketchen et al., 2007; Slater and Narver, 
1998, 1999).  
Competitor knowledge is different with regard to its accessibility. Competitors operate 
in a similar market and technology context (Dussauge et al., 2000). Their knowledge is 
oftentimes embodied in the products or services available on the market. That makes it 
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easier to identify relevant aspects and absorb them. However, it limits the opportunities 
for generating economic returns because of the reduced degree of novelty. In this re-
spect, a market-oriented knowledge search is more likely associated with imitations or 
“me-too” products (Lukas and Ferrell, 2000). Knowledge accessed through such a 
search can be rather familiar and without a high degree of novelty. As a result, our first 
hypothesis reads: 
Hypothesis 1: Market-driven search is stronger associated with imitation success than 
with new-to-market innovation success. 
Science-driven search requires a different set of specialized competencies. Universities 
are the primary producers of fundamentally new knowledge and technology. The 
knowledge produced often has a high degree of novelty, which provides important busi-
ness opportunities (e.g. Cohen et al., 2002). What is more, academic incentive systems 
for knowledge publication and sharing make university knowledge largely a public 
good (Perkmann and Walsh, 2007). However, university knowledge is frequently fur-
ther removed from commercial application and requires substantial investments in de-
velopment to commercialize it (Link et al., 2007; Siegel et al., 2004). Moreover, firms 
require specialized absorptive capacities to assess and transfer this type of knowledge. 
Assessing the full value of the often tacit and causally ambiguous knowledge may only 
be possible through joint research activities in which university and firm scientists de-
velop a mutual understanding and language in practice over time (Laursen and Salter, 
2006). Science-driven knowledge search should therefore be shaped by the competen-
cies in the firm’s own R&D department (Asmussen et al., 2009). The skills as well as 
the personal networks of firm scientists and engineers developed through education and 
training (Adler and Kwon, 2002) are a necessary prerequisite. 
A firm’s search based on knowledge from universities or public research institutes can 
thus be assumed to provide highly novel knowledge and corresponding opportunities for 
commercialization (e.g. Cohen et al., 2002). Hence, university knowledge has the poten-
tial to lead to the generation of new-to-market innovations. 
Hypothesis 2: Science-driven search is stronger associated with innovation success of 
new-to-market innovations than with imitation success. 
Finally, suppliers have been characterized as an important driver for innovation success 
(e.g. Pavitt, 1984). On the one hand, firms may use suppliers to learn faster, accelerate 
the product development process and rely on resources created in a co-evolutionary re-
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lationship between the focal firm and its network of suppliers (Dyer and Hatch, 2004; 
van Echtelt et al., 2008). On the other hand, knowledge produced by suppliers is not 
necessarily unique since potential competitors may equally benefit from the supplier’s 
expertise. Moreover, Kotabe (1990) finds that firms that rely heavily on supplier 
knowledge may lose relevant manufacturing process knowledge, which may cost the 
firm the opportunity to improve their manufacturing technology in a rapidly changing 
technological environment. As a result, the effects of supplier-driven knowledge search 
can be expected to affect imitation and new-to-market innovation equally. 
Hypothesis 3: Supplier-driven knowledge search is equally associated with success of 
new-to-market innovations as well as imitations. 
4.2.3 Search and sectoral patterns of innovation 
Existing research on knowledge search that distinguishes between the manufacturing 
and the service sector is scarce. Most empirical analyses are either explicitly limited to 
firms in manufacturing (e.g. Laursen and Salter, 2006) or rely on patent statistics to 
trace knowledge flows (e.g. Katila and Ahuja, 2002). The latter approach is implicitly 
focused on manufacturing firms as several studies show that firms in manufacturing 
sectors are significantly more likely to patent than service firms (e.g. Arundel and 
Kabla, 1998; Harabi, 1995). Although a fairly rich body of literature on innovation in 
services has developed in recent years (for a recent review see Paswan et al., 2009), it 
has been argued that many studies actually lack relation to the well-established models 
for the study of innovation in manufacturing industries (Gallouj and Weinstein, 1997). 
Castellacci (2008, 2010) therefore calls for a more integrated view of the patterns that 
innovation activity takes in both manufacturing and services sectors. Our research re-
sponds to this call and explores, based on the sectoral taxonomy developed by Castel-
lacci (2008), the importance of the different types of knowledge search for achieving 
either imitation or new-to-market innovation performance. Due to the novelty of the 
adopted taxonomy we will, however, not derive any ex-ante hypotheses on expected 
relationships within each of the sectoral patterns presented.  
The sectoral taxonomy suggested by Castellacci (2008) identifies four main sectoral 
groups, which are defined along two dimensions: (1) their function in the economic sys-
tem as a provider and/or recipient of advanced products, services and knowledge; and 
(2) their sectoral technological trajectory, which characterizes innovation activities. The 
technological trajectory can be seen as a pattern of “normal” problem solving activity 
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(Dosi, 1982). The pattern is sectoral to the extent that industries differ significantly in 
their ability to exploit the dominant natural trajectories (Nelson and Winter, 1977). This 
implies that those sectors whose knowledge base is closely related to emerging technol-
ogy fields enjoy higher growth prospects as they exhibit higher dynamism and techno-
logical opportunities. The well-known taxonomy developed by Pavitt (1984), which 
groups firms into four major patterns of innovation, builds on the idea that those pat-
terns can be characterized by different technological trajectories. The supplier-
dominated, scale-intensive, specialized suppliers, and science-based industries, as de-
fined by Pavitt, however, focus on the manufacturing sector, thus neglecting the emer-
gence of advanced services which are closely related to new technological trajectories. 
Examples include new services in the information and communications sectors which 
have opened up the way for future growth opportunities (Castellacci, 2008).  
Instead of proposing, however, a new taxonomy of service industries to complement 
those used to characterize manufacturing industries (e.g., Miozzo and Soete, 2001), Cas-
tellacci (2008) puts emphasis on the interdependence and vertical linkages that bind 
together different groups of manufacturing and service sectors. Based on the two di-
mensions outlined above (vertical chains and technological content), he distinguishes 
between advanced knowledge providers (AKP), supporting infrastructural services 
(SIS), producers of mass production goods (MPG), and producers of personal goods and 
services (PGS). Both AKP and SIS are characterized as providing rather intermediate 
goods and services to other sectors while MPG and PGS assume a higher position in the 
vertical chain by providing rather final goods and services. In contrast to this, both AKP 
and MPG are characterized by a higher technological content than SIS and PGS, i.e. the 
former are able to develop new technologies internally to provide them to other sec-
tors.63 
The role of search for achieving innovation performance within these four categories 
can consequently be expected to differ according to the sector’s position in the vertical 
chain and the technological content. Market-driven knowledge search has been de-
scribed as being conducive to accessing customer and competitor knowledge that, due 
to the lack of novelty, will lead to imitation rather than new-to-market innovation suc-
63 Castellacci (2008) moreover identifies two sub-groups per category: knowledge-intensive business 
services and specialized suppliers manufacturing (AKP), science-based manufacturing and scale-intensive 
manufacturing (MPG), network infrastructure services and physical infrastructure services (SIS), suppli-
er-dominated goods and supplier-dominated services (PGS). For ease of interpretation, these sub-groups 
will however be omitted from the following analysis. 
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cess. As MPG and PGS are classified as providing rather final goods and services to the 
market, closeness to customers and competitors is likely to be important. Market-driven 
knowledge search might therefore convey highly relevant knowledge for firms in these 
categories to achieve success with their innovations. However, due to the lack of novel-
ty, it is likely to be the firm’s ability to generate imitations that will benefit from this 
type of knowledge search. 
Science-driven knowledge search, by contrast, can be assumed to provide highly novel 
knowledge and corresponding opportunities for commercialization. They should hence 
be more valuable to firms characterized by higher technological content like AKP and 
MPG. As a result, it is likely that those firms’ innovation performance with market nov-
elties will increase compared to those with imitations. Finally, supplier-driven 
knowledge search has been described as theoretically inconclusive with respect to the 
type of innovation performance it is likely to foster. On the one hand, knowledge from 
suppliers can be immediately relevant and even evolve in a co-evolutionary way togeth-
er with the focal firm’s knowledge and hence provide a head start over competitors. On 
the other hand, such knowledge can in principle also be accessed by competitors if they 
collaborate with the same supplier, leading to less novelty in the innovation outcome. 
Consequently, the role that supplier-driven search will play within the four sectoral pat-
terns is unclear and requires ex-post analysis. 
4.3 Empirical study 
4.3.1 Data 
The empirical part of our study is based on cross-sectional data from the third Commu-
nity Innovation Survey (CIS-3), which was conducted in 2001 under the co-ordination 
of Eurostat. The survey covers the innovation activities of enterprises in the EU member 
states (including some neighbouring states) during a three-year period from 1998-2000. 
What is exceptional about CIS-3 is that it offers representative firm data from all EU 
member states, which are to a great extent relevant to the questions raised in our study. 
The micro data of CIS-3 also provide information on the two-digit industry code 
(NACE) of a firm. This means that it is possible to assign firms to different sectoral 
patterns of innovation. As the data are anonymized, it is impossible to identify single 
firms or to trace the exact answers back to the respective firms (Eurostat, 2005). The 
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dataset we use in this study offers data for five Western European member states, which 
make up a sample of 4,933 observations of enterprises from the following countries: 
Belgium (636 firms), Germany (1,446 firms), Greece (332 firms), Portugal (489 firms) 
and Spain (2,030 firms). Sectoral patterns were identified based on the firms’ NACE 2-
digit classification (Castellacci, 2008). Table 4.1 provides details on the industries rep-
resented in our analysis. 
Table 4.1: Industry breakdown 
Industry NACE Code (Rev. 1.1) Sectoral pattern 
Manufacturing     
Food and tobacco 15 – 16 Personal goods and services 
Textiles, clothing and leather 17 – 19 Personal goods and services 
Wood / paper / publishing / printing 20 – 22 Personal goods and services 
Chemicals (incl. pharmaceuticals) 24 Mass production goods 
Plastics / rubber  25 Mass production goods 
Glass / ceramics  26 Mass production goods 
Metals 27 – 28 Mass production goods 
Machinery and equipment 29 Advanced knowledge providers 
Office and computing machinery 30 Mass production goods 
Electrical machinery and apparatus 31 Mass production goods 
Radio, TV and communication equipment 32 Mass production goods 
Medical, precision and optical equipment 33 Advanced knowledge providers 
Motor vehicles and trailers 34 Mass production goods 
Transport equipment 35 Mass production goods 
Manufacturing n.e.c.  
(e.g. furniture, sports equipment and toys) 
36 – 37 Personal goods and services 
Services     
Wholesale trade and commission trade 51 Supporting infrastructure services 
Transport and storage (land, water, air) 60 – 63 Supporting infrastructure services 
Post and Telecommunications 64 Supporting infrastructure services 
Financial intermediation 65 – 67 Supporting infrastructure services 
Computer, engineering and R&D services 72, 73, 74 Advanced knowledge providers 
A major benefit of CIS-3 is that it provides direct, importance-weighted measures for a 
comprehensive set of variables for a firm’s innovation management (Criscuolo et al., 
2005). General managers, heads of R&D departments or innovation management are 
asked directly if and how they are able to generate innovations. Such immediate infor-
mation on processes and outputs can be added to traditional measures for innovation 
such as patents (Kaiser, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006). That seems to be especially 
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relevant for our research question as service firms have a lower propensity to patent 
their innovations. 
Innovation surveys like CIS rely on firms’ self-reporting. This might raise quality issues 
regarding administration, non-response and response accuracy (for a discussion see 
Criscuolo et al., 2005). However, the implementation of the survey is designed to limit 
possible negative effects. The fact that the survey is conducted via mail prevents certain 
shortcomings and biases of telephone interviews (for a discussion see Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001). Moreover, the survey is accompanied by extensive pre-testing and 
piloting in various countries, industries and firms with regard to interpretability, reliabil-
ity and validity (Laursen and Salter, 2006). In order to improve response accuracy, the 
questionnaire offers detailed definitions and examples. 
4.3.2 Variables and method 
4.3.2.1 Measuring success of new-to-market innovations and imitations 
Several authors have introduced different concepts for measuring innovation success 
(for an overview see Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003). One possibility is to use innovation 
inputs (R&D expenditures) as an indicator of innovation efforts and (indirectly) innova-
tion success. Another way is to look at the outcome of innovative efforts, such as pa-
tents, new processes, services and/or products. The latter is the perspective that we 
choose for our study. Furthermore, we distinguish between new-to-market innovations 
and imitations by considering the degree of novelty. We refer to a product or service as 
a new-to-market innovation if it is new not just to the firm but also to its overall market. 
In contrast, we consider a product or service to be an imitation if it is new to the firm 
but has alternatives on the market. 
The success of an innovation largely depends on market acceptance. For this reason we 
define innovation success as the share of sales achieved with products/services new to 
the market on the one hand and the share of sales achieved with products/services new 
to the firm on the other.64 For ease of presentation we will subsequently limit the termi-
nology for innovation outputs to the terms “market novelties” for products and/or ser-
vices new to the market and “firm novelties” for products and/or services new to the 
64 Not all of a firm’s “new to the market” products are necessarily “new to the world”; they may be new 
to the firm’s specific market only. 
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firm only. There is no implicit or explicit distinction between innovative products and 
services beyond the industry classification. 
4.3.2.2 Capturing knowledge search 
Measuring knowledge spillovers is a challenging task since they leave no paper trail. 
Several studies use patent statistics and subsequent citations to capture them (e.g., 
Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). However, such an approach is 
not always appropriate as “not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are pa-
tented” (Griliches, 1990, p. 1669). Moreover, the distribution of patenting firms is often 
heavily skewed. This is for example demonstrated by Bloom and van Reenen (2002). In 
their study, 72% of the sample of almost 60,000 patents by UK firms originates from 
just twelve companies. Patenting implies the disclosure and codification of knowledge 
in exchange for protection (Gallini, 2002). The majority of valuable knowledge may 
therefore never be patented. Moreover, patent statistics provide limited opportunities to 
identify distinct types of knowledge search because they do not offer any information 
on the relationships between the two firms identified in the patents (e.g. whether they 
are customers or competitors). Therefore, we use survey questions to gain information 
about external knowledge sources. Importance-weighted answers indicate the value of 
their contribution. More precisely, respondents are asked to evaluate the importance of 
the main sources for their innovation activities on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 
“not used” to “high”. We use information about seven different sources: suppliers, cus-
tomers, competitors, universities, public research institutes, professional exchanges (e.g. 
conferences), as well as exhibitions and fairs. In a similar setting, Laursen and Salter 
(2006) generate indices for the breadth and depth of a firm’s knowledge search based on 
these questions. Breadth is measured as the number of different sources used while 
depth is measured as the number of highly important sources. We deviate from their 
approach in order to identify a firm’s targeted knowledge search. 
We argue that R&D managers develop targeted types of knowledge search with a cer-
tain direction. This is in contrast to Laursen and Salter (2006), who assume that 
knowledge search is defined on the basis of breadth and depth and thus ignore direction. 
We inspect the correlations between the several knowledge sources as shown in Table 
4.2 and find that customers and competitors, universities and public research institutes, 
and suppliers, professional exchanges and exhibitions/fairs are correlated with each oth-
er. This observation provides grounds for the assumption that firms apply targeted 
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knowledge searches (Sofka and Grimpe, 2010). We therefore apply a principal compo-
nent factor analysis in order to identify underlying factors. The data appear to be suita-
ble (Cronbach’s alpha scale reliability coefficient: 0.70; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy: 0.69). We identify three factors with an eigenvalue greater than 
one. We conduct an orthogonal varimax rotation in order to interpret the factors with 
respect to their informational content. The orthogonality assumption of the factors is 
tested through a likelihood ratio test, which confirms the independence of all factors 
with an error probability far below one percent (Kaiser and Rice, 1974). Factor loadings 
identify three individual factors distinctively (above 0.69), as illustrated in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.2: Correlation matrix of knowledge sources 
  Supplier Customer Competitor University 
Public 
Research 
Institute 
Professional 
Exchange 
Exhibitions 
and Fairs 
Supplier 1             
Customer 0.118 1           
Competitor 0.166 0.441 1         
University 0.132 0.208 0.175 1       
Public Research Insti-
tute 0.130 0.171 0.144 0.571 1     
Professional Exchange 0.224 0.207 0.265 0.352 0.289 1   
Exhibitions and Fairs 0.266 0.264 0.309 0.203 0.203 0.547 1 
N 4,933             
The retained factors reflect our conceptualization of knowledge search defined along 
specific search directions instead of rather broadly defined breadth and depth. The first 
factor is characterized by scientific contributions to innovation processes (public re-
search institutes and universities). Therefore we will refer to this factor as “science-
driven knowledge search”. Suppliers, professional exchanges, and exhibitions/fairs load 
highly positive on the second factor. This is surprising at first sight as our theoretical 
argumentation is largely based on supplier interaction without taking into account pro-
fessional exchanges or fairs in particular. Then again, supplier knowledge provides the 
highest level of uniqueness and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO) of any item in the 
factor analysis. This indicates that supplier knowledge is the defining influence behind 
factor 2. We suspect that fairs and professional exchanges serve as the contact points at 
which firms find and connect with potential suppliers and are therefore considered an 
element of search for this particular factor. Hence, we interpret this factor as “supplier-
driven knowledge search”. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that it does not ex-
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clusively capture supplier knowledge but a broader conceptualization in which 
knowledge is made “accessible” (fairs, exhibitions, exchanges) or can be procured. In 
contrast, the third factor reflects a considerable contribution to innovation processes 
coming from the firms’ market environment (customers and competitors). We interpret 
this factor accordingly as “market-driven knowledge search”. We will use the three de-
rived factor scales as focus variables to test our hypotheses empirically. 
Table 4.3: Results of the principal component factor analysis 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness KMOa 
Supplier   0.703   0.505 0.851 
Customer     0.845 0.264 0.707 
Competitor     0.807 0.301 0.720 
University 0.865     0.224 0.647 
Public Research Institute 0.869     0.232 0.654 
Professional Exchange   0.698   0.369 0.712 
Exhibitions and Fairs   0.762   0.331 0.695 
Overall         0.695 
a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy. Presented factor loadings are yielded after varimax rotation. Factor loadings 
below 0.5 are excluded from the table. 
4.3.2.3 Control variables 
We include several control variables in our empirical model to account for other factors 
that may influence the estimation results. Obviously, the success of a firm’s innovation 
activities depends crucially on the level of its investments in research and development. 
These in-house R&D investments have been found to form a firm’s absorptive capacity 
for identifying, assimilating and exploiting external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989, 1990). Hence, we include R&D intensity measured by R&D expenditures as a 
share of sales. Furthermore, valuable knowledge is often the result of accumulated R&D 
over time, which typically requires a dedicated R&D department. We include a dummy 
control variable for whether the company performs R&D continuously. As a firm’s in-
novation success may be affected by the availability of resources we control for a liabil-
ity of size or smallness by adding the firm’s sales from the start of the reporting period 
(1998) in logs. A firm’s degree of internationalization is captured by the export intensity 
which is measured as ratio of exports to total sales. As our observations stem from vari-
ous European countries, it is necessary to control for effects of the national regulation 
environment as well as peculiarities of the innovation system. This is done by incorpo-
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rating country dummy variables into the regression. If a firm is part of a group, it can 
spread certain functions among subsidiaries or draw from their resources. We therefore 
add a dummy variable to control for this fact. In addition, some firms may only invest in 
process innovation. The innovation success of these activities cannot be accounted for. 
We thus add a dummy variable for process innovators. 
4.3.3 Estimation strategy 
In order to test the three hypotheses, we estimate two separate empirical models for both 
dependent variables: share of sales with firm novelties and share of sales with market 
novelties. As the dependent variables in all models are shares, they are censored be-
tween 0 and 1 with a significant fraction of observations having a value of zero. We 
address this issue by estimating Tobit models. For the exploratory part of our analysis 
we run the same estimations on subsamples representing the four sectoral patterns. The 
size of the overall sample allows for a sector-specific split with each subsample contain-
ing at least 800 observations. An alternative approach could have been to generate inter-
action terms between the type of knowledge search and the sectoral patterns. However, 
due to potential multicollinearity and difficulties in interpretation of multiplicative in-
teractions in non-linear models, we opt for separate estimations (e.g. Salomon and Jin, 
2010).  
We benefit from a comprehensive dataset that does not limit the empirical findings to a 
particular firm size, industry or country setting. Then again, this induces additional lay-
ers of heterogeneity to the dataset, which may not be completely captured by control 
variables. Most standard regression models require homoscedasticity for consistent es-
timation results.65 That is, the variance of the random variable is assumed to be the same 
regardless of whether observations stem from large or small firms and of how they dif-
fer by industry or country. If this is not the case, estimations might suffer from hetero-
scedasticity. Heteroscedastic datasets may lead to an underestimation of the variance in 
an empirical model and subsequently to a lower threshold for the identification of sig-
nificant results. Given the nature of our dataset, we consider it necessary to test for ho-
moscedasticity. We apply Likelihood ratio tests to check if firm size, industry and loca-
65 See Greene (2002), p. 698-700, for details in the context of Tobit models. 
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tion of a firm cause heteroscedasticity.66 The results of the LR test reject homoscedastic-
ity in all model specifications. Thus we include firm size, country dummies and industry 
dummies in heteroscedastic regressions where we consider the variance 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2 of observa-
tion i to be of the form 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2 = 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑖𝑖′𝑎). The vector of variables in the heteroscedastici-
ty term is represented by z while a denotes the vector of additional coefficients to be 
estimated. This correction allows for the estimation of heteroscedasticity-consistent co-
efficients. 
In addition, we inspect the dataset for issues arising from multicollinearity by calculat-
ing both pair-wise correlations and variance inflation factors. The dataset shows no par-
ticularly high degree of multicollinearity by any conventionally applied standard in the 
literature (Chatterjee and Hadi, 2006).67 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.4 shows interesting differences in firms’ knowledge search with respect to in-
novation success. We conduct significance tests on mean differences between firms 
with above average usage of certain types of knowledge search compared with the rest. 
Firms using science-driven knowledge search at an above average level exhibit a signif-
icantly higher share of sales of both market and firm novelties. In contrast, we do not 
observe a significant difference for firms engaging predominantly in a supplier-driven 
knowledge search. A somewhat mixed pattern is revealed by firms that mainly use a 
market-driven knowledge search. We find a higher share of sales of firm novelties while 
there is no observable difference in the share of sales of market novelties compared to 
firms that use a market-driven knowledge search to a below average extent. 
However, firms differ along several dimensions with regard to their choice of type of 
knowledge search. Again, we test for significant mean differences between firms with 
an above average use of a particular type of search compared to their below average 
counterparts. Common to all types of knowledge search is the fact that they are signifi-
cantly more likely to be chosen by firms with higher R&D spending and continuous 
66 These variables have frequently been shown to cause heteroscedasticity in this setting (see. e. g. 
Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2007). 
67 The correlation matrix and the variance inflation factors are presented in Table D 3 in Appendix D. 
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R&D activities. Firms with above average search for external knowledge are also signif-
icantly larger (in terms of sales), which reflects the availability of resources to develop 
an active search for external knowledge. 
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics differentiated by type of knowledge search 
  
All firms Science-driven search  - above average use 
Supplier-driven search  
- above average use 
Market-driven search  
- above average use 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Share of sales with 
market novelties 0.102 0.181 0.112 *** 0.180 0.105   0.181 0.103   0.176 
Share of sales with 
firm novelties 0.159 0.235 0.168 ** 0.228 0.157   0.231 0.169 *** 0.230 
N 4,933   1,932     2,522     2,535     
Asterisks indicate the level of significance that the differences of sample means are not equal 0: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Results are derived from Two-sample t tests comparing sample means of above average and below average use. The descriptive 
statistics of the remaining variables is shown in Table D 1 in Appendix D. 
Firms with above average science- and/or market-driven knowledge search are signifi-
cantly more internationalized (measured as export share of sales) and part of a company 
group. Process innovators are more likely to focus on science-driven and/or supplier-
driven knowledge search. With regard to differences across sectoral patterns, we find 
that science-driven knowledge search is significantly more attractive for firms in AKP 
and MPG. Supplier-driven knowledge search is more intensively used by SIS firms, and 
market-driven knowledge search again by AKP and MPG firms. 
4.4.2 Regression results 
Table 4.5 shows the results of the Tobit model estimations. As outlined previously, we 
correct the variance in each model to account for the effects of heteroscedasticity and 
test the outcomes of this correction successfully. We estimate two separate models for 
each dependent variable. 
Columns I and II show the estimation results for the full sample. The results in column I 
show a positive relationship between success with new-to-market innovations, as meas-
ured by the share of sales of market novelties, both for science-driven and supplier-
driven knowledge search. Thus, we find support for hypotheses 2, which states that sci-
ence-driven knowledge search propel success with new-to-market innovations rather 
than with imitations. Column II shows that success with imitations, as measured by the 
share of sales of firm novelties, is positively affected by market-driven knowledge 
search while there is no impact on success of new-to-market innovations. This finding 
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supports hypothesis 1 and implies a rejection of hypothesis 3. Supplier-driven 
knowledge search propels performance with new-to-market innovations but has no sig-
nificant effect on imitations. 
Table 4.5: Results of Tobit estimations for the full sample 
 
Share of sales of market 
novelties 
Share of sales of firm 
novelties 
 I II 
Science-driven search (scale) 0.047 ** 0.022     
 (0.022)     (0.025)     
Supplier-driven search (scale) 0.046 ** 0.015     
 (0.022)     (0.025)     
Market-driven search (scale) 0.029     0.136 *** 
 (0.019)     (0.022)     
R&D intensity 0.326 *** 0.138 ** 
 (0.058)     (0.067)     
Continuous R&D activitiesa 0.090 *** 0.036 *** 
 (0.010)     (0.011)     
Export intensity 0.037 **  0.012     
 (0.017)     (0.019)     
Sales 1998 (log) -0.002     0.001     
 (0.003)     (0.003)     
Part of company groupa 0.010     -0.001     
 (0.009)     (0.011)     
Process innovationa 0.000     -0.058 *** 
 (0.009)     (0.010)     
Constant -0.177 ** -0.086 *   
  (0.046)     (0.051)     
Country dummies included included 
Industry dummies included included 
Wald-Test on joint significance of 
industry dummies W(χ2(3)) = 4.99 W(χ2(3)) = 4.37 
R2McFadden 0.14 0.12 
N 4,933 4,933 
LR/Wald chi2 306.82 288.90 
P-value 0.00 0.00 
Log likelihood -1,872.29 -2,351.57 
LR - Test on heteroscedasticity LR(χ2(10)) = 3745*** LR(χ2(10)) = 4703*** 
a Dummy variable. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) respectively. Search scales are rescaled between 0 and 1. Coefficients of sector and country dummies are presented in Table D 
2 in Appendix D. Heteroscedasticity terms include 3 dummies for firm size measured by sales in 1998 (log) (0-24th percentile, 25th -
49th percentile, 50th -74th percentile), country dummies and industry dummies. 
Regarding our control variables, we find – as expected – a positive effect of R&D inten-
sity on both new-to-market innovation and imitation performance. Moreover, perform-
ing R&D continuously has a positive impact on both types of a firm’s innovation suc-
cess. Regarding the remaining control variables in our regression we find that higher 
export intensity goes hand in hand with higher new-to-market innovation performance 
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while there is no significant effect on imitation success. This may reflect incentives to 
engage in new-to-market innovation due to high competition pressure in international 
markets. If firms are process innovators they have to allocate limited personnel and fi-
nancial resources to the development of both new processes and new products. There-
fore, innovation success in terms of sales will decrease, which is supported by our find-
ings of negative effects of process innovation. However, this holds only for the models 
of imitation. No effects can be found for firm size and for a firm being part of a compa-
ny group. 
Table 4.6 shows the results of the Tobit estimations of the four major sectoral patterns. 
Several interesting similarities but also differences can be identified among the models. 
A first striking finding is that a market-driven knowledge search never propels innova-
tion success with new-to-market innovations but only with imitations. This holds for the 
three sectoral patterns AKP, MPG and PGS. An exception is, however, SIS, which ex-
hibits no significant effect of a market-driven knowledge search at all. Another interest-
ing finding is that both a science-driven and a supplier-driven knowledge search are 
relevant for new-to-market innovation performance in AKP and SIS while we find no 
effect in MPG and PGS. Additionally, a science-driven search strategy also facilitates 
innovation performance with imitations in AKP. The results for the control variables are 
largely in line with the findings of the full sample estimations. 
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Table 4.6: Results of the Tobit estimations for the sectoral patterns 
  AKP MPG SIS PGS 
 
Share of sales of 
market novelties 
Share of sales of 
firm novelties 
Share of sales of 
market novelties 
Share of sales of 
firm novelties 
Share of sales of 
market novelties 
Share of sales of 
firm novelties 
Share of sales of 
market novelties 
Share of sales of 
firm novelties 
  III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
Science-driven search (scale) 0.074 *   0.092 **  0.027     -0.052     0.175 *** 0.019     -0.044     0.027     
 (0.041)     (0.047)     (0.035)     (0.041)     (0.060)     (0.072)     (0.042)     (0.050)     
Supplier-driven search (scale) 0.105 **  0.037     -0.005     0.018     0.103 **  -0.061     0.037     0.028     
 (0.045)     (0.051)     (0.036)     (0.042)     (0.049)     (0.052)     (0.042)     (0.049)     
Market-driven search (scale) 0.065     0.186 *** 0.015     0.142 *** 0.031     0.043     0.000     0.116 *** 
 (0.040)     (0.045)     (0.032)     (0.037)     (0.043)     (0.047)     (0.038)     (0.043)     
R&D intensity 0.180 *** 0.109     0.511 *** 0.294     0.992 **  1.220 **  1.397 *** 0.148     
 (0.064)     (0.076)     (0.169)     (0.191)     (0.420)     (0.572)     (0.459)     (0.563)     
Continuous R&D activitiesa 0.148 *** 0.028     0.079 *** 0.055 *** 0.039 *   0.016     0.064 *** 0.005     
 (0.021)     (0.022)     (0.016)     (0.018)     (0.023)     (0.026)     (0.019)     (0.022)     
Export intensity 0.025     0.025     0.051 *   0.024     -0.163 **  -0.088     0.097 *** 0.048     
 (0.033)     (0.037)     (0.026)     (0.031)     (0.065)     (0.055)     (0.033)     (0.035)     
Sales 1998 (log) -0.017 *** -0.003     0.002     0.008     0.003     0.007     0.011 *   -0.003     
 (0.006)     (0.007)     (0.005)     (0.006)     (0.005)     (0.006)     (0.007)     (0.007)     
Part of company groupa 0.001     0.012     0.011     -0.036 *   -0.007     0.038     0.020     -0.001     
 (0.018)     (0.021)     (0.016)     (0.019)     (0.021)     (0.023)     (0.019)     (0.022)     
Process innovationa 0.002     -0.031     -0.008     -0.042 **  -0.015     -0.068 *** 0.013     -0.087 *** 
 (0.017)     (0.020)     (0.015)     (0.017)     (0.022)     (0.023)     (0.019)     (0.022)     
Constant 0.021     -0.081     -0.173 **  -0.169 *   -0.233 *** -0.058     -0.395 *** 0.015     
  (0.087)     (0.100)     (0.077)     (0.088)     (0.087)     (0.095)     (0.117)     (0.108)     
Country dummies included     included     included     included     included     included   included     included   
R2McFadden 0.19 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.15 
N 1,164 1,164 1,702 1,702 800 800 1,267 1,267 
LR/Wald chi2 120.82 55.29 88.90 103.43 43.57 47.91 78.26 86.74 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Log likelihood -423.56 -522.82 -582.15 -762.98 -292.07 -335.65 -498.62 -665.34 
LR - Test on heteroscedasticity LR(χ2(7)) =    847*** 
LR(χ2(7)) = 
1046*** 
LR(χ2(7)) = 
1164*** 
LR(χ2(7)) = 
1526*** 
LR(χ2(7)) =    
584*** 
LR(χ2(7)) =    
671*** 
LR(χ2(7)) =    
997*** 
LR(χ2(7)) = 
1331*** 
a Dummy variable. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. Search scales are rescaled between 0 and 1. Heteroscedasticity terms 
include 3 dummies for firm size measured by sales in 1998 (log) (0-24th percentile, 25th -49th percentile, 50th -74th percentile), country dummies and industry dummies. 
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4.5 Concluding remarks 
Our research benefits from a comprehensive cross-country dataset, which allows us to 
draw conclusions beyond a certain industry or country context. However, we see room 
for improvement, which may provide pathways for future research. The effects of in-
vestments in R&D and open innovation networks may reach their full potential over the 
long run. Hence, longitudinal studies may help to test and substantiate some of our 
cross-sectional findings. Besides, qualitative studies may provide further in-depth in-
sights into the mechanisms underlying the different types of knowledge search. In this 
respect it would be especially fruitful to explicitly capture the role of functional depart-
ments (especially marketing and procurement) and their interaction with the R&D de-
partment when certain knowledge sources are identified, activated and exploited. This 
may be especially relevant with regard to how legitimacy and trust can be established 
and how these mechanisms differ across varying knowledge sources. Finally, our inves-
tigation is limited to product innovation. Extending this line of research to other types of 
innovations like organizational or business model innovations may be a fruitful direc-
tion for further research. 
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5 Summary and conclusions 
5.1 Summary 
This thesis provides empirical evidence from Germany on the effects of vertical rela-
tions, competition and search strategies on different aspects of innovation behaviour. It 
is hence approaching central aspects of research on industrial organization and man-
agement. 
In chapter 2 we study the effects of bargaining power in vertical relations on suppliers’ 
R&D profitability and suppliers’ innovation incentives. These questions have relevance 
for competition policy as they are often addressed when assessing effects of mergers in 
downstream markets or when investigating conduct in downstream markets with respect 
to impact upon upstream markets (see e. g. Competition Commission, 2008). In order to 
test the hypotheses, survey-based datasets are used which provide rich information on 
the relationships between suppliers and their buyers on the level of the supply firm. Of-
tentimes, researchers can only observe horizontal links between supply firms when in-
vestigating questions of both suppliers’ profitability and innovation incentives. Hence 
additional information on their buyers provides a valuable opportunity to take vertical 
interactions into account. 
Section 2.1 explores the relationship between a supplier’s bargaining power and R&D 
profitability. Studies on the relationship between R&D, innovation and firm profitability 
mostly concentrate on the impact of horizontal market structure which follows tradi-
tional industrial organization literature that emphasizes the importance of market con-
centration and entry barriers for firm profitability. While providing inconclusive results, 
none of the existing studies took however the vertical interactions of R&D performers 
into account. 
Building on theoretical and empirical evidence on the effects of bargaining in vertical 
relationships with respect to suppliers’ profitability, the market position and the degree 
of concentration in the buyer portfolio are identified as the crucial determinants of a 
supplier’s bargaining power. Regarding R&D profitability, the latter is expected to di-
minish returns from R&D, while the former is expected to increase it. 
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The hypotheses are tested using a sample of 472 German firms from manufacturing 
sectors. The empirical findings support all hypotheses and therefore highlight the im-
portance of taking bargaining power in vertical relations into account when analysing 
R&D profitability. The estimated effects are considerable: for an average R&D per-
forming supplier an increase of R&D intensity in 2010 by a percentage point would 
reduce profits by about 14 % in 2012 given he depends completely from the largest 
three buyers and does hold an average market share. Contrastingly, a monopolist R&D 
performing supplier with average buyer concentration would experience a profit in-
crease by 10 % in 2012. What is more, the findings support the hypothesis of a lagged 
impact of R&D investments on a supplier’s R&D profitability (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 
1982). 
In section 2.2 we subsequently analyse the relationship between buyer power and inno-
vation incentives of supplying firms. While theory provides mixed results about this 
relationship, empirical studies typically find a negative correlation between buyer power 
and suppliers' innovation incentives. However, most studies are limited to certain indus-
tries and apply measures of buyer power generated either on an industry level or by sub-
jective assessments of suppliers. Moreover, they do not consider the type of buyer mar-
ket competition and likely effects on suppliers' innovation incentives. 
We benefit from a dataset that in contrast to the dataset used in section 2.1 additionally 
provides data on the industry of the buyers. This allows taking account of downstream 
industry characteristics. What is more, the available data also allow distinguishing be-
tween different degrees of buyer power. Based on a sample of 1,036 firms across manu-
facturing and service industries, we find a negative effect of buyer power on a supplier’s 
likelihood to invest in R&D for both measures applied. As expected, the effect is more 
pronounced for the measure indicating strong buyer power. Again we find considerable 
effects of buyers’ bargaining power. We estimate that a switch from no buyer power to 
strong buyer power decreases the probability of a supplier to establish R&D activities 
on average by 27 %. Furthermore strong buyer power also reduces a supplier’s R&D 
intensity. Here a switch from no buyer power to strong buyer power leads on average to 
a reduction by 37 %. 
We also find downstream industry characteristics to have an impact on supplier’s R&D 
incentives when using a sample of manufacturing firms. We find evidence that in manu-
facturing industries the demand-pull argument applies. That is, stronger downstream 
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competition leads to higher demand for innovative intermediate goods, thereby increas-
ing not only the likelihood of R&D investments but also the intensity of R&D invest-
ment on the supply side. In contrast, we find that suppliers have a lower likelihood to 
take up R&D activities if downstream R&D intensity is high. This is a reasonable find-
ing considering that R&D projects often require a minimum investment. On one hand, 
the minimum investment is likely to be higher if buyers are strongly involved in R&D 
while it on the other hand has to be financed with internal cash-flow. 
Finally, we also explore whether there are joint effects of buyer power and downstream 
industry characteristics on suppliers’ innovation incentives. We interestingly find for the 
sample of manufacturing firms that the negative effect of buyer power on a supplier’s 
R&D probability is mitigated by downstream competition. This can be explained by 
spillovers from buyers in a highly competitive environment to suppliers which are more 
likely to be absorbed if buyers are large. This will in turn improve the bargaining posi-
tion of the supplier. Consequently the supplier has a higher incentive to innovate. We 
also find a negative joint effect of buyer power and downstream R&D intensity on a 
supplier’s R&D intensity which is in line with the argument that suppliers with power-
ful buyers who invest heavily into R&D reduce their efforts in order to maintain their 
profitability. 
Even though the studies presented in sections 2.1 and 2.2 utilize valuable datasets in 
terms of information on supplier-buyer relationships, our understanding of bargaining 
power, buyer power and the resulting effects on suppliers R&D profitability and innova-
tion incentives is far from being complete. Part of this is due to missing information on 
buyer characteristics that go beyond their industry affiliation. Therefore it would be 
helpful if we knew about the size of the buyers, the share of inputs sourced from a par-
ticular supplier, the product market they are active in, concentration within these mar-
kets and so on. Observations of supplier-buyer relationships over a longer period in time 
would complement richer data on buyers and improve analysis of vertical relationships 
considerably. This also applies from an econometrical point of view as panel data atten-
uates issues of endogeneity which can hardly be overcome with cross-section data. 
The relationship between competition and resulting innovation incentives is dealt with 
in chapter 3, which contributes to the existing research by analysing the nexus between 
product market competition and innovation at the firm level in Germany. The study 
makes use of panel data from 1997-2005 for 1,015 German companies and applies two 
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measures for product market competition: traditional price-cost margins and the profit 
elasticity which was recently proposed by Boone (2007) as a measure of industry level 
competitive behaviour. The econometric approach deviates from most prior research in 
the way that we do not only consider the impact on R&D expenditure but distinguish 
the effect of product market competition on the decision to invest in R&D and on the 
amount of R&D given that the firm has decided to conduct R&D. Though this distinc-
tion has become popular as the first stage in the model by Crèpon et al (1998) that links 
innovation and productivity and has been employed in many cross-sectional studies, to 
the best of our knowledge, a similar approach to examine the relationship between com-
petition and innovation using longitudinal data is only adopted by Artes (2009) for 
Spanish firms.  
Recent theoretical contributions furthermore argue that the effect of competition on 
R&D also depends on firms’ technological distance to the frontier as well as on the 
technological spread within an industry (Aghion et al., 2005, Acemoglu et al., 2006). 
Section 3 contributes to the empirical literature on competition and innovation since the 
estimation strategy takes account of both these factors as well. Moreover, we are able to 
distinguish constant and deviation effects of competition, technological distance and 
technological spread on innovation incentives. 
The results do not support a u-shaped relationship between competition and innovation 
for German manufacturing firms. Instead, we find a high level of constant competition 
to negatively affect innovation incentives which supports Schumpeter’s (1942) argu-
ment that intense competition reduces margins thereby reducing opportunities for fi-
nancing innovation projects. 
Firms in technologically very uneven sectors are found to have a lower probability of 
performing R&D. Having said that, the results also show that a high constant level of 
technological disparity is linked to higher R&D intensities. This can be explained by 
stronger R&D incentives for R&D performers in unlevelled sectors due to larger 
productivity differences between the firms within an unlevelled sector compared to ra-
ther equally productive firms in a levelled sector. Therefore, expected profits of R&D in 
an unlevelled sector are higher compared to a levelled sector once the R&D investment 
is sunk. 
We also observe that a constantly high level of technological distance implies a lower 
probability for R&D activities which is countervailed by a positive effect of a short term 
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increase in technological distance. The constant level of technological distance seems to 
be less important for the decision on the intensity of R&D. This finding reflects that the 
investment decision will have a long-term perspective while in contrast the decision on 
R&D intensity is rather a short-term decision. 
Moreover the results show that both technological distance and competition are strongly 
related to each other and that an effect of competition on innovation incentives should 
not be considered separately from technological distance. Our findings support the ar-
gument of Aghion et al. (2005) that innovation incentives of technological laggards de-
crease if competition gets more intense. In addition, this study provides evidence that 
firm level measures of competition are preferable compared to industry level measures 
as a more precise measurement of changes in competition is possible. 
In chapter 4 we conduct a study on the nature of firms’ search for external knowledge 
and what effects practitioners can expect from applying them. We argue conceptually 
that different instances of knowledge search are not homogeneous with regard to the 
sources they encompass. In that sense, conceptualizations describing knowledge search 
along the dimensions of breadth and depth (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 
2006) may underestimate the degree of heterogeneity among different knowledge 
sources. What is more, we integrate two additional elements into the stream of research 
on open innovation and search strategies. First, we focus on varying degrees of novelty 
in firms’ open innovation performance. Some knowledge sources can be expected to 
provide knowledge with a higher degree of novelty providing more opportunities for 
new-to-market innovation than others. Second, the nature of innovation activities differs 
significantly across sectors. In a first step, we test our hypotheses empirically for a 
comprehensive sample of almost 5,000 firms from five Western European countries and 
find support for most of them. In a second step, we explore the effects of search on both 
types of innovation performance across four sectoral patterns of innovation which en-
compass both manufacturing and service firms. 
From a research perspective, we introduce the notion of selectivity in firms’ knowledge 
search. Neither breadth nor depth in a firm’s search provide much guidance as to what 
knowledge sources to combine in a broad knowledge search and what ones to empha-
size for depth. We find strong support for our theoretical argument that management 
should choose a certain direction for a firm’s knowledge search. Science-driven, mar-
ket-driven, and supplier-driven knowledge search differ significantly in the kind of 
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knowledge they can provide and the way they can be accessed by the firm. They can 
therefore not be assumed to be substitutive. 
This is reflected in the value they can provide in different sectors and with respect to 
different degrees of novelty. Several studies highlight the increasing importance of ser-
vice sectors for most modern economies (e.g. Sirilli and Evangelista, 1998). Moreover, 
successful innovation in most sectors is increasingly based on a combination of novel 
products and services instead of a narrow focus on one or the other. However, empirical 
tests of open innovation knowledge search have primarily focused on manufacturing 
sectors (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001). We find considerable differences across the four sectoral patterns on which our 
analysis is based (Castellacci, 2008). It appears that firms can selectively influence their 
innovation performance depending on targeted search for external knowledge and their 
sectoral trajectories. In this respect, we find that market-driven knowledge search al-
most always increases imitation performance. It seems to be very limited in providing 
highly novel knowledge to firms that would consequently result in new-to-market inno-
vations. Market-driven knowledge search thus includes the danger of over-emphasizing 
short-term customer needs and imitations of already existing products. Hence, our find-
ings support existing literature (e.g. Slater and Narver, 1998): A primary strategy of 
avoiding “customer-led” traps of incremental innovation may rest in refocusing a firm’s 
knowledge pool with search directed at leading universities and specialized suppliers. 
In contrast to this, firms adopting a science-driven or supplier-driven knowledge search 
have a good chance to create new-to-market innovations. Advanced knowledge provid-
ers can also propel imitation performance by relying on knowledge inputs from science. 
It seems that in this sectoral pattern the firm’s knowledge base needs to be regularly 
informed by novel insights from science to be able to even keep up with competitors 
and to successfully imitate their products.  
5.2 Conclusions 
As mentioned in the introduction, the evaluation of the Lisbon strategy shows that the 
goal to spend 3% of the GDP for R&D is clearly missed. Hence the successor of the 
Lisbon strategy, Europe 2020, is still pursuing the 3% goal as a means to develop an 
economy based on knowledge and innovation. In order to deliver the objectives of Eu-
rope 2020, the European Commission emphasizes that it is vital to enhance key instru-
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ments such as the single market. Therefore they are willing to make use of specific 
competition policy which is supposed to assure that efficient markets support competi-
tion thereby providing incentives for innovation and growth. Furthermore, Europe 2020 
encompasses instruments by which the delivery of the strategy’s objectives is backed 
up. The flagship initiative "Innovation Union" which is intended to enhance framework 
conditions for innovation and R&D on one hand and the accessibility of financial means 
for research and innovation on the other hand is one of these means. The implementa-
tion of this flagship initiative is supposed to ensure “that innovative ideas can be turned 
into products and services that create growth and jobs” (European Commission, 2010b; 
p. 12). To this end, the initiative encompasses among others actions on both EU and 
national level to support links between education (universities), business and research 
and innovation. The strengthening of these links is important as firms can benefit from 
connecting their own innovation activities to external know-how since doing so enables 
them to absorb innovation impulses from other players in the innovation system. The 
increasing adoption of such cooperative behaviour is in sharp contrast to research and 
development carried out merely within the bounds of an enterprise. 
The instruments applied in Europe 2020, namely the creation of innovation incentives 
through competition as well as the strengthening of links between actors in the innova-
tion system are the subject of interest of this thesis. It provides empirical evidence on 
the effects that can be expected to occur when these instruments are applied successful-
ly. 
The investigation of incentives emerging from competition on business innovation in 
chapter 3 shows that a first requirement for a successful competition policy is to make 
sure that competition can be properly measured. As we show the measured effects of 
competition on firms’ innovation incentives in our study differ considerably, depending 
on which measure is used. We apply two different measures of competition, the 1-PCM 
on firm level and the PE which is measured on industry level. Besides the theoretical 
drawbacks of the 1-PCM (see Tirole, 1998 and Boone, 2008 as well as the references 
cited therein) this measure is easily computed and the data required is readily available 
in most datasets. Moreover it provides a competition measure at firm level.68 Comple-
68 Most datasets contain the required information to compute the PCM on firm level. If the firm is active 
in many product markets however, there is an aggregation problem as well since the PCM computed on 
firm level then reflects competition intensity in more than one market. 
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mentary, we use the profit elasticity (PE) proposed by Boone et al. (2007). PE is meas-
ured on industry level and is defined as the percentage fall in profits due to a percentage 
increase in costs. The aggregation problem of other measures of competition on industry 
level, e. g. concentration measures which may reflect an average over many heteroge-
neous product markets, are relevant for the PE as well. Therefore it is recommendable 
to compare the results of different measures and thus check their robustness. 
We also show that changes in competition policy aiming at an increase of the average 
level of competition would lower innovation incentives according to our findings. This 
is due to the fact, that increased competition lowers margins and hence operating prof-
its. As the latter are a common source to finance innovation projects, a reduction in 
profits implies less opportunity to innovate. In addition, activities of research and devel-
opment usually have a long-term perspective. The decision to invest in such activities is 
hence determined by a firm’s assessment how profitable resulting innovations may be in 
the future. If the level of competition increases in the long-term perspective, then the 
expected profitability of R&D activity decreases and firms’ may rather refrain from 
investing in R&D. Therefore, the introduction of policy measures aiming at an increase 
in innovation and R&D spending by stimulating competition as postulated in the Hori-
zon 2020 strategy would have negative effects on innovation incentives of German 
manufacturers. 
In addition, a change in competition, e. g. by entry, and its impact on firms’ innovation 
incentives will depend on the individual distance to the technological frontier. If the 
distance is too large, an increase in competition will affect innovation incentives nega-
tively. Therefore, careful assessment is needed when policies concerned with the stimu-
lation of competition are applied to industries with a small fraction of highly productive 
firms. While the very productive firms are likely to respond positively in terms of R&D 
engagement on intensifying competition, the less productive firms may either refrain 
from starting R&D or reduce their spending. 
Increasing innovation incentives by competition policy also has to take vertical relation-
ships between firms into account. The results of chapter 2 imply that firms profit from a 
diversified buyer structure in terms of increased profitability. This implies that a high 
degree of concentration on downstream markets adversely affects the opportunities for 
suppliers to invest in innovation. This is confirmed by the results of section 2.2 which 
show that buyer power lowers both firms’ probability to start R&D activities and the 
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amount of investment. There is a vast strand of literature reporting that firms in order to 
finance innovation projects rely heavily on their internal cash flow as the cost for exter-
nal capital is oftentimes too high (for a survey see Hall and Lerner, 2010). Hence, com-
petition authorities have to carefully investigate the possible adverse effects of mergers 
in the downstream market on supply markets. To this end, they have to account for the 
characteristics of the downstream industry. Section 2.2 shows that these also matter for 
the innovation incentives of suppliers.  
Our results hint in the direction, that buyer power in combination with strong down-
stream competition does not necessarily lead to less upstream innovation incentives. In 
fact, strong buyer market competition may even spur innovation incentives if transferred 
to suppliers by a powerful buyer. European competition policy is focusing on the con-
sumer though. That is, the impact of downstream mergers on suppliers is only of con-
cern if competition authorities expect harm for the end user. The evaluation of merger 
effects on the supply market and the subsequent feedback effects on downstream mar-
kets as well as consumers appears to be a heroic task however. 
The Commission moreover stated that “much of the current interest in buyer power 
highlights the plight and problems faced by small suppliers. It is clear that some of these 
concerns relate to issues that are not a matter of competition law but rather highlight 
social or political concerns” (OECD, 2008; p. 2). Hence the scope for competition poli-
cy to consider effects of downstream concentration on suppliers’ innovation incentives 
seems to be limited anyway. 
The flagship initiative "Innovation Union" which is outlined in Europe 2020 is supposed 
to ensure “that innovative ideas can be turned into products and services that create 
growth and jobs” (European Commission, 2010b; p. 12). One of the aims of the flagship 
initiative is to support links between education (universities), business and research and 
innovation. The strengthening of these links is important as firms can benefit from con-
necting their own innovation activities to external know-how since doing so enables 
them to absorb innovation impulses from other players in the innovation system. How 
such links can be successfully exploited with respect to both an innovation’s degree of 
novelty as well as a firm’s sector of activity is shown chapter 4. In search for external 
knowledge firms should focus their search since not all types of knowledge search pro-
vide the basis for new-to-market innovations. Market-driven knowledge search provides 
imitations which may still be profitable without entailing the increased risk of the new-
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to-market innovations. The performance potentials of selective knowledge search for 
external knowledge are especially high for advanced knowledge providers and support-
ing infrastructural service sectors. Firms in these sectors should develop deeper ties with 
leading universities as well as suppliers. These activities require resource commitments 
in terms of financial investments (e.g. specialized labs) and human resources (e.g. joint 
research projects, sponsored PhD projects). The recognition of industry differences in 
our study is important because in all other sectors (MPG, PGS), the expected returns of 
external search cannot outweigh the costs. Consequently, firms in these sectors are bet-
ter off fostering their internal R&D activities when it comes to generating new-to-
market products. 
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A Appendix: Bargaining in vertical relationships and 
suppliers’ R&D profitability 
Table A 1: Industry breakdown 
Variable Industry group Nace Codea 
IND1 Food/Tobacco  10-12 
IND2 Textiles 13-15 
IND3 Wood/Paper 16-17 
IND4 Chemicals 20-21 
IND5 Synthetics 22 
IND6 Glass/Ceramics 23 
IND7 Metal 24-25 
IND8 Machinery 28, 33 
IND9 Electronics 26-27 
IND10 Automotive 29-30 
IND11 Furniture/Sport/Toys 
(Reference group) 
31-32 
a Nace Code Rev. 2 
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Table A 2: Descriptive statistics differentiated by suppliers’ R&D status (continued from 
Table 2.2) 
 Full Sample  R&D 
performer 
 Non-R&D 
performer 
 T-test 
  Mean SD  Mean SD 
 
Mean SD      
IND1 0.066 0.248 
 
0.025 0.156 
 
0.125 0.332 
 
4.39 *** 
IND2 0.053 0.224 
 
0.029 0.167 
 
0.089 0.285 
 
2.88 ** 
IND3 0.057 0.232 
 
0.018 0.133 
 
0.115 0.319 
 
4.53 *** 
IND4 0.091 0.288 
 
0.125 0.331 
 
0.042 0.200 
 
-3.12 ** 
IND5 0.083 0.276 
 
0.068 0.252 
 
0.104 0.306 
 
1.41 
 IND6 0.074 0.262 
 
0.071 0.258 
 
0.078 0.269 
 
0.27 
 IND7 0.140 0.347 
 
0.143 0.351 
 
0.135 0.343 
 
-0.23 
 IND8 0.161 0.368 
 
0.186 0.390 
 
0.125 0.332 
 
-1.77 * 
IND9 0.169 0.376 
 
0.236 0.425 
 
0.073 0.261 
 
-4.73 *** 
IND10 0.044 0.206 
 
0.054 0.226 
 
0.031 0.174 
 
-1.15 
 IND11 0.061 0.240 
 
0.046 0.211 
 
0.083 0.277 
 
1.64 
 N 472     280     192         
All variables are dummy variables. Columns with heading SD display standard deviations. The last two columns display t-statistics 
whether a T-test on mean difference between the respective group of R&D and non-R&D performers rejects the Null hypothesis of 
no difference. The asterisks indicate the corresponding level of significance (* 10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 %). 
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Table A 3: Estimation results of heteroscedasticity consistent ordered Probit models (con-
tinued from Table 2.3) 
 Dependent variable: Profit over sales 
 
2011 2012 2011 2012 
  I II III IV 
IND1 -0.626     -1.604     -0.770     -1.773 *   
(0.976)     (1.013)     (0.941)     (0.979)     
IND2 -0.516     -1.902 *   -0.637     -2.032 *   
(1.208)     (1.116)     (1.185)     (1.103)     
IND3 0.994     0.471     0.906     0.412     
(1.472)     (1.386)     (1.471)     (1.403)     
IND4 3.970 *** 2.176 *   4.150 *** 2.207 *   
(1.410)     (1.315)     (1.413)     (1.328)     
IND5 0.347     -0.297     0.204     -0.450     
(1.191)     (0.972)     (1.165)     (0.952)     
IND6 1.967     1.200     1.754     0.954     
(1.370)     (1.281)     (1.342)     (1.248)     
IND7 -0.029     -0.862     -0.101     -0.942     
(0.926)     (0.890)     (0.896)     (0.864)     
IND8 2.342 **  2.404 *** 2.423 *** 2.486 *** 
(0.934)     (0.863)     (0.911)     (0.844)     
IND9 2.996 *** 1.859     2.706 **  1.444     
(1.154)     (1.191)     (1.127)     (1.137)     
IND10 0.498     0.494     0.331     0.245     
(1.347)     (1.277)     (1.366)     (1.312)     
Wald - Test: joint 
significance of indus-
try dummies 
31.45 *** 39.97 *** 33.60 *** 43.64 *** 
R2 McFadden 0.81  0.81  0.80  0.80  
N 472  472  472  472  
Log likelihood -919  -916  -915  -910  
LR-test on hetero-
scedasticity 
 
LRχ2 (11) = 
49.95 *** 
LRχ2 (11) = 
54.79 *** 
LRχ2 (11) = 
50.91 *** 
LRχ2 (11) = 
54.41 *** 
All variables are dummy variables. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% 
(**) and 1% (***) respectively. Heteroscedasticity term includes East and 10 industry dummies. 
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Table A 4: Estimation results of heteroscedasticity consistent ordered Probit models for a 
sample excluding small firms and a sample of R&D performing firms (continued from 
Table 2.4) 
 Dependent variable: Profit over sales 2012 
 
 
Small firms excluded R&D performing firms 
  I II III IV 
IND1 -2.478 *   -2.992 **  1.671     0.972     
(1.321)     (1.202)     (2.118)     (2.094)     
IND2 -2.511 *   -2.647 *   -0.739     -0.913     
                                           (1.526)     (1.495)     (1.496)     (1.517)     
IND3 -0.069     -0.111     5.528     5.961     
                                           (1.590)     (1.563)     (5.736)     (5.836)     
IND4 0.589     0.093     3.291 **  2.881 *   
                                           (1.625)     (1.466)     (1.641)     (1.624)     
IND5 -0.132     -0.669     -0.087     -0.143     
                                           (1.291)     (1.264)     (1.345)     (1.309)     
IND6 0.425     -0.025     2.981     2.830     
                                           (1.592)     (1.489)     (1.937)     (1.908)     
IND7 -0.588     -0.765     0.416     0.212     
                                           (1.148)     (1.086)     (1.373)     (1.314)     
IND8 1.567     1.520     2.508 *   2.583 **  
                                           (1.130)     (1.079)     (1.322)     (1.270)     
IND9 1.639     0.491     3.272 **  2.760 *   
                                           (1.497)     (1.408)     (1.653)     (1.575)     
IND10 0.281     0.080     0.649     0.109     
                                           (1.523)     (1.482)     (1.790)     (1.851)     
Wald - Test: joint  
significance of industry 
dummies 
26.02 ** 32.28 ** 21.44 ** 20.73 ** 
        R2 McFadden 0.52 0.75 0.59 0.65 
N 357 357 280 280 
Log likelihood -687 -670 -530 -526 
LR-test on hetero-
scedasticity: 
LRχ2 (11)= 
38.56 *** 
LRχ2 (11)= 
37.49 *** 
LRχ2 (16)= 
68.91 *** 
LRχ2 (16)= 
66.64 *** 
All variables are dummy variables. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. Hetero-
scedasticity term for the sample in columns I and II includes East and 10 industry dummies while it includes 5 size dummies, East 
and 10 industry dummies for the sample in columns III and IV. 
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Table A 5: Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
    A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 
A PROFIT 2012 1                             
B PROFIT 2011 0.737 1                           
C RDINT 0.048 0.073 1                         
D MSHARE 0.169 0.156 0.102 1                       
E BUYCON -0.046 -0.069 0.054 0.093 1                     
F SUBSTITa -0.196 -0.184 -0.201 -0.115 -0.076 1                   
G ELAST_La 0.102 0.105 -0.022 0.133 -0.078 -0.151 1                 
H ELAST_Ma -0.107 -0.114 -0.027 -0.146 0.007 0.173 -0.671 1               
I ELAST_Ha -0.119 -0.098 0.024 -0.002 0.077 0.093 -0.262 -0.324 1             
J COMPa 0.175 0.121 0.020 0.119 0.068 -0.090 0.072 -0.045 -0.025 1           
K DIVERS -0.035 0.038 0.057 -0.103 -0.160 -0.087 0.001 -0.021 -0.021 0.083 1         
L EXPORT 0.146 0.171 0.173 0.097 -0.056 -0.208 0.056 -0.056 -0.067 0.150 0.055 1       
M SIZE 0.014 0.016 0.015 -0.022 -0.129 -0.038 -0.029 0.041 -0.039 0.064 0.089 0.286 1     
N FOREIGNa -0.107 -0.028 -0.034 -0.004 -0.042 0.016 -0.003 -0.045 0.077 0.002 -0.014 0.149 0.006 1   
O EASTa  0.020 0.008 0.146 -0.035 0.197 -0.006 -0.126 0.077 0.0361 -0.041 -0.129 -0.179 -0.168 -0.067 1 
VIF 2.41 2.31 1.25 1.12 1.20 1.21 3.63 3.91 2.30 1.11 1.16 1.33 1.16 1.08 1.17 
Mean VIF 1.76                           
 
N 472     
                      
 a Dummy variable. Correlations and variance inflation factors of industry dummies are not presented but available from the author upon request. 
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B Appendix: Buyer power and suppliers’ incentives to 
innovate 
B.1 Calculation of buyer market competition measures 
PCM and R&D intensity are calculated for domestic and international markets. For do-
mestic industries both measures are calculated on 2-digit-level Nace rev. 1.1 (except for 
Nace 24, which is separated in 244 pharmaceuticals and other chemicals) using MIP 
data. The PCM is calculated as given in equation (B.1). sit represents sales, mit material 
costs and wit wages and salaries in industry i and year t. For German data we take the 
average over the time period from 2001 to 2004. 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑅 = 14��𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �
𝑖𝑖
 (B.1) 
  
The calculation of domestic R&D intensity is carried out as shown in equation (B.2) 
with RDit denoting R&D expenditure of industry i in year t. Taking the average over the 
years 2001 to 2004 yields RDintiGER. 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑅 = 14��𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �
𝑖𝑖
 (B.2) 
  
For customers in foreign countries we calculate the buyer market competition measures 
from OECD's Structural Analysis Database (STAN). We use information on the year 
2003 from 19 OECD countries which represent the vast majority of export markets of 
the German economy: USA, France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan, Italy, 
Spain, Belgium, Korea, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, Ireland, 
Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. The PCM on Nace 2 industry level (with the ex-
ception of Nace 244) is calculated as shown in equation (B.3). gocit denotes gross output 
while iicit and lcompcit account for expenditure on intermediate inputs and labour com-
pensation of employees, respectively. The values refer to industry i in year t and country 
c. 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 = ∑ 𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐
∑ 𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐
 (B.3) 
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Data on the R&D intensity of buyers in international markets is taken from OECD’s 
Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development (ANBERD) data base and 
linked to STAN. The year 2003 is used as reference year. 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 = ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐
∑ 𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐
 (B.4) 
  
The calculation of the R&D intensity for international markets is carried out as shown in 
equation (B.4). RDci represents the R&D expenditure in country c and industry i in the 
reference year. 
Finally, the international values are weighted with firm i’s export share of sales while 
the domestic values of PCM and RDint are weighted with firm i's share of domestic 
sales. The sum of both parts yields the variables used for the estimations. 
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B.2 Additional Tables 
 
Table B 1: Industry breakdown 
Variable Industry Group Nace Codea 
IND1 Food/Tobacco  15, 16 
IND2 Textiles 17, 18, 19 
IND3 Wood/Paper/Printing 20, 21 
IND4 Chemicals 24 
IND5 Synthetics 25 
IND6 Glass/Ceramics 26 
IND7 Metal 27, 28 
IND8 Machinery 29, 33.3 
IND9 Electronics 30, 31, 32, 33.2, 33.4, 33.5 
IND10 Automotive 34, 35 
IND11 Furniture/Sport/Toys 33.1, 36 
IND12 Wholesale 51 
IND13 Transportation 60, 61, 62, 63, 64.1 
IND14 Media Services 22.1 
IND15 Computer/Telecomm. 64.3, 72.1, 72.2, 72.3, 72.4, 72.6 
IND16 Financial Services 65, 66, 67 
IND17 Consulting 74.1, 74.4 
IND18 Techn. Services 74.2, 74.3 
IND19 Enterprise Services 
(Reference group) 
70.3, 74.5, 74.6, 74.7, 74.8 
a Nace Rev. 1.1 
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Table B 2: Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition 
RDt+1 Dummy variable taking value 1, if firm reports to have R&D expenditure in 
2005 and 0 otherwise. 
RDINTt+1 R&D expenditure in 2005 divided by employees in 2005. 
BP_L Dummy variable taking value 1, if firm reports to generate at least 50% of the 
sales in 2004 with the largest 3 customers and 0 otherwise. 
BP_H Dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm reports to generate at least 50% of the 
sales in 2004 with the largest 3 customers and reports either to have more than 
5 competitors or to have highly substitutable products. If one condition is not 
fulfilled the dummy takes the value 0. 
BUYPCMa 1 – PCM on 2-digit level (Nace Rev. 1.1) and 3-digit level for Nace 244. 
BUYRDINTa Industry R&D intensity on 2-digit level (Nace Rev. 1.1) and 3-digit level for 
Nace 244. 
NOCOMPt Dummy variable taking value 1 if firm reports to have no competitors on the 
main product market in 2004. Otherwise the dummy takes the value 0. 
COMPt Dummy variable taking value 1 if firm reports to have 1 to 5 competitors on the 
main product market in 2004. Otherwise the dummy takes the value 0. 
DIVERSt 1 – share of sales in 2004  generated by the main product line. 
SIZE t Log of number of employees in 2004 (full time equivalents). 
AGE t Log of the number of years (in 2004) since the enterprise was founded. 
GROUPt Dummy variable taking the value 1, if firm reports to be part of an enterprise 
group in 2004 and 0 otherwise. 
EASTt Dummy variable taking the value 1, if firm are located on the former GDR 
territory or in West-Berlin in 2004 and 0 otherwise. 
a For further explanations see Appendix B.1. 
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Table B 3: Industry breakdown of suppliers‘ largest customers 
Variable Industry group of largest 
buyer 
NACE Codea 
BUYIND1 Raw materials 10-11, 13-14, 17.1, 21.1, 23.2-23.3, 24.1, 26.5, 27.1, 
37.1-37.2, 40-41 
 
BUYIND2 Industry intermediates 15.7, 17.2, 17.5-17.6, 18.3, 19.1, 20.1-20.4, 21.2, 22.2, 
24.2-24.7, 25.1-25.2, 26.1-26.4, 26.6-26.8, 27.2-27.5, 
28.4-28.7, 31.2-31.6, 32.1, 34.3 
BUYIND3 Capital goods 28.1-28.3, 29-30, 31.0-31.1, 32.2, 33, 34.1-34.2, 35.1-
35.3 
 
BUYIND4 Consumer goods 15.1-15.6, 15.8-15.9, 16.0, 17.3-17.4, 17.7, 18.1-18.2, 
19.2-19.3, 20.5, 22.1, 22.3, 24.4-24.5, 29.7, 31.5, 32.3, 
33.5, 35.4-35.5, 36.1-36.6 
BUYIND5 Enterprise services 45, 51, 60.2-60.3, 61.1-61.2, 62.2-62.3, 63.1-63.2, 63.4, 
64.1, 65.1-65.2, 66, 67.1, 71.2-71.3, 72.1-72.4, 72.6, 
73.1-73.2, 74.1-74.8, 90, 92.1, 92.4 
BUYIND6 Consumer services 
(Reference group) 
45.4, 50, 52, 55, 60.1, 62.1, 63.3, 64.2-64.3, 67.2, 70.1-
70.3, 71.1, 71.4, 72.5, 80.4, 92.2-92.3, 92.6-92.7, 93 
 
a Nace Rev. 1.1. 
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Table B 4: Descriptive statistics differentiated by a supplier’s R&D status (continued from 
Table 2.6) 
                                             
Full Sample  R&D 
performer 
 Non-R&D 
performer 
 T-test 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  t-value 
IND1 
 
0.032 
 
0.176 
 
0.025 0.157 
 
0.038 0.19 
 
1.122 
 IND2 
 
0.038 
 
0.19 
 
0.036 0.186 
 
0.039 0.194 
 
0.301 
 IND3 
 
0.049 
 
0.216 
 
0.046 0.21 
 
0.052 0.222 
 
0.412 
 IND4 
 
0.047 
 
0.212 
 
0.080 0.271 
 
0.020 0.139 
 
-4.590 *** 
IND5 
 
0.056 
 
0.23 
 
0.057 0.232 
 
0.055 0.229 
 
-0.095 
 IND6 
 
0.025 
 
0.156 
 
0.023 0.15 
 
0.027 0.162 
 
0.377 
 IND7 
 
0.126 
 
0.333 
 
0.111 0.315 
 
0.139 0.347 
 
1.348 
 IND8 
 
0.091 
 
0.287 
 
0.128 0.335 
 
0.059 0.236 
 
-3.890 *** 
IND9 
 
0.124 
 
0.329 
 
0.204 0.403 
 
0.055 0.229 
 
-7.418 *** 
IND10 
 
0.024 
 
0.154 
 
0.023 0.15 
 
0.025 0.156 
 
0.197 
 IND11 
 
0.025 
 
0.156 
 
0.040 0.196 
 
0.013 0.111 
 
-2.820 *** 
IND12 
 
0.050 
 
0.218 
 
0.023 0.15 
 
0.073 0.261 
 
3.702 *** 
IND13 
 
0.086 
 
0.28 
 
0.025 0.157 
 
0.138 0.345 
 
6.553 *** 
IND14 
 
0.034 
 
0.181 
 
0.021 0.144 
 
0.045 0.207 
 
2.101 ** 
IND15 
 
0.043 
 
0.204 
 
0.067 0.251 
 
0.023 0.151 
 
-3.480 *** 
IND16 
 
0.019 
 
0.138 
 
0.021 0.144 
 
0.018 0.133 
 
-0.367 
 IND17 
 
0.036 
 
0.186 
 
0.017 0.129 
 
0.052 0.222 
 
3.034 *** 
IND18 
 
0.045 
 
0.208 
 
0.040 0.196 
 
0.050 0.218 
 
0.777 
 IND19 0.049 0.216 0.013 0.112 0.080 0.182 5.080 *** 
BUYIND1 
 
0.087 
 
0.282 
 
0.084 0.278 
 
0.089 0.285 
 
0.299 
 BUYIND2 
 
0.146 
 
0.353 
 
0.155 0.363 
 
0.138 0.345 
 
-0.816 
 BUYIND3 
 
0.297 
 
0.457 
 
0.338 0.474 
 
0.263 0.44 
 
-2.664 *** 
BUYIND4 
 
0.110 
 
0.313 
 
0.103 0.304 
 
0.116 0.321 
 
0.673 
 BUYIND5 0.203 0.402 0.191 0.394 0.213 0.409 0.850 
BUYIND6 
 
0.157  0.337  0.128 0.335  0.182 0.386  2.383 ** 
N                                            1,036  476  560    
All variables are dummy variables. Columns with heading SD display standard deviations. The last two columns display t-statistics 
whether a T-test on mean difference between the group of R&D performers and non-R&D performers rejects the Null hypothesis of 
no difference. The asterisks indicate the corresponding level of significance (* 10%, ** 5 %, *** 1 %). 
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Table B 5: Estimation results of generalised Tobit models using different specifications of 
buyer power (continued from Table 2.7) 
                                             Selection: RDi,t+1   Intensity: RDINT i,t+1 
    I II  III IV 
  BP_L BP_H  BP_L BP_H 
IND1 
 
0.809 **  0.810 **  
 
2.83 *** 2.862 *** 
  
(0.344)     (0.344)     
 
(0.720)     (0.718)     
IND2 
 
1.19 *** 1.159 *** 
 
2.711 *** 2.702 *** 
                                           
 
(0.321)     (0.320)     
 
(0.697)     (0.692)     
IND3 
 
0.971 *** 0.955 *** 
 
2.794 *** 2.78 *** 
                                           
 
(0.304)     (0.304)     
 
(0.674)     (0.672)     
IND4 
 
2.012 *** 2.024 *** 
 
4.604 *** 4.62 *** 
                                           
 
(0.320)     (0.321)     
 
(0.747)     (0.745)     
IND5 
 
1.184 *** 1.186 *** 
 
3.201 *** 3.207 *** 
                                           
 
(0.298)     (0.299)     
 
(0.678)     (0.677)     
IND6 
 
0.794 **  0.79 **  
 
2.776 *** 2.765 *** 
                                           
 
(0.358)     (0.358)     
 
(0.733)     (0.734)     
IND7 
 
0.869 *** 0.855 *** 
 
3.1 *** 3.091 *** 
                                            (0.267)     (0.267)      (0.620)     (0.618)     
IND8  1.499 *** 1.484 ***  4.208 *** 4.197 *** 
                                           
 
(0.282)     (0.282)     
 
(0.702)     (0.699)     
IND9 
 
1.959 *** 1.944 *** 
 
4.643 *** 4.637 *** 
                                           
 
(0.276)     (0.276)     
 
(0.729)     (0.725)     
IND10 
 
0.776 **  0.746 **  
 
3.327 *** 3.306 *** 
                                           
 
(0.365)     (0.365)     
 
(0.751)     (0.748)     
IND11 
 
1.877 *** 1.874 *** 
 
3.662 *** 3.662 *** 
                                           
 
(0.365)     (0.366)     
 
(0.789)     (0.787)     
IND12 
 
0.619 *   0.616 *   
 
2.121 *** 2.109 *** 
                                           
 
(0.318)     (0.319)     
 
(0.653)     (0.653)     
IND13 
 
0.223     0.210     
 
1.206 *   1.189 *   
                                           
 
(0.296)     (0.296)     
 
(0.642)     (0.641)     
IND14 
 
0.605 *   0.599 *   
 
2.592 *** 2.579 *** 
                                           
 
(0.337)     (0.338)     
 
(0.693)     (0.693)     
IND15 
 
1.976 *** 1.964 *** 
 
4.589 *** 4.595 *** 
                                           
 
(0.314)     (0.314)     
 
(0.749)     (0.744)     
IND16 
 
1.384 *** 1.374 *** 
 
3.031 *** 3.025 *** 
                                           
 
(0.386)     (0.386)     
 
(0.779)     (0.778)     
IND17 
 
0.79 **  0.779 **  
 
3.375 *** 3.37 *** 
                                           
 
(0.344)     (0.344)     
 
(0.710)     (0.708)     
IND18 
 
1.217 *** 1.193 *** 
 
4.024 *** 3.993 *** 
                                             (0.311)     (0.311)       (0.670)     (0.668)     
BUYIND1 
 
0.102     0.090     
 
-0.015     -0.020     
                                           
 
(0.201)     (0.201)     
 
(0.306)     (0.307)     
BUYIND2 
 
0.349 *   0.340 *   
 
0.325     0.326     
                                           
 
(0.180)     (0.180)     
 
(0.282)     (0.282)     
BUYIND3 
 
0.415 **  0.410 **  
 
0.072     0.08     
                                           
 
(0.176)     (0.176)     
 
(0.271)     (0.271)     
BUYIND4 
 
0.286     0.287     
 
0.445     0.451     
                                           
 
(0.193)     (0.194)     
 
(0.300)     (0.300)     
BUYIND5 
 
0.314 *   0.319 **  
 
0.424     0.434     
  
(0.162)     (0.163)     
 
(0.268)     (0.269)     
Wald-Test for joint significance of 
industry dummies 
 156.36 *** 155.81 ***  80.24 *** 80.84 *** 
N  1,036  1,036   1,036  1,036  
LR/Wald χ2                                112  111   112  111  
P-value  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  
All variables are dummy variables. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors in column III and IV are corrected for 
the inclusion of the inverse Mills Ratio. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively.  
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Table B 6: Estimated coefficients of the generalised Tobit model for a sample of manufac-
turing firms using different specifications of buyer power (Continued from Table 2.8) 
                                             Selection: RDi,t+1   Intensity: RDINT i,t+1 
    I II  III IV   BP_L BP_H  BP_L BP_H 
IND1 
 
-1.089 *** -1.081 *** 
 
-0.607     -0.535     
  
(0.377)     (0.377)     
 
(0.542)     (0.544)     
IND2 
 
-0.755 **  -0.779 **  
 
-0.745     -0.73     
                                           
 
(0.354)     (0.353)     
 
(0.486)     (0.488)     
IND3 
 
-0.984 *** -0.995 *** 
 
-0.611     -0.626     
                                           
 
(0.345)     (0.346)     
 
(0.473)     (0.472)     
IND4 
 
0.082     0.097     
 
0.96 **  0.985 **  
                                           
 
(0.356)     (0.357)     
 
(0.390)     (0.390)     
IND5 
 
-0.783 **  -0.776 **  
 
-0.337     -0.329     
                                           
 
(0.336)     (0.337)     
 
(0.442)     (0.441)     
IND6 
 
-1.247 *** -1.25 *** 
 
-0.665     -0.697     
                                           
 
(0.393)     (0.394)     
 
(0.568)     (0.566)     
IND7 
 
-1.156 *** -1.166 *** 
 
-0.366     -0.38     
                                            (0.312)     (0.313)      (0.447)     (0.446)     
IND8  -0.558 *   -0.572 *    0.592     0.575     
                                           
 
(0.325)     (0.326)     
 
(0.385)     (0.385)     
IND9 
 
-0.035     -0.047     
 
0.937 *** 0.935 *** 
                                           
 
(0.314)     (0.314)     
 
(0.353)     (0.353)     
IND10 
 
-1.381 *** -1.408 *** 
 
-0.225     -0.242     
                                           
 
(0.406)     (0.406)     
 
(0.565)     (0.563)     
BUYIND1 
 
0.333     0.337     
 
0.048     0.066     
                                           
 
(0.289)     (0.290)     
 
(0.378)     (0.378)     
BUYIND2 
 
0.798 *** 0.786 *** 
 
0.17     0.189     
                                           
 
(0.242)     (0.242)     
 
(0.353)     (0.350)     
BUYIND3 
 
0.778 *** 0.778 *** 
 
0.023     0.058     
                                           
 
(0.242)     (0.243)     
 
(0.344)     (0.343)     
BUYIND4 
 
0.646 **  0.648 **  
 
0.347     0.367     
                                           
 
(0.266)     (0.267)     
 
(0.377)     (0.377)     
BUYIND5 
 
0.769 *** 0.78 *** 
 
0.451     0.477     
  
(0.231)     (0.232)     
 
(0.353)     (0.353)     
Wald-Test for joint signifi-
cance of industry dummies 
 69.92 *** 70.25 ***  44.52 *** 44.83 *** 
N                                          
 
660 
 
660 
  
660 
 
660 
 LR/Wald χ2                              76  77   76  77  P-value                                    0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000   
All variables are dummy variables. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors in column III and IV are corrected for 
the inclusion of the inverse Mills Ratio. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. 
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Table B 7: Estimation results of generalised Tobit models including interactions between 
buyer power and downstream industry characteristics (continued from Table 2.9) 
                                             Selection: RDi,t+1   Intensity: RDINT i,t+1 
    I II  III IV 
  BP_L BP_H  BP_L BP_H 
IND1 
 
-1.162 *** -1.138 *** 
 
-0.659     -0.746     
  
(0.382)     (0.381)     
 
(0.548)     (0.545)     
IND2 
 
-0.781 **  -0.814 **  
 
-0.763     -0.753     
                                           
 
(0.357)     (0.355)     
 
(0.486)     (0.482)     
IND3 
 
-0.996 *** -1.013 *** 
 
-0.605     -0.661     
                                           
 
(0.347)     (0.347)     
 
(0.472)     (0.465)     
IND4 
 
0.109     0.111     
 
0.976 **  0.942 **  
                                           
 
(0.359)     (0.359)     
 
(0.390)     (0.383)     
IND5 
 
-0.771 **  -0.772 **  
 
-0.327     -0.295     
                                           
 
(0.338)     (0.338)     
 
(0.439)     (0.433)     
IND6 
 
-1.290 *** -1.286 *** 
 
-0.676     -0.686     
                                           
 
(0.393)     (0.394)     
 
(0.569)     (0.559)     
IND7 
 
-1.179 *** -1.190 *** 
 
-0.377     -0.4     
                                            (0.314)     (0.314)      (0.447)     (0.440)     IND8  -0.548 *   -0.576 *    0.606     0.524                                                
 
(0.327)     (0.327)     
 
(0.384)     (0.378)     
IND9 
 
-0.045     -0.055     
 
0.929 *** 0.888 **  
                                           
 
(0.316)     (0.316)     
 
(0.354)     (0.347)     
IND10 
 
-1.434 *** -1.435 *** 
 
-0.234     -0.345     
                                           
 
(0.408)     (0.406)     
 
(0.565)     (0.557)     
BUYIND1 
 
0.252     0.287     
 
0.017     0.056     
                                           
 
(0.291)     (0.291)     
 
(0.375)     (0.370)     
BUYIND2 
 
0.751 *** 0.757 *** 
 
0.136     0.157     
                                           
 
(0.244)     (0.244)     
 
(0.348)     (0.342)     
BUYIND3 
 
0.729 *** 0.742 *** 
 
0.001     0.055     
                                           
 
(0.243)     (0.244)     
 
(0.339)     (0.334)     
BUYIND4 
 
0.572 **  0.611 **  
 
0.318     0.339     
                                           
 
(0.269)     (0.268)     
 
(0.373)     (0.369)     
BUYIND5 
 
0.694 *** 0.738 *** 
 
0.402     0.406     
  
(0.234)     (0.234)     
 
(0.347)     (0.344)     
Wald-Test for joint sig-
nificance of industry 
dummies 
 72.47 *** 72.08 ***  44.94 *** 44.09 *** 
N                                          
 
660 
 
660 
  
660 
 
660 
 LR/Wald χ2                               77  86   77  86  
P-value                                    0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000   
All variables are dummy variables. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors in column III and IV are corrected for 
the inclusion of the inverse Mills Ratio. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. 
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C Appendix: Market incentives to innovate 
C.1 Measurement of profit elasticity 
We estimated profit elasticities using the model proposed by Boone et al. (2007). The 
original equation is given by: ln(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1 ln(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2 ln(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Profits of firm i in period t are denoted with 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and measured by the difference between 
sales, material costs (including energy costs) and wages and salaries. The firm specific 
fixed effect is represented by 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖. The marginal costs are approximated by the expression 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 which represents the sum of material costs (including energy costs) and wages and 
salaries divided by sales. The number of full time employees is measured by empit. The 
profit elasticity, i. e. the percentage change of profits if marginal costs increase by one 
percent, is then given by 𝛽𝛽1. To allow 𝛽𝛽1 to vary by year we adopt the following adjust-
ment: 
ln(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖[𝛽𝛽1 ln(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2 ln(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)]
𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
This specification includes additional year dummies denoted with 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖. Using the com-
prehensive dataset provided by the CSS, we run Fixed Effect estimations for each Nace 
3-digit-industry and yield thus negative profit elasticities for each industry and year. For 
the ease of interpretation we use the absolute value of the profit elasticity, i. e. an in-
crease in the absolute value can be interpreted as an increase in the level of competition. 
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C.2 Measurement of total factor productivity 
We estimate a firm specific production function and subsequently compute the total 
factor productivity as residual. This method is well described in the relevant literature 
(see the overview by Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991). The estimation equation of the log-
transformed production function is given by: ln(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1 ln(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2 ln(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽3 ln(𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The sales per employee of firm i in period t with are represented by yit while kit denotes 
the capital intensity measured by tangible assets divided by employees. The material 
costs per employee are given by mit and the employees are represented by lit. We also 
include industry dummies which are denoted by 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 and year dummies which are repre-
sented by tt. The firm fixed effect is captured by the term 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖. To estimate the production 
function we use information on all firms included in the sample. 
After estimating the production function, the total factor productivity can be calculated 
as residual. The equation given above changes to: 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ln(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝛽𝛽1 ln(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝛽𝛽2 ln(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝛽𝛽3 ln(𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
Hence, we obtain a firm specific total factor productivity which is changing by year. 
Note that we estimate the TFP for all MIP firms available, i. e. we use a larger sample 
consisting of about 13,900 observations from roughly 5,000 firms. By doing so, we 
make sure to have a representative picture of the technological situation within an in-
dustry. 
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C.3 Estimation results applying PE 
Table C 1: Estimation results of the Random Effects Probit using PE 
  Dependent variable: RDit 
I II III IV 
PE t-1 0.423     0.142     0.319 **  -0.062     
 
(0.261)     (0.105)     (0.151)     (0.415)     
PE t-1 x PE t-1 -0.052                                            
 
(0.044)                                
DTF t-1 0.578 **  0.566 *   1.302 **  0.571 **  
 
(0.290)     (0.289)     (0.529)     (0.290)     
SDDTF t-1 -1.122     -1.051     -0.920     -2.959     
 
(1.052)     (1.042)     (1.043)     (3.955)     
PE t-1 x DTF t-1                           -0.308 *                
 
                  (0.184)              
PE t-1 x SDDTF t-1                                        0.837     
 
                           (1.649)     
CAP (ln) t-1 0.001     0.003     0.003     0.003     
 
(0.042)     (0.042)     (0.042)     (0.042)     
GPa t -0.082     -0.081     -0.078     -0.081     
 
(0.088)     (0.088)     (0.088)     (0.088)     
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆����  -0.040     -0.046     -0.042     -0.043     
 
(0.097)     (0.096)     (0.096)     (0.095)     
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷������  -0.859 **  -0.842 **  -0.838 **  -0.852 **  
 
(0.385)     (0.384)     (0.385)     (0.384)     
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷����������  -4.757 *   -4.584 *   -4.623 *   -4.829 *   
 
(2.766)     (2.772)     (2.778)     (2.855)     
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�������  0.362 *** 0.363 *** 0.361 *** 0.363 *** 
 
(0.036)     (0.036)     (0.036)     (0.036)     
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃������  0.074     0.074     0.076     0.072     
 
(0.060)     (0.059)     (0.059)     (0.059)     
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅�������  0.298 *** 0.293 *** 0.292 *** 0.295 *** 
 
(0.090)     (0.090)     (0.090)     (0.090)     
Constant -0.770     -0.509     -0.976     0.026     
  (0.806)     (0.765)     (0.821)     (1.368)     
Wald-Test: joint significance of 
PE, DTF/SDDTF and interaction 
terms 
χ2 (2) =  
3.17 
   
χ2 (3) =  
8.26 ** 
χ2 (3) =  
2.89 
 
N 3,085  3,085  3,085  3,085  
Wald Chi 360  359  362  361  
Log likelihood -1,568  -1,569  -1,567  -1,569  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
a Dummy variable. Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. Estimation includes 7 time dummies and 9 mean industry variables. Results of the remaining 
variables are presented in Table C 2 in Appendix C.3. 
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Table C 2: Estimation results of the Random Effects Probit using PE (continued from Ta-
ble C 1) 
  Dependent variable: RDit 
I II III IV 
YEAR1999a 0.043     0.037     0.037     0.040     
 
(0.051)     (0.051)     (0.052)     (0.052)     
YEAR2000a 0.314 *** 0.307 *** 0.307 *** 0.307 *** 
 
(0.103)     (0.102)     (0.103)     (0.102)     
YEAR2001a 0.229 *   0.211     0.204     0.210     
 
(0.134)     (0.133)     (0.133)     (0.133)     
YEAR2002a 0.032     0.015     0.006     0.016     
 
(0.116)     (0.114)     (0.114)     (0.114)     
YEAR2003a 0.040     0.022     0.013     0.023     
 
(0.123)     (0.121)     (0.121)     (0.121)     
YEAR2004a 0.293 **  0.274 **  0.264 **  0.277 **  
 
(0.134)     (0.132)     (0.131)     (0.132)     
YEAR2005a 0.274 **  0.255 *   0.245 *   0.258 *   
 
(0.139)     (0.137)     (0.137)     (0.137)     
Mean IND2 -0.012     0.032     0.062     0.012     
 
(0.235)     (0.230)     (0.230)     (0.229)     
Mean IND3 -0.334     -0.296     -0.257     -0.315     
 
(0.217)     (0.216)     (0.218)     (0.220)     
Mean IND4 1.104 *** 1.114 *** 1.121 *** 1.114 *** 
 
(0.223)     (0.222)     (0.218)     (0.222)     
Mean IND5 0.431 *   0.494 **  0.524 **  0.476 **  
 
(0.224)     (0.217)     (0.218)     (0.221)     
Mean IND6 0.380     0.437 *   0.467 **  0.422 *   
 
(0.235)     (0.230)     (0.230)     (0.232)     
Mean IND7 0.252     0.295     0.333     0.275     
 
(0.215)     (0.213)     (0.214)     (0.217)     
Mean IND8 0.880 *** 0.932 *** 0.974 *** 0.920 *** 
 
(0.229)     (0.224)     (0.225)     (0.226)     
Mean IND9 1.105 *** 1.165 *** 1.204 *** 1.147 *** 
 
(0.230)     (0.225)     (0.227)     (0.230)     
Mean IND10 1.535 *** 1.599 *** 1.624 *** 1.581 *** 
  (0.253)     (0.247)     (0.247)     (0.251)     
N 3,085  3,085  3,085  3,085  
Wald Chi 360  359  362  361  
Log likelihood -1,568  -1,569  -1,567  -1,569  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
a Dummy variable. Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. 
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Table C 3: Estimation results of the Random Effects OLS using PE 
  Dependent variable: RDINTit 
I II III IV 
PE t-1 -0.016     -0.041     -0.193     -0.495     
 
(0.352)     (0.114)     (0.161)     (0.535)     
PE t-1 x PE t-1 -0.005                                            
 
(0.059)                                
DTF t-1 -0.662 **  -0.661 **  -1.411 **  -0.661 **  
 
(0.297)     (0.297)     (0.619)     (0.298)     
SDDTF t-1 -0.376     -0.374     -0.547     -4.907     
 
(1.263)     (1.262)     (1.258)     (5.261)     
PE t-1 x DTF t-1                           0.300                  
 
                  (0.217)              
PE t-1 x SDDTF t-1                                        1.864     
 
                           (2.166)     
CAP (ln) t-1 0.021     0.022     0.021     0.020     
 
(0.041)     (0.041)     (0.041)     (0.041)     
GPa t 0.037     0.037     0.034     0.036     
 
(0.094)     (0.094)     (0.094)     (0.094)     
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆����  -0.049     -0.049     -0.049     -0.044     
 
(0.105)     (0.105)     (0.105)     (0.105)     
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷������  -0.633 *   -0.634 *   -0.651 *   -0.630     
 
(0.383)     (0.383)     (0.381)     (0.385)     
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷����������  5.842 *   5.854 *   6.082 *   5.276     
 
(3.284)     (3.272)     (3.254)     (3.407)     
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�������  -0.102 **  -0.102 **  -0.104 **  -0.101 **  
 
(0.041)     (0.041)     (0.041)     (0.041)     
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃������  0.009     0.009     0.007     0.009     
 
(0.063)     (0.062)     (0.063)     (0.062)     
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅�������  0.295 *** 0.294 *** 0.294 *** 0.295 *** 
 
(0.096)     (0.096)     (0.096)     (0.096)     
Constant -6.365 *** -6.339 *** -5.923 *** -5.074 *** 
  (0.913)     (0.869)     (0.893)     (1.795)     
Wald-Test: joint significance of 
PE, DTF/SDDTF and  
interaction terms 
F(2,705) 
 = 0.07 
   F(3,705) 
 = 2.34 * 
F(3,705) 
 = 0.36 
 
N 1,954  1,954  1,954  1,954  
R2 0.27  0.27  0.28  0.28  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
a Dummy variable. Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. Estimation includes 7 time dummies and 9 mean industry variables. Results of the remaining 
variables are presented in Table C 4 in Appendix C.3. 
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Table C 4: Estimation results of the Random Effects OLS using PE (continued from Table 
C 3) 
  Dependent variable: RDINTit 
I II III IV 
YEAR1999a -0.288 *** -0.288 *** -0.290 *** -0.285 *** 
 
(0.067)     (0.067)     (0.067)     (0.067)     
YEAR2000a -0.304 *** -0.305 *** -0.308 *** -0.309 *** 
 
(0.090)     (0.089)     (0.089)     (0.089)     
YEAR2001a -0.298 **  -0.299 **  -0.296 **  -0.309 **  
 
(0.144)     (0.143)     (0.142)     (0.142)     
YEAR2002a 0.038     0.037     0.045     0.033     
 
(0.123)     (0.122)     (0.121)     (0.121)     
YEAR2003a -0.037     -0.038     -0.030     -0.037     
 
(0.130)     (0.128)     (0.127)     (0.127)     
YEAR2004a -0.094     -0.095     -0.086     -0.094     
 
(0.140)     (0.138)     (0.137)     (0.137)     
YEAR2005a -0.160     -0.161     -0.150     -0.158     
 
(0.146)     (0.145)     (0.143)     (0.144)     
Mean IND2 0.504     0.508     0.463     0.459     
 
(0.407)     (0.406)     (0.398)     (0.410)     
Mean IND3 0.197     0.199     0.157     0.159     
 
(0.396)     (0.395)     (0.388)     (0.398)     
Mean IND4 1.621 *** 1.621 *** 1.617 *** 1.620 *** 
 
(0.390)     (0.390)     (0.386)     (0.389)     
Mean IND5 0.556     0.561     0.529     0.516     
 
(0.406)     (0.403)     (0.397)     (0.405)     
Mean IND6 0.444     0.448     0.413     0.414     
 
(0.441)     (0.438)     (0.432)     (0.440)     
Mean IND7 0.316     0.318     0.279     0.267     
 
(0.384)     (0.383)     (0.377)     (0.389)     
Mean IND8 1.375 *** 1.378 *** 1.331 *** 1.342 *** 
 
(0.404)     (0.402)     (0.393)     (0.403)     
Mean IND9 1.495 *** 1.499 *** 1.459 *** 1.452 *** 
 
(0.408)     (0.406)     (0.398)     (0.409)     
Mean IND10 2.279 *** 2.283 *** 2.249 *** 2.239 *** 
  (0.396)     (0.392)     (0.385)     (0.395)     
N 1,954  1,954  1,954  1,954  
R2 0.27  0.27  0.28  0.28  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
a Dummy variable. Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. 
  
 
Appendix: Market incentives to innovate 153 
 
C.4 Additional tables 
Table C 5: Variable description 
Variable  Definition 
RDt Dummy variable taking unit value if firm i expensed a positive value on R&D 
in year t and zero otherwise. 
RDINTt Logarithm of R&D expenditure over employees of firm i in year t. 
1-PCMt-1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖−1 = (𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑖𝑖−1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖−1 −𝑊𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖−1) 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑖𝑖−1⁄  with PQt-1 denoting 
firm i's sales in t-1, Mt-1 representing the material costs (including energy costs), 
Wt-1 denoting the wages and salaries and RDexpt-1 denoting the R&D outlays of 
firm i in t-1. Then we calculate 1-PCMt-1.  
PEt-1 See Appendix B for a detailed description of the variable’s generation. 
DTFt-1 See Appendix C for a detailed description of the variable’s generation. 
SDDTFt-1 Standard deviation of the DTF within firm i'’s Nace 2-digit industry in year t-1. 
SIZEt-1 Logarithm of the number of fulltime employees of firm i in year t-1. 
CAPt-1  Logarithm of firm i's tangible assets divided by the number of employees in 
year t-1. 
GPt Dummy variable taking unit value if firm i is part of an enterprise group in year 
t and zero otherwise. 
EASTt Dummy variable taking unit value if in year t firm i is located in the part of 
Germany formerly constituting the German Democratic Republic and West-
Berlin and zero otherwise. 
 
 
Table C 6: Breakdown of industry classification 
Industry NACE codea Industrydummy 
Food / Tobacco 15 – 16 IND1 (Reference category) 
Textiles 17 – 19 IND2 
Paper / Wood / Print 20 – 22 IND3 
Chemical 23 – 24 IND4 
Plastics / Rubber 25 IND5 
Glass / Ceramics 26 IND6 
Metal 27 – 28 IND7 
Machinery 29 IND8 
Electricalengineering 30 – 32 IND9 
Medicine / Optic / Processing 33 IND10 
Vehiclesb 34 – 35 IND10 
a Two-digit dummy according to Nace Rev. 1.1. b Our panel contains only a few observations from industries 34-35. Therefore we 
use one dummy variable for industries 33-35. 
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Table C 7: Descriptive statistics differentiated by firms‘ R&D status (continued from Ta-
ble 3.1) 
  Full Sample  R&D performer  Non-R&D 
performer 
  T-test 
  Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
 
 
YEAR 1998 0.165 0.371 
 
0.158 0.364 
 
0.177 0.382 
 
1.3862 
 YEAR 1999 0.172 0.378 
 
0.169 0.375 
 
0.177 0.382 
 
0.5273 
 YEAR 2000 0.100 0.299 
 
0.116 0.321 
 
0.071 0.256 
 
-4.0722 *** 
YEAR 2001 0.083 0.276 
 
0.088 0.283 
 
0.076 0.265 
 
-1.1111 
 YEAR 2002 0.165 0.371 
 
0.153 0.360 
 
0.186 0.389 
 
2.3951 ** 
YEAR 2003 0.143 0.350 
 
0.133 0.340 
 
0.160 0.367 
 
2.0634 ** 
YEAR 2004 0.096 0.295 
 
0.102 0.303 
 
0.086 0.280 
 
-1.5054 
 YEAR 2005 0.076 0.266 
 
0.081 0.273 
 
0.068 0.252 
 
-1.3382 
 IND1 0.053 0.224 
 
0.030 0.170 
 
0.093 0.290 
 
7.625 *** 
IND2 0.058 0.234 
 
0.036 0.187 
 
0.095 0.294 
 
6.821 *** 
IND3 0.092 0.290 
 
0.048 0.214 
 
0.169 0.375 
 
11.3918 *** 
IND4 0.090 0.286 
 
0.107 0.310 
 
0.060 0.238 
 
-4.4384 *** 
IND5 0.102 0.303 
 
0.097 0.296 
 
0.111 0.315 
 
1.2507 
 IND6 0.062 0.241 
 
0.055 0.228 
 
0.074 0.262 
 
2.1678 ** 
IND7 0.163 0.369 
 
0.142 0.349 
 
0.199 0.399 
 
4.1564 *** 
IND8 0.160 0.367 
 
0.194 0.396 
 
0.102 0.302 
 
-6.815 *** 
IND9 0.115 0.319 
 
0.147 0.354 
 
0.059 0.236 
 
-7.423 *** 
IND10 0.104 0.306 
 
0.143 0.350 
 
0.037 0.189 
 
-9.423 *** 
N 3,085     1,954     1,565         
All variables are dummy variables. Columns with heading SD display standard deviations. The last two columns display t-statistics 
whether a T-test on mean difference between the group of R&D performers and non-R&D performers rejects the Null hypothesis of 
no difference. The asterisks indicate the corresponding level of significance (* 10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 %). 
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Table C 8: Estimation results of the Random Effects Probit using 1-PCM (Continued from 
Table 3.3) 
  Dependent variable: RDit 
I II III IV 
YEAR1999a 0.048     0.049     0.048     0.049     
 
(0.051)     (0.051)     (0.051)     (0.051)     
YEAR2000a 0.306 *** 0.312 *** 0.312 *** 0.313 *** 
 
(0.102)     (0.102)     (0.102)     (0.102)     
YEAR2001a 0.059     0.063     0.058     0.064     
 
(0.104)     (0.103)     (0.103)     (0.103)     
YEAR2002a -0.132     -0.131     -0.137     -0.130     
 
(0.088)     (0.088)     (0.088)     (0.088)     
YEAR2003a -0.132     -0.131     -0.134     -0.131     
 
(0.093)     (0.093)     (0.093)     (0.093)     
YEAR2004a 0.128     0.132     0.125     0.131     
 
(0.104)     (0.104)     (0.104)     (0.104)     
YEAR2005a 0.106     0.115     0.104     0.115     
 
(0.117)     (0.117)     (0.117)     (0.117)     
Mean IND2 0.296     0.299     0.305     0.304     
 
(0.246)     (0.246)     (0.248)     (0.250)     
Mean IND3 -0.086     -0.076     -0.070     -0.072     
 
(0.232)     (0.232)     (0.234)     (0.235)     
Mean IND4 1.187 *** 1.194 *** 1.189 *** 1.195 *** 
 
(0.237)     (0.236)     (0.237)     (0.237)     
Mean IND5 0.673 *** 0.689 *** 0.697 *** 0.694 *** 
 
(0.232)     (0.232)     (0.233)     (0.235)     
Mean IND6 0.506 **  0.516 **  0.541 **  0.520 **  
 
(0.241)     (0.241)     (0.243)     (0.244)     
Mean IND7 0.571 **  0.581 **  0.583 **  0.586 **  
 
(0.227)     (0.227)     (0.229)     (0.231)     
Mean IND8 1.252 *** 1.252 *** 1.261 *** 1.256 *** 
 
(0.230)     (0.229)     (0.231)     (0.232)     
Mean IND9 1.354 *** 1.361 *** 1.366 *** 1.364 *** 
 
(0.236)     (0.236)     (0.238)     (0.238)     
Mean IND10 1.749 *** 1.761 *** 1.757 *** 1.766 *** 
  (0.249)     (0.249)     (0.250)     (0.253)     
N 3,085  3,085  3,085  3,085  
Wald Chi 361  362  363  362  
Log likelihood -1,542  -1,543  -1,541  -1,543  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
a Dummy variable. Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. 
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Table C 9: Estimation results of the Random Effects OLS using 1-PCM (Continued from 
Table 3.4) 
  Dependent variable: RDit 
I II III IV 
YEAR1999a -0.287 *** -0.284 *** -0.278 *** -0.285 *** 
 
(0.064)     (0.065)     (0.064)     (0.065)     
YEAR2000a -0.296 *** -0.300 *** -0.290 *** -0.299 *** 
 
(0.087)     (0.087)     (0.087)     (0.086)     
YEAR2001a -0.259 **  -0.261 **  -0.257 **  -0.263 **  
 
(0.109)     (0.109)     (0.108)     (0.109)     
YEAR2002a 0.042     0.041     0.021     0.041     
 
(0.088)     (0.088)     (0.088)     (0.088)     
YEAR2003a -0.022     -0.023     -0.040     -0.026     
 
(0.091)     (0.091)     (0.091)     (0.091)     
YEAR2004a -0.068     -0.070     -0.080     -0.076     
 
(0.101)     (0.101)     (0.101)     (0.102)     
YEAR2005a -0.133     -0.141     -0.157     -0.143     
 
(0.116)     (0.116)     (0.116)     (0.116)     
Mean IND2 0.649     0.648     0.627     0.658     
 
(0.438)     (0.440)     (0.454)     (0.445)     
Mean IND3 0.221     0.212     0.184     0.226     
 
(0.435)     (0.437)     (0.451)     (0.443)     
Mean IND4 1.565 *** 1.554 *** 1.523 *** 1.552 *** 
 
(0.428)     (0.430)     (0.443)     (0.432)     
Mean IND5 0.541     0.526     0.496     0.537     
 
(0.439)     (0.441)     (0.455)     (0.446)     
Mean IND6 0.281     0.261     0.262     0.270     
 
(0.483)     (0.483)     (0.491)     (0.487)     
Mean IND7 0.395     0.389     0.343     0.406     
 
(0.420)     (0.422)     (0.437)     (0.430)     
Mean IND8 1.359 *** 1.359 *** 1.329 *** 1.372 *** 
 
(0.432)     (0.435)     (0.449)     (0.440)     
Mean IND9 1.413 *** 1.408 *** 1.390 *** 1.419 *** 
 
(0.441)     (0.443)     (0.458)     (0.448)     
Mean IND10 2.154 *** 2.141 *** 2.105 *** 2.158 *** 
  (0.428)     (0.430)     (0.445)     (0.437)     
N 1,954  1,954  1,954  1,954  
R2 0.31  0.31  0.32  0.31  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
a Dummy variable. Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. 
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D Appendix: Selective search, sectoral patterns and the 
impact on product innovation performance 
Table D 1: Descriptive statistics by type of knowledge search (Continued from Table 4.4) 
  
All firms Science-driven search -above average use 
Supplier-driven search -
above average use 
Market-driven search -
above average use 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
            Share of sales with 
market novelties 
0.102 0.181 0.112 *** 0.180 0.105  0.181 0.103  0.176 
Share of sales with 
firm novelties 
0.159 0.235 0.168 ** 0.228 0.157  0.231 0.169 *** 0.230 
Science-driven 
search (scale) 
0.000 1.000 1.048 *** 0.800 0.037 *** 1.056 0.012  1.009 
Supplier-driven 
search (scale) 
0.000 1.000 0.126 *** 0.927 0.802 *** 0.543 0.003  0.934 
Market-driven 
search (scale) 
0.000 1.000 0.120 *** 0.940 0.033 ** 0.984 0.815 *** 0.517 
R&D intensity 0.024 0.083 0.039 *** 0.110 0.026 * 0.088 0.027 *** 0.084 
Cont. R&D 
activitiesa 
0.423 0.494 0.616 *** 0.486 0.452 *** 0.498 0.488 *** 0.500 
Export intensity 0.212 0.280 0.267 *** 0.296 0.213  0.280 0.237 *** 0.284 
Sales 1998 (log) 15.952 1.970 16.461 *** 2.073 15.993  1.952 16.137 *** 1.989 
Part of company 
groupa 
0.458 0.498 0.551 *** 0.498 0.433 *** 0.496 0.483 *** 0.500 
Process innovationa 0.647 0.478 0.692 *** 0.462 0.687 *** 0.464 0.641  0.480 
Greecea 0.067 0.251 0.038 *** 0.192 0.071  0.257 0.049 *** 0.215 
Portugala 0.099 0.299 0.076 *** 0.265 0.105  0.307 0.080 *** 0.271 
Spaina 0.412 0.492 0.420  0.494 0.393 *** 0.489 0.377 *** 0.485 
Germanya 0.293 0.455 0.329 *** 0.470 0.311 *** 0.463 0.370 *** 0.483 
Belgiuma 0.129 0.335 0.136  0.343 0.119 ** 0.324 0.125  0.331 
Advanced 
knowledge 
id a 
0.236 0.425 0.328 *** 0.470 0.238  0.426 0.271 *** 0.445 
Mass production 
goodsa 
0.345 0.475 0.368 *** 0.482 0.339  0.474 0.361 ** 0.480 
Supporting 
infrastructure 
i a 
0.162 0.369 0.100 *** 0.300 0.138 *** 0.345 0.155  0.362 
Personal goods and 
servicesa 
0.257 0.437 0.204 *** 0.403 0.285 *** 0.451 0.213 *** 0.409 
N 4,933   1,932     2,522     2,535     
a Dummy variable. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) respectively. 
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Table D 2: Results of Tobit estimations for the full sample (Continued from Table 4.5) 
 
Share of sales of market 
novelties 
Share of sales of firm 
novelties 
 I II 
Greecea -0.022  -0.070 *** 
 (0.037)  (0.031)  
Portugala 0.109 *** -0.081 *** 
 (0.022)     (0.022)     
Spaina 0.085 *** 0.109 *** 
 (0.017)     (0.015)     
Germanya 0.066 *** 0.058 *** 
 (0.017)     (0.014)     
Advanced knowledge providersa 0.028 ** 0.031 * 
 (0.014)     (0.016)     
Mass production goodsa 0.020  0.024 * 
 (0.012)     (0.014)     
Supporting infrastructure servicesa 0.003  0.011     
 (0.016)     (0.017)     
Wald-Test on joint significance of 
industry dummies W(χ2(3)) = 4.99 W(χ2(3)) = 4.37 
R2McFadden 0.14 0.12 
N 4,933 4,933 
LR/Wald chi2 306.82 288.90 
P-value 0.00 0.00 
Log likelihood -1,872.29 -2,351.57 
LR - Test on heteroscedasticity LR(χ2(10)) = 3745*** LR(χ2(10)) = 4703*** 
a Dummy variable. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) respectively. Heteroscedasticity terms include 3 dummies for firm size measured by sales in 1998 (log) (0-24th percentile, 25th 
-49th percentile, 50th -74th percentile), country dummies and industry dummies. 
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Table D 3: Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
A Science-driven search (scale) 1                
B Supplier-driven search (scale) 0 1               
C Market-driven search (scale) 0 0 1              
D R&D intensity 0.218 0.019 0.041 1             
E Continuous R&D activitiesa 0.325 0.054 0.164 0.263 1            
F Export intensity 0.145 0.003 0.109 0.011 0.266 1           
G Sales 1998 (log) 0.189 0.005 0.103 -0.109 0.285 0.279 1          
H Part of company groupa 0.156 -0.060 0.060 -0.007 0.191 0.179 0.478 1         
I Process innovationa 0.063 0.119 -0.018 -0.030 0.081 0.060 0.148 0.068 1        
J Greecea -0.082 0.045 -0.097 -0.078 -0.094 -0.203 -0.184 -0.140 0.022 1       
K Portugala -0.058 0.029 -0.089 -0.073 -0.111 0.048 -0.079 -0.039 0.100 -0.089 1      
L Spaina 0.028 -0.060 -0.082 0.063 -0.006 -0.055 -0.039 -0.028 -0.067 -0.225 -0.277 1     
M Germanya 0.049 0.042 0.219 -0.007 0.108 -0.042 0.180 0.035 0.005 -0.173 -0.214 -0.539 1    
N Advanced knowledge providersa 0.194 -0.007 0.095 0.285 0.186 0.033 -0.151 -0.009 -0.073 -0.024 -0.106 -0.050 0.098 1   
O Mass production goodsa 0.032 -0.010 0.042 -0.059 0.099 0.187 0.079 0.051 0.026 -0.050 0.029 -0.011 -0.001 -0.403 1  
P Supporting infrastructure servicesa -0.140 -0.071 -0.014 -0.104 -0.185 -0.236 0.142 0.109 0.011 -0.008 -0.006 -0.111 0.101 -0.245 -0.319 1 
VIFb 1.22 1.04 1.10 1.21 1.41 1.37 1.68 1.36 1.06 1.63 1.69 2.73 2.59 1.77 1.64 1.58 
Mean VIF 1.57                
N 4,933                
a Dummy variable. b Variance Inflation Factor. 
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